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Abstract
A current and popular view of the relationship between areas of the mind-brain sciences is one
where inter-communication and cross-disciplinary collaboration is required to advance
epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain. My goal in this dissertation is to analyze what
it means for information from different areas of science to fit together to produce strong
epistemic claims by addressing how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are
corroborated in scientific practice. Philosophers of science have advanced various concepts of
the notion of fitting together information from different areas of science and its relation to
scientific progress (e.g., Bickle, 1998, 2003, 2006; Darden and Maull, 1977; Mitchell, 2002,
2003; Mitchell and Dietrich, 2006; Nagel 1949, 1970, 1979; Piccinini and Craver, 2011; and
Roskies, 2010). However, each of these concepts are vague and subject to multiple clarificatory
questions. To get a handle on the notion of fitting together and its ability to produce
epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain, I introduce the term ‘interdisciplinary
corroboration’ as a placeholder for the various accounts of fitting together to facilitate my
investigation of how claims about the mind-brain are corroborated by interdisciplinary evidence
in practice. To address this question, I argue that looking at review papers (specifically, Trends
in Cognitive Sciences review papers) is a good place to begin analyzing interdisciplinary
corroboration. Accordingly, I conduct a two-part analysis of a Trends in Cognitive Sciences
review paper by Eichenbaum (2013) entitled ‘Memory on Time’ structured around what
Eichenbaum does and does not do to support the claims he advances about spatio-temporal
memory organization. My analysis revealed that critical information was missing to adequately
assess the extent to which the claims about memory organization were corroborated in
Eichenbaum’s paper. I use the lessons from my analysis to develop and advance a methodology
for philosophers of science interested in knowledge production for evaluating review papers for
corroboration in the mind-brain sciences.

Key Words: Philosophy of Neuroscience, Philosophy of Science, Mind-Brain Sciences,
Interdisciplinary Corroboration, Review Papers, Systematic Review Papers, Meta-Analysis,
Spatio-Temporal Organization of Memory, Scientific Progress, Scientific Explanation.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The mind-brain sciences comprises multiple areas of science (e.g., psychology, biology,
computational modelling and artificial intelligence, neuroscience, etc.). It has been argued by
philosophers of the mind-brain sciences that claims about the mind-brain stand on firm epistemic
footing (i.e., that they are well supported) when they are the product of evidence from those
respective areas of the mind-brain sciences fitting together. However, the philosophical accounts
advocating the notion of fitting together lack a clear explanation as to what constitutes fitting
together; what does it mean for pieces of evidence from different areas of science to fit together
in such a way that produces epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain? How and to what
extent are claims about the mind-brain corroborated in scientific practice? This is the main
question I address in my dissertation. I introduce the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ as a
placeholder for the various philosophical accounts of fitting together to facilitate my
investigation of what it means for claims to be corroborated by interdisciplinary evidence in the
mind-brain sciences. My definition of interdisciplinary corroboration reads that claims about the
mind-brain are corroborated when interdisciplinary pieces of evidence point towards a general
claim and when those pieces of evidence are mutually supportive. I argue that review papers
(specifically, Trends in Cognitive Sciences review papers) are a good place to start investigating
interdisciplinary corroboration insofar as these papers often contain arguments demonstrating
how interdisciplinary evidence combines to corroborate a given claim. To get clear on how
exactly this occurs, I conducted a two-part analysis of a review paper by Eichenbaum (2013)
entitled ‘Memory on Time’ on the topic of memory organization (i.e., how memories are
organized in space and time). My analysis revealed that key information was missing in the
review paper that is necessary to properly assess how and to what extent claims about memory
organization are corroborated. I use the lessons from my analysis to develop and advance a
methodology for evaluating review papers with an eye for corroboration in the mind-brain
sciences.
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Preface
Multiple areas of the mind-brain sciences (e.g., psychology, cognitive science, biology,
neuroscience, etc.) aim to advance knowledge about how the brain realizes psychological
functions (e.g., decision making, memory, language, etc.). Kaplan (2017) has noted both
scientists and philosophers of science alike concede that understanding the relationship between
the different areas comprising the mind-brain sciences is critical for scientific progress. The
current and dominant view of the relationship between the different areas of the mind-brain
science is one where inter-communication and cross-disciplinary collaboration is required to
advance epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain1.
In this dissertation, I am interested in the integrative and collaborative relationship between
different areas of the mind-brain science and how this relationship results in epistemically strong
claims about the mind-brain. My goal in this dissertation is to analyze what it means for
information from different areas of science to fit together in such a way that results in
epistemically strong claims by addressing the question of how and to what extent claims about
the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific practice.
This question was prompted by numerous accounts of scientific progress emphasizing the notion
of interdisciplinary pieces of evidence fitting together in such a way that the resulting claim
about the mind-brain stands on firm epistemic footing. That is, I noticed many accounts of
progress in the philosophy of the mind-brain sciences argue that strong epistemic claims are the
result of interdisciplinary evidence fitting together in such a way that the resulting claim is
corroborated.

1

A note on how I use the term ‘mind-brain’ is necessary. I am concerned primarily with how claims from different
areas of the mind-brain sciences fit together in such a way that a claim about the mind-brain is corroborated. Due
to this, and the fact that much of my analysis deals with scientific studies, I use the word ‘mind’ in the way that
scientists in the mind-brain sciences use the term, i.e., to refer to cognitive processes/functions and states
occurring within an organism that are ‘causally responsible for but not identical to’ that organism’s behavior
(Sullivan 2014,48). It is this set of states and processes that scientists in the mind-brain sciences investigate.
While the goal of the sciences is often stated in terms of ‘understanding the mind’, scientists typically break this
down into ‘understanding an aspect of the mind’. By aspect of the mind I mean either a cognitive state (e.g.,
feeling happy, feeling hungry, etc.) or a cognitive process (e.g., procedural memory, decision-making, etc.). Thus,
when I discuss how the mind-brain (or an aspect of the mind-brain) works, I understand these questions as
referring to how the brain realizes psychological functions.

viii

To better understand this phenomenon, I begin in chapter one by laying down the relevant
motivation and background for my dissertation by surveying the history of different accounts of
scientific progress emphasizing the fitting together of results from different areas of science as an
integral part of scientific progress and strong explanations. I review some reductionist (Nagel
1949, 1961, 1979; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006) and non-reductionist (Darden and Maull, 1977;
Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Roskies 2010)
accounts of the relationship between areas of science emphasizing the phenomena of fitting
together. While the surveyed accounts advance different concepts and descriptions of fitting
together and what it entails for scientific progress, ultimately, both reductionist and nonreductionist accounts alike recognize the importance of collaboration amongst different areas of
science such that evidence from each area be fit together (in some respect) to yield strong
epistemic claims about the mind-brain.
A note on the scope and purpose of this chapter. There are many more accounts of scientific
progress and fitting together than I survey in chapter one; I flag these accounts in footnote seven
of chapter one. Including every and all accounts emphasizing the notion of different areas of
science fitting together for scientific progress would go beyond the scope of my first chapter.
Accordingly, I selected some key reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress to
demonstrate that despite different concepts of fitting together, a common assumption underlying
these accounts is that epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain require evidence from
different areas of science to fit together in some way.
Despite this consensus, the accounts of fitting together that I survey are vague and elicit
numerous questions as to how exactly this fitting together occurs. For example, it is unclear
what criteria must be met in order to confidently assert that pieces of evidence fit together in
such a way that its resulting claim stands on strong epistemic footing.
To get a handle on the nature of fitting together in the mind-brain sciences, I introduce the term
‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ (hereafter IC) in chapter two as a placeholder for what I think
philosophers of science have been gesturing towards but have yet to analyze in depth. I
introduce this term as a working definition whereby IC occurs when the results of different areas
of the mind-brain sciences (using different protocols, methods, etc.) corroborate some claim
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about the mind-brain insofar as they all generally point towards a similar claim and insofar as
those pieces of evidence are mutually supportive.
Given that IC is a working definition, it too requires elaboration. To shed light on the nature of
IC, I suggest looking for instances of it in scientific practice. Specifically, I recommend looking
at review papers, which are units of analysis surveying literature from a variety of areas of
science on a given topic. While some review papers consist solely of a literature summary, other
review papers include explanations and arguments. These arguments, which may be implicit or
explicit, can involve showing how a given claim is corroborated by the literature surveyed in the
review paper; because authors of review papers frequently cite interdisciplinary findings in their
summary, and because they sometimes demonstrate how those findings corroborate a claim
about the mind-brain, review papers are strong candidates to begin investigating the nature of
interdisciplinary corroboration. Put differently, they are a good place to start investigating how
and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific practice.
I argue that while there are numerous types of review papers on offer in the mind-brain sciences,
looking at a Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper is an ideal starting point to begin my
investigation insofar as it contains components indicative of IC (i.e., the author of a review paper
in Trends in Cognitive Sciences surveys interdisciplinary findings and sometimes includes
arguments about how those findings fit together to corroborate a claim about the mind-brain).
A note on the scope of this chapter. In chapter two, I consider two options for beginning my
investigation of how claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific practice – i.e., a
Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper and a Frontier in Neuroscience systematic review
paper. I argue are both well-suited for the task of investigating IC. However, due to the scope of
my dissertation, I decided to focus on a Trends in Cognitive Sciences review to begin the process
of investigating how, and to what extent, claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in
scientific practice. I acknowledge, in chapter four, different avenues of research one could
undertake in exploring the epistemic role of units of analysis that function to corroborate claims
about the mind-brain and their implications for scientific progress. This includes extending my
project by comparing a Trends in Cognitive Sciences paper with a Frontiers in Neuroscience
systematic review paper to discern whether the additional components of the latter (i.e., adhering
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to systematic review guidelines and/or including a meta-analysis) increase the integrity of the
corroboration of the claims they advance about the mind-brain.
To better understand how claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in a Trends in Cognitive
Sciences review paper, I conducted a two-part analysis of a review paper entitled ‘Memory on
Time’ (2013) (hereafter referred to as the case study) by Eichenbaum in chapters three and four.
Critically, I began my analysis in chapter three with a general understanding of how a Trends in
Cognitive Sciences review paper works; this came from the descriptive work I provided for the
different kinds of review papers found in mind-brain science journals in chapter two.
Furthermore, my analysis is guided by some cursory criteria such as the following questions:
“what is the main aim of the review paper”, “what claims does Eichenbaum defend”, “how does
Eichenbaum show support for his claims”, “what kind of arguments does Eichenbaum provide”,
and “does the case study represent a strong example of interdisciplinary corroboration”?
Guided by these questions, I structured chapter three around the work Eichenbaum does in the
case study to defend the claims he advances. This work primarily consists of Eichenbaum
stating findings from various interdisciplinary studies which he states support a given claim
about memory organization. His arguments for the corroboration of these claims are implied by
the language and terms he used to introduce findings for a given claim and to advance specific
claims about memory organization. For example, when introducing evidence for claim x,
Eichenbaum states that there is ‘substantial evidence’ supporting x, thus conveying to the reader
that there are good reasons to take x as corroborated (since it is supported by substantial
interdisciplinary evidence) (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).2 My analysis of these terms indicated that
the kind of corroboration in the case study was one where the claims were not to be understood
as true, but instead as highly probable, approximately true, etc. Further, I argue because the cited
findings are interdisciplinary and because they are published in high-calibre mind-brain journals
with high impact factors and citation rates, the cited findings constitute reliable pieces of
information (thus increasing the integrity of the corroboration of the claims in the case study). I

2

Where x represents one of the claims contained within ‘Memory on Time’ (Eichenbaum 2013).
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note that, prima facie, the case study appears to represent a strong example of interdisciplinary
corroboration.
As I conducted my analysis in chapter three, which indicated Eichenbaum’s argument for the
claims he advances in the case study depended on critical terms such as ‘substantial evidence’, I
began to notice that certain pieces of information were missing from Eichenbaum’s argument
that could potentially undermine the case study representing a clear case of IC (ibid).
Specifically, I began to wonder about the following questions: “what counts as substantial
evidence”, “what is meant by consistency in the case study”, and “how are anomalies factored
into the findings supporting the claims found in the case study”. These questions led me to
conduct part two of my analysis in chapter four, where I address these questions and their
implications for interdisciplinary corroboration.
Thus, my analysis in chapter three structured around the work Eichenbaum did to support the
claims he advances prompted questions concerning just how clearly the case study represented a
clear instance of IC. To better analyze how and to what extent corroboration occurs in the case
study, I structured my analysis in chapter four around what features were missing in the case
study (i.e., what Eichenbaum does not do to support the claims he advances).3 For example, I
noted that definitions for terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘consistency’ were lacking; this is
critical because Eichenbaum’s implicit arguments hinges on these terms (ibid). I argued that if
these key terms are not defined, it is difficult to discern whether and to what extent the claims in
the case study are corroborated. I elaborated on the questions “what counts as substantial
evidence”, “what is meant by consistency in the case study”, and “how are anomalies factored
into the findings supporting the claims in the case study” in this chapter, and, in elaborating on
these, it struck me that another important factor missing in the case study was an evaluation of
the methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites. I then demonstrate how all of these missing
pieces of information complicate the case study representing a clear case of interdisciplinary
corroboration.

3

These missing features were determined by the questions and concerns that arose in conducting my analysis in
chapter three.
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From my analysis, I extracted three key lessons. The first lesson is that the fundamental
assumptions shared by both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress that I
surveyed in chapter one – i.e., that epistemically strong claims are the result of evidence from
different areas of science fitting together – is complex, and not nearly as straightforward as the
literature makes it out to be. The second lesson is that my analysis prompts a revised definition
of interdisciplinary corroboration. Interdisciplinary corroboration should now be understood as a
phenomenon whereby findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain insofar as they are
interdisciplinary, mutually supportive, and rule out coincidence, errors, and alternative
hypotheses, and all point towards a similar claim. Finally, the third lesson emerging from my
analysis is that certain critical pieces of information are missing to adequately assess the extent
to which the claims Eichenbaum advances in the case study are corroborated.
After conducting my analysis and extracting its key lessons, I recognized that the questions and
concerns I raise in chapter four would be helpful in evaluating future/different review papers for
corroboration. From this, I advanced a methodology comprising an itemized list of questions to
direct towards the evaluation of review papers for corroboration.
A note on the nature of my methodology is warranted. The methodology I advance in chapter
four is meant as a working framework. In chapter two, I highlighted multiple types of units of
analysis that could be considered for investigating interdisciplinary corroboration. However, due
to the scope of my dissertation, I began my investigation of interdisciplinary corroboration via a
Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper. Accordingly, the methodology I advance pertains
primarily to this kind of unit of analysis. As more research is conducted on the different units of
analysis in the mind-brain sciences and interdisciplinary corroboration, I expect my methodology
to be revised, and my definition of IC to become sharper.
I conclude, in chapter five, by summing up the dissertation, acknowledging its limitations, and
noting the contributions of my dissertation for the mind-brain sciences and, more generally, for
the philosophy of science and empirically engaged philosophy of mind.
A final note on what I am not trying to accomplish in this dissertation is necessary. I am not
trying to establish whether any of the main claims Eichenbaum defends are true; nor is it my goal
to assess the scientific rigor of Eichenbaum’s paper. The purpose of the dissertation is also not
xiii

to ascertain which of the surveyed accounts in the first chapter most accurately captures the
nature of interdisciplinary corroboration in the mind-brain sciences. Instead, my main goal is to
analyze one aspect of the nature of the integrationist relationship of the different areas
comprising the mind-brain sciences by asking what it means for different pieces of evidence to
fit together in a way that yields strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain. I introduced a
case study of a Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper to see what lessons can be learned
regarding the nature of interdisciplinary corroboration. My analysis revealed that critical
information is missing to adequately assess the extent to which corroboration has occurred, and,
accordingly, I advanced an itemized list as a methodology for philosophers of science interested
in knowledge production to consult when analyzing review papers for corroboration.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
Multiple fields of science comprising the mind-brain sciences (e.g., psychology, cognitive
science, neuroscience, biology, etc.) aim to understand and advance knowledge about the mindbrain.4 Kaplan (2017) notes there is consensus between both scientists and philosophers alike
that “… understanding the complex relationship between neuroscience and psychological science
…” is critical for achieving progress in the mind-brain sciences (1).5
During the pinnacle of computational cognitive psychology (i.e., the mid-20th century), the
relationship between these fields was viewed as one of autonomy (ibid). In other words, the
respective phenomena of investigation, methods, and theories of each area of science were held
to be completely independent from each other. There was thus no need for interdisciplinary
collaboration or cross-field projects (ibid).
This understanding of the relationship between the different fields of mind-brain sciences has
recently undergone substantial change. Nowadays, the autonomy view of the mind-brain
sciences is considerably less popular. Instead, the autonomy view has been replaced by a
characterization which sees the relationship as one of ‘complete disciplinary integration and
interdependence’ (ibid).
In discussing various positions on the debate over which ontology of the mind-brain is the
correct one, Anderson (2015) notes that all positions in this debate reject the traditional view of
the autonomy of psychology and neuroscience (70). Thus, there is currently a general rejection
of the autonomy view of the relations between different areas of the mind-brain sciences.
Churchland and Sejnowski (2000) state whereas it was previously held that discoveries and
explanations at the neuronal and the cognitive level were considered completely separate and of

4

As I note in my preface, my use of the term ‘mind-brain’ throughout this dissertation refers to understanding
how the brain realizes psychological functions.
5

Kaplan (2017) typically refers to the relationship in question as consisting of the relationship between
neuroscience and psychology. Unless otherwise specified, when I refer to this relationship, I understand it in the
broader sense of comprising the multiple areas housed under the mind-brain sciences. These include but are not
limited to: computer science and artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, biology, neurobiology,
neurophysiology, linguistics, etc.

1

little ‘academic significance’ to the other, there is now consensus amongst scientists that the time
is ripe for the convergence of the mind-brain sciences (14). Kaplan (2017) attributes this shift to
the birth of cognitive neuroscience, where from the beginning, contributors of the cognitive
neuroscience movement (such as Michael S. Gazzaniga and George A. Miller who coined the
term ‘cognitive neuroscience’ in 1979) acknowledged the ‘integrative and interdisciplinary’
character of the emerging field which shared the goal of trying to understand the mind-brain
(Kaplan 2017, 2).6
Similarly, Boone and Piccinini (2016) argue against the traditional cognitive science view of
explanations as distinct and autonomous; instead, they maintain that explanations in cognitive
neuroscience must integrate the “… computational and representational functions and structures
across multiple levels of organization in order to explain cognition” (1509). The research
strategy appealed to in cognitive neuroscience, according to Churchland and Sejnowski, is
neither top-down nor bottom-up, but is instead best understood as an interaction between the
various fields in the mind-brain sciences whereby research from one field provides
“…constraints, corrections, and inspiration for research at other levels” (Churchland and
Sejnowski 2000, 14).7
6

In a letter correspondence to Michael S. Gazzaniga from George A. Miller, Miller defines cognitive neuroscience
as the following: “Cognitive neuroscientists attempt to discover the molecular logic of organic knowledge systems,
i.e., the principles that, in addition to the principles of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, govern the
behavior of inanimate matter in living knowledge systems” (Gazzaniga 2000, 11).
7

Churchland and Sejnowski note that there are at minimum three different definitions of the term ‘levels’
(Churchland and Sejnowski 2000, 14). They highlight: levels of analysis, levels of organization, and levels of
processing. Briefly, levels of analysis refers to the conceptual distinctions in terms of the different types of
questions one can ask about a given phenomenon. Marr and Poggio (1977) distinguish three respective levels of
analysis: the computational level (which decomposes a task into its main parts), the algorithmic level (which
stipulates a form procedure to perform the task) and the level of physical implementation (Churchland and
Sejnowski 2000, 14). The level of organization refers to how those three levels of analysis ‘map onto the nervous
system’. The structure of the nervous system involves “… molecules, synapses, neurons, networks, layers, maps,
and systems. The range of structural organization implies, therefore, that there are many levels of implementation
and that each has its companion task description” (ibid, 15). The implications of the structural organization of the
nervous systems are that because there are as many types of task descriptions as there are levels of structure, the
algorithmic level as well as the level of implementation are ‘over simplified’ (ibid). Critically, the levels of structural
organization, while conceptually separable, cannot be physically separated. For example, they note that attention
can rely on mechanisms at various levels; some may be found at the level of a local neural network, while others
may be housed within (a) broader neural system(s) found in multiple locations of the brain (ibid). Finally, the level
of processing is described as there being different degrees of information processing depending on the distance
between the responding cells and the sensory input. As an example of fruitful integration of levels between
different fields of the mind-brain sciences, Churchland and Sejnowski advance a case study of color vision whereby
different theories were proven correct, but at different levels of structural organization (ibid 17-18).

2

Thus, the current and popular view of the relationship between the different fields of the mindbrain sciences is integrationist, interdisciplinary, and non-autonomous. This characterization
allots a fundamental role to the notion of ‘fitting together’ for explanation and progress in the
mind-brain sciences. That is, to understand an aspect of the mind-brain, pieces of evidence from
different areas of the mind-brain science must fit together in some way to produce epistemically
strong claims about the mind-brain; this is part and parcel of the view of the relationship between
the mind-brain sciences being integrative, collaborative, and non-autonomous.
My goal in this dissertation is to assess and analyze this integrative nature of the mind-brain
sciences; to tackle the question of what it means for different areas of the mind-brain sciences to
be fit together in such a way that yields epistemically strong claims, thereby advancing
knowledge of the mind-brain.8
My aim in this chapter primarily motivational; here, I review the history of different accounts of
scientific progress emphasizing the phenomena of fitting together and highlight a key problem
shared by the surveyed accounts. I begin in section 1.1 and 1.1.2 by reviewing some reductionist
(Nagel 1949, 1961, 1979; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006) and non-reductionist (Darden and Maull,
1977; Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Roskies
2010) accounts of the relationship between areas of the mind-brain sciences emphasizing the
fitting together of evidence from different areas of science as critical for scientific progress and
strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain.9 In section 1.2, I evaluate the surveyed accounts

Thus, when Churchland and Sejnowski (2000) claim that different fields comprising the mind-brain sciences (which
often work at different levels) interact with each other by providing “… constraints, corrections, and inspiration for
research at other levels” they mean that this type of interdisciplinary interaction will lead to ‘a chain of models
linking adjacent levels’, ultimately providing us with a more comprehensive picture of how some feature of the
mind-brain works (ibid, 14, 21).
8

My goal for my dissertation and the question of how pieces of interdisciplinary evidence fit together to yield
strong claims about the mind-brain was motivated by Sullivan’s (2009) work on experimental protocols and her
(2016) work on construct stabilization. Specifically, Sullivan’s (2009, 2016) skepticism towards accounts of
scientific progress claiming that results from different areas of the mind-brain sciences fit neatly together to yield
claims about the mind-brain that stand on firm epistemic footing, led me to think more critically about how the
concept of fitting together actually occurs in scientific practice.
9

Reviewing each and every reductionist and non-reductionist account of progress and interdisciplinary fitting
together would be far beyond the scope of my dissertation. For more reductive accounts c.f., Churchland’s notion
of ‘co-evolution’ (1986), Hooker’s ‘general theory of reduction’ (1981), Schaffner’s ‘general reduction paradigm’
(1967), and his revised ‘general reduction-replacement model’ (1992); for non-reductive accounts c.f., the notion
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and highlight the common assumption underlying all accounts – namely, that progress is made
when results from different areas of science are fit together yielding complete and strong
epistemic claims. I then identify a key problem with this assumption; specifically, the notions of
fitting together advanced by the surveyed accounts are vague and under-analyzed. I sum up this
chapter in section 1.3, by noting why it is important to analyze this assumption and to get a
handle on the notion of fitting together.

1.1 Historical Reviews of Scientific Progress in the Mind-Brain Sciences (Some
Reductionist Approaches)
Reductionism is a popular account of explanation that offers a model for the relationship
between different areas of science. Historically, reductionism was brought to the forefront of
philosophy of science with the alleged reduction of Newtonian mechanics to Einstein’s special
theory of relativity, chemistry to atomic physics, gas laws to statistical mechanics, etc. (Curd and
Cover 1998, 903). Nagel spearheaded reductionism by proposing a model of inter-theoretic
reduction (Nagel 1949, 1961, 1979). Nagel believed that reductionism enabled a special kind of
understanding; one which constituted/led to an ‘important scientific achievement’ (Nagel 1949,
123).10 Briefly, Nagel took reductionism as an explanatory relation holding between two
theories whereby one theory is derivable from the other, with the help of bridge laws (when
applicable). Such a relation holds only if two formal conditions plus an essential condition are
met; if one or more conditions are not satisfied, the alleged reduction would fail (Nagel 1949,
1979). I will first consider each condition in detail, and then discuss Nagel’s inter-theoretic
model of reduction and its relation to the concepts of fitting together and scientific progress.
As stated above, Nagel construed reductionism as an explanatory relation holding between the
theories of two sciences whereby one theory is derivable from the other. Nagel took the set of
theories and/or experimental laws comprising the reduced theory as the ‘secondary science’, and
the theory which enables the reduction as the ‘primary science’ (Nagel 1949, 107; Nagel 1979,
338). On Nagel’s view, a reduction occurs when the claims of a secondary sciences’

of ‘cross-disciplinary patterns’ by Bechtel (1986), ‘decomposition’ by Bechtel and Richardson (1993), ‘integration’
by Boone and Piccinini (2016), ‘coordinated contributions’ by Hastings et al. (2014), and the notion of ‘robustness’
by Wimsatt (1980, 2007).
10

Nagel contrasts ‘important scientific achievement’ with ‘trivial scientific accomplishments’, which are often ad
hoc in nature (Nagel 1949, 123). I elaborate on the two types of achievements shortly.
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theories/experimental laws are demonstrated to be the logical consequence of the fundamental
claims of the primary science. This is the first formal condition of reduction – the derivability
condition. That is, the claims from the secondary science are logically derivable from those of
the primary science.
Nagel identifies two main types of reductions (i.e., homogenous and heterogenous), each of
which have different implications for the derivability condition (Nagel 1979, 339). The former
kind of reduction occurs when “… the laws of the secondary science employ no descriptive
terms that are not also used with approximately the same meanings in the primary science.
Reductions of this type can therefore be regarded as establishing deductive relations between two
sets of statements that employ a homogenous vocabulary” (ibid). These reductions are relatively
unproblematic since the two sciences share (more or less) the same descriptive terms.
Accordingly, the derivability condition can be easily satisfied (Nagel 1949, 103).
As an example of a homogenous reduction, Nagel cites the reduction of Galilean science to
Newtonian mechanics. Nagel notes while it is undoubtedly true that one can differentiate
between the subject matters of Galilean science and Newtonian mechanics, there is an important
sense in which these subject matters are ‘homogenous and continuous’ (ibid). That is, both
sciences are inquiring into the motions of bodies and the causal underpinnings of these motions,
and there are no descriptive terms that appear in Galilean science that do not also appear with
approximately the same meaning in Newtonian mechanics (ibid). Thus, because there are no
terms which are discontinuous (i.e., the terms in the former possess more or less the same
meaning as those found in the latter), the derivation of the secondary science to the primary
science is uncomplicated and uncontroversial (ibid 103-104; Nagel 1979, 338).
Heterogenous reductions, however, are more complicated and are a source of great ‘intellectual
discomfort’ (Nagel 1979, 338). This discomfort is in part due to the fact that the subject matters
between the primary and secondary science are ‘qualitatively discontinuous’ and that “… the
secondary science employs in its formulations of laws and theories a number of distinctive
descriptive predicates that are not included in the basic theoretical terms or in the associated
rules of correspondence of a primary science” (ibid, 342).
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As an example of a heterogenous case, Nagel cites the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical
mechanics. Specifically, the terms ‘temperature’ ‘heat’ and ‘entropy’ as well as other general
assumptions found in the former are not present in nor entailed by principles in mechanics.
(Nagel 1949, 121, and Nagel 1979, 342-343). The discontinuity of subject matter and
descriptive terms makes satisfying the derivability condition impossible. This is because,
according to Klee (1999), the principles of logic stipulate that “… no term can appear in the
conclusion of a formal demonstration unless the term also appears in the premises” (112). The
only way the derivability condition can be satisfied for heterogenous reductions is by satisfying
Nagel’s second formal condition: the connectability condition (Nagel 1949, 119).
The connectability condition requires that one establish a ‘proper kind of relation’ between those
expressions contained in the laws of the secondary science and the fundamental principles of the
primary science (ibid, 120). This relation – also known as a bi-conditional bridge law – can be
understood in one of two ways: either as a logical relation whereby a term in the secondary
science is related to some expression in the primary science via synonymity or entailment, or, by
adopting a material or physical hypothesis whereby “… the occurrence of the properties
designated by some expression in the premises of the primary science is a sufficient, or necessary
and sufficient, condition for the occurrence of the properties designated by the expression of the
secondary discipline” (ibid). Thus, if there is some term/expression x in the experimental laws of
the secondary science not found in the theoretical assumptions of the primary science, a suitable
relation/bridge law must be established between x and the theoretical assumptions of the primary
science. In the case of a material or physical hypothesis, however, because the meaning of the
term/expression contained in the secondary science cannot be demonstrated as ‘analytically
related’ to the expression in the primary science, the material or physical hypothesis is at best,
‘contingently true’ (ibid, 121).
Nagel examines the two possible relations via the derivation of the Boyle-Charles law from the
kinetic theory of gases. Nagel notes that the term ‘temperature’ – which, for the sake of
simplicity, Nagel considers as the sole term occurring in the laws of the secondary science that
does not occur in the expressions of the primary science – as used in thermodynamics is neither
synonymous with, nor entailed by the expression ‘mean kinetic energy’ (ibid). Accordingly, a
successful deduction would require that an additional assumption be introduced, and in this case
6

that assumption would come in the form of an empirical hypothesis stating “… a determinate
factual connection between two properties of physical systems that are in principle independently
identifiable …” (ibid).
Nagel considers the reduction of a secondary science to a primary science to be constitutive of an
‘important scientific achievement’ crucial for scientific progress (ibid, 123). However, the
satisfaction of the two formal conditions does not guarantee an important scientific achievement.
Nagel notes: “For if the premises of an alleged primary science could be selected quite
arbitrarily, subject only to formal requirements that have been mentioned thus far, the logical
deduction of the laws of a secondary science from such premises selected ad hoc would in most
cases represent only a trivial scientific accomplishment” (ibid, second emphasis mine). Since a
trivial scientific accomplishment would be largely inconsequential to scientific progress, Nagel
introduced an essential condition, which requires the assumptions of the primary science be
empirically supported by evidence that has ‘some measure of adequacy’ (ibid).11 Nagel
elaborates on the essential condition by returning to the example of the reduction of
thermodynamics to mechanics:
It is well known that the general assumption according to which physical bodies in different
states of aggregation are systems of molecules is confirmed by a large number of wellestablished facts of chemistry and of molar physics, facts which are not primarily about
thermal properties of bodies. Accordingly, the adoption of this hypothesis for the special task
of accounting for the thermal behavior of gases is in line with the normal strategy of the
natural sciences to extend the use of ideas fruitful in one set of inquiries into related domains.
Similarly, the fundamental principles of mechanics, which serve as partial premises in the
reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics, are supported by evidence drawn from many
fields of study distinct from the study of gases (ibid, 124, emphases mine).
I will now unpack this quote in the context of Nagel’s inter-theoretic reduction model to draw
out some implications of his model for the notion of fitting and scientific progress. To see how
fitting together contributes to scientific progress, it is helpful to consider Nagel’s distinction
between good and bad science.
11

Nagel says no more here on what is meant by adequacy, stating that it is an issue beyond the scope of his work.
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Bad science is the product of unsuccessful and ad hoc reductions; bad science results in trivial
scientific accomplishments (ibid, 123). Good science, on the other hand, is the product of
successful reductions and results in important scientific achievements (ibid). A successful
reduction requires the two formal conditions plus an essential condition are satisfied. The
essential condition requires assumptions in the primary science to be supported by empirical
evidence that possesses a certain degree of adequacy (ibid). Nagel provides no explanation of
what he means by ‘adequacy’, but at the very least, Nagel seems committed to the idea that
assumptions are empirically adequate to the extent that they are well-confirmed, and assumptions
are well-confirmed to the extent that there is evidence from multiple fields of science supporting
them. In Nagel’s example of the reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics (quoted above), he
states the assumptions of mechanics (i.e., the primary science) are supported by numerous
different fields of study; this is where the notion of fitting together enters into Nagel’s model of
inter-theoretic reduction and scientific progress. That is, if the assumptions of the primary
science are not empirically supported by different areas of science, the essential condition is not
satisfied. If this condition is not satisfied, the reduction is unsuccessful. By this, Nagel seems to
imply that for the assumptions of the primary science to be empirically adequate, they must be
supported by evidence from different areas of science. Thus, different areas of science must fit
together in such a way that they support/confirm the assumptions of the primary science. To the
extent that this occurs, the essential condition is satisfied. If the essential condition and formal
conditions are satisfied, a successful reduction occurs. This is important because Nagel takes
successful reductions as paradigmatic of important scientific achievements. This is the relation
of the notion of fitting together and scientific progress for Nagel’s inter-theoretic model of
reduction.
Another more recent account of reduction has been proposed in the mind-brain sciences by
Bickle (2003, 2006). Building on his 1998 book, Psychoneural Reduction, Bickle advances a
‘reductive-in-practice’ model in his (2003) Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly
Reductive Account, and again in his (2006) ‘Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating
the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience’. In these works,
Bickle argues that a ruthless reduction is ‘alive and thriving’ in the field of cellular and
molecular neuroscience and that in this field, low-level neuroscience can directly explain
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behavior via a methodology Bickle dubs ‘intervening molecularly and tracking behaviorally’
(hereafter the IMTB method) (Bickle 2003, 2-3; Bickle 2006, 411, 425).
One of the motivating factors behind Bickle’s works is to dispel the anti-reductionist worry that
low-level neuroscience is incapable of directly explaining behavior (Bickle 2006, 411). Drawing
on Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell’s (2000) Principles of Neural Science, Bickle argues that most
working neuroscientists agree with the main tenets of the textbook; namely, that it is, in fact,
possible to link psychological concepts to ‘molecular-biological mechanisms and pathways’
(Bickle 2006, 412). For Bickle, these links are constitutive of a ruthless reduction whereby
behavior is directly explained by low-level neuroscience.
A great deal of anti-reductionist push-back stems from a deep-seated doubt about the potential
for neuroscience to bypass multiple levels in one shot. That is, reduction in the mind-brain
sciences was traditionally understood as being composed of multiple levels such as the
behavioral level, the information processing level, the neuroanatomical level, etc.12 The thought
was that in order to claim a mind-to-molecules reduction, intermediary bridges needed to be
established between each and every level.13 However, Bickle argues, this step-by-step
reductionist picture is misguided and can be completely discarded once one shifts their focus to
work in cellular and molecular neuroscience. In this field, Bickle states: “… molecular
neuroscientists have developed experimental practices that bridge the behavioral to the molecular
pathway levels directly; and these practices are common to all recent empirical successes …”
(ibid, 414). Further, when one devotes attention to the field of cellular and molecular
neuroscience, it is demonstrably clear that a step-by-step level-based reduction is unnecessary
since there is a type of ruthless reduction that can and has bypassed multiple levels by explaining
behavior directly at the cellular/molecular level (ibid).
While Bickle never explicitly states that this kind of ruthless reduction constitutes scientific
progress, resulting in epistemically strong explanations about the mind-brain, it is implied by his
account of reduction. For instance, Bickle quotes the Principles of Neural Science (1991),
12

See Bickle’s (2006) figure 1 for a visual representation of this reduction via levels model on page 413.
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This seems akin to the picture Churchland and Sejnowski paint when they describe interdisciplinary interaction
as ‘a chain of models linking adjacent levels’, providing a more comprehensive explanation of the mind
(Churchland and Sejnowski 2000, 14).
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wherein Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell assert that the ultimate explanandum of the mind-brain
sciences is to discover and understand how the mind works (i.e., how it thinks, perceives,
remembers, processes, etc.) (Bickle 2003, 3). As stated above, Bickle notes that neuroscientists
already have experimental practices in place that bridge molecular pathways directly to behavior,
and that further, all successful empirical cases share these experimental practices (Bickle 2006,
414). It is those ‘bridges’ or ‘links’ that do the work required by Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell
(1991, 2000) to answer the ‘ultimate explanandum’ (i.e., the mind) (Bickle 2003, 3; Bickle 2006,
414).
What experimental methods are employed by working neuroscientists enabling them to explain
behavior to molecules directly? One of these methods is what Bickle dubs the ‘intervene
molecularly and track behaviorally’ method (hereafter the IMTB method). This method is of
great significance, since, for Bickle, this method is tantamount to, “… what “reductionism”
amounts to within the current discipline” (Bickle 2006, 425). The IMTB method provides a new
way to conceptualize reductionism contrasting with inter-theoretic options which dominated a
fair part of modern philosophy of science (ibid). The IMTB method is comprised of two parts:
first, one causally intervenes “… at the level of cellular activity or molecular pathways within
specific neurons …”, and second, one tracks “… the effects of these interventions under
controlled experimental conditions using behavioral protocols well accepted within experimental
psychology” (ibid). Bickle explains the implications of this method:
… this methodology constitutes an implicit condition on explanation in this field. One only
claims a successful explanation, a successful search for a cellular or molecular mechanism,
or a successful reduction, of a psychological kind when one successfully intervenes at the
lower level and then measures a statistically significant behavioral difference (ibid).
Bickle uses Kogan, Frankland, and Silva’s (2000) work on social recognition memory in
mammals to illustrate the IMTB method in practice. Kogan et al. (2000) intervened in the
cAMP-PKA-CREB pathway in mice by inserting a Neo gene which does not allow the activator
α and δ isoforms of the CREB molecule to develop (Bickle 2006, 420). Kogan et al. (2000) then
applied a “… hippocampus-dependent fear-conditioning memory task (memory for a novel
environmental context-foot shock association) …” to the CREBαδ− knock-outs which
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demonstrated impairment in long-term memory despite in-tact short-term memory (Bickle 2006,
421-422).14 Kogan et al. (2000) applied a behavioral paradigm developed by Thor and Holloway
(1982) to their work with CREBαδ− knock-out mice in addition to employing different
experimental control groups (Bickle 2006, 422). Their results demonstrated:
… CREBαδ—mutants displayed normal short-term social recognition memory for a juvenile
conspecific presented earlier. Thirty minutes after the initial exposure to it, they spent the
same amount of time (statistically) in stereotypic investigative interaction with the juvenile as
did the wild-type control adults. … However, CREBαδ—mutants were seriously impaired in
long-term recognition memory. In fact, the mutants spent the same amount of time
(statistically) investigating the same juvenile 24 h after initial exposure as they did during the
initial exposure. This result indicates complete long-term amnesia despite intact short termrecognition (ibid).
Bickle takes this result as confirmation of the claim that there is “… a molecular mechanism of
the consolidation switch for a cognitively robust kind of memory” (ibid). Thus, because
interventions at the molecular level (i.e., the cAMP-PKA-CREB pathway) allowed for the
tracking of targeted behavior (i.e., social recognition memory) via the ‘widely accepted’ Thor
and Holloway (1980) protocol for studying the nature of social recognition memory, Bickle
concludes by stating this example constitutes the gold standard for how hypotheses and claims
about the mind-brain can be confirmed reductively in a way that bypasses multi-level steps (by
moving directly from the cellular/molecular level to behavior)15 (ibid, 425-427).
However, if it is the case that Bickle’s account of reduction does away with different levels
involved in traditional accounts of reduction (e.g., work done at the information processing level,
the neuroanatomical level, etc.), each of which is studied by different fields of science, and we
can explain behavior directly by appeal to the cellular/molecular level, where does the concept of
fitting together come into play? Prima facie, it appears to have little to no role at all. That is, if
the ‘explanatory relevance’ of higher-level theorizing is abandoned in favor of the IMTB method
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See Bickle (2006) pages 420-425 for an in-depth explanation of Kogan et al.’s (2000) experiments and results.
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See Sullivan (2009) for a critique of Bickle’s reduction-in-practice model.
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and the levels held between behavior and molecules on the traditional view disappear, then there
seems to be no place for higher-level theorizing from different areas of the mind-brain sciences.
Importantly, in arguing for a ruthless reduction that bypasses multi-level steps, Bickle does not
advocate a wholescale elimination of high-level theorizing, but instead offers it a new job, so to
speak. He maintains that the methods employed by higher-level theorizing in contemporary
neuroscience such as fMRI, cognitive and computational modelling, neuropsychological
assessment, etc., are crucial for successful reductions (and ultimately achieving progress with
respect to understanding the mind-brain) (ibid, 427). Further, Bickle insists this kind of
theorizing and their respective methods are essential for explaining the link from molecules to
behavior, as the theorizing conducted at higher levels helps address critical questions such as the
following: “What are good experimental protocols for tracking behavioral outcomes for the
psychological phenomenon we seek the cellular and molecular mechanisms of … and “Where
shall we begin inserting our cellular and molecular interventions? (The possibility space in both
brains and intra-neuron molecular pathways is enormous!)” (ibid).
Bickle classifies these kinds of questions as heuristic, and accordingly, considers the role for
higher-level theorizing as one of heuristics (ibid). Bickle argues it would be quite difficult to
address these questions at the cellular/molecular level; that is, he takes these higher-level
questions as fundamental and ineliminable in the search for cellular and molecular mechanisms
(ibid). This interplay of higher-level theorizing about behavioral and/or cognitive phenomena,
along with the work conducted at the lower-level neuroscience level via the IMTB method,
demonstrates the importance of interdisciplinary fitting together for scientific progress and
strong explanations about the mind-brain. The phenomenon of fitting together, however, does
not sit at the level of the actual reduction itself (as it does with many inter-theoretic models of
reduction) but instead precedes it. That is:
… from a diachronic perspective on mind-brain science, investigation into a cognitive or
behavioral phenomenon initially looks like the approach illustrated in Fig. 1 with
investigations and explanations at multiple levels and the search for step-by-step linkages of
features down the level’s hierarchy. But when this methodology reaches candidate cellular or
molecular processes in specific neurons linked in the ways revealed by neuroanatomy,
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investigation shifts to the approach in Fig. 8. And when these investigations succeed, a
reduction of mind to molecular pathways is taken as established (ibid, 428).16
The role of higher-level theorizing comes into play in the early stages of investigation by
isolating the “… relevant neuroanatomy and the candidate cellular and molecular mechanisms
…” so that the work at the cellular/molecular level can proceed via the IMTB method (ibid).
While Bickle never explicitly argues this, his account seems to imply that if higher-level
theorizing were eliminated, then work at the cellular/molecular level would not get off the
ground, and thus the prospect of reducing mind to molecular pathways would be compromised.
In fact, Bickle (2003) argues that transdisciplinary projects (i.e., projects that incorporate
questions, data, theories, etc., from different areas of the mind-brain sciences) are key for making
headway in the search for cellular/molecular mechanisms. He cites his own project (Bickle et. al
2000) which combines methods, theories, data, etc., from single-cell physiology, functional
neuroimaging and biological modelling to help answer what cellular/molecular mechanism is
responsible for saccade sequences in the frontal cortex and how they are processed (Bickle 2003,
115-130). According to this transdisciplinary picture, aspects of both high and low-level
neuroscience need to fit together for progress (i.e., for the reduction of mind to molecules) to
occur.17
In sum, Bickle argues that low-level neuroscience can directly explain behavior by appealing to
experimental practices such as the IMTB method commonly used by scientists in
cellular/molecular neuroscience. However, low-level neuroscience still needs higher-level
theorizing in order to adequately pick out and isolate the desired cellular/molecular mechanism
in question; this is where the relationship between progress and fitting together lies.
Before moving onto non-reductionist accounts of progress, I will briefly recapitulate how the
notion of fitting together plays into Nagel and Bickle’s accounts of reductionism. For Nagel, the
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Figure 1 displayed the traditional model of reduction as a step-by-step hierarchy of levels (see Bickle 2006, page
413 for illustration) and figure 8 displayed Bickle’s reductive-in-practice or ruthless reduction model which
bypasses multiple levels by linking the behavioral level directly to the cellular molecular level (see Bickle 2006,
page 426 for illustration).
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See Bickle (2003) for an example of a transdisciplinary project which combines questions, theories, and data
from single-cell physiology, neurocomputational modelling, and functional neuroimaging (115-130).
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role of fitting together comes into play with the essential condition which claims that the
assumptions of the primary science must be well-supported by different areas of science.
Despite Nagel failing to provide an account of what it means for evidence to be well-supported
and how evidence from multiple fields confirms assumptions in the primary science, it is clear
that the phenomenon of fitting together interdisciplinary evidence is required for successful
reductions, which, on Nagel’s view, are the key to scientific progress. That is, the results from
these areas of science must fit together in such a way that lend empirical support to the
assumptions of the primary science for the reduction to stand on firm epistemic footing. For
Bickle, the notion of fitting together occurs between the interaction between high-level
theorizing which occurs prior to actual investigations and discoveries at the cellular/molecular
level. Similarly, Bickle does not provide an in-depth analysis of what fitting together would look
like nor what it entails; nonetheless, the fitting together of the higher and lower-levels of the
mind-brain sciences is critical for the reduction of mind-to-molecules (and thus for scientific
progress and strong explanations of the mind-brain).
1.1.1 Historical Reviews of Scientific Progress in the Mind-Brain Sciences (Some Non-Reductionist
Approaches)
Reductionist models are not the only accounts of scientific progress emphasizing the importance
of different areas of science fitting together; non-reductive alternatives similarly emphasize this
notion as central to scientific progress and strong explanations. Some non-reductive alternatives
include the following concepts put forward to explain the nature of how different areas fit
together in a way that is constitutive of progress and strong explanations: ‘interfield theories’ by
Darden and Maull (1977), ‘integrative pluralism’ Mitchell (2002, 2003), ‘convergence’ by
Roskies (2010), and ‘seamless integration’ by Piccinini and Craver (2011).
During Nagel’s time, the focus was on relations between different theories within different areas
of science (Darden and Maull 1977, 43). Nagel’s inter-theoretic reduction model demonstrated
the derivational reduction of a theory from a secondary science to a theory from the primary
science (ibid). Instead of trying to understand the relations between different areas of science by
focusing on their theories, Darden and Maull shift their focus to understanding the kinds of
relations that exist between fields in their (1977) paper ‘Interfield Theories’. Briefly, examples
of fields include cytology, genetics, biochemistry, etc. (ibid). Fields may contain a theory or
14

multiple theories; genetics, for example, contains the classical theory of the gene (ibid).
Theories such as the classical theory of the gene are what they dub ‘intrafield theories’ – i.e.,
theories that exist within a particular field. Finally, interrelations between different fields can be
generated via what they call ‘interfield theories’ (ibid). Interfield theories bridge different fields
of science, resulting in scientific progress. To better understand how interfield theories
constitute progress, I begin by reviewing what a field is, the kinds of relations that can exist
between them, and the motivations for generating an interfield theory. I elaborate on their
account of interfield theories by drawing on their example of the chromosome theory of
Mendelian heredity and state its implications for scientific progress and the notion of fitting
together.18
Darden and Maull define the term field as a field of science possessing the following
characteristics: (a) a field must have a central problem, (b) it must possess a domain of items that
are understood as facts relating to that problem, (c) it must possess general goals and explanatory
factors guiding scientists on how to solve the central problem, (d) it must possess its respective
techniques and methodologies, (e) they frequently employ their own special vocabulary, and
sometimes (f) but not always, fields will have concepts, laws, and theories that are associated
with the central problem (a) that help to realize its explanatory goals (c) (ibid, 44).
For example, in the field of physical chemistry, the central problem (a) was to determine how
different parts of molecules interact, its domain (b) consisted of molecules, their respective parts
and interactions, and the development of new techniques (d) such as mass spectrometry have
allowed scientists to determine (c) the structure and interaction of molecules.19 At any given
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While Darden and Maull (1977), Mitchell (2002, 2003), and Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) write and focus on
examples in the biological sciences specifically, I have included them in my survey since the biological sciences are
housed under the larger umbrella of cognitive neuroscience and/or (more generally) the mind-brain sciences.
Recall that George A. Miller defined ‘cognitive neuroscience’ as the following: “Cognitive neuroscientists attempt
to discover the molecular logic of organic knowledge systems, i.e., the principles that, in addition to the principles
of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, govern the behavior of inanimate matter in living knowledge
systems” (Gazzaniga 2000, 11, emphasis mine).
In a different characterization, Bechtel and Richardson (1993) use the term biology generally to characterize the
‘life sciences’ as comprising, “… physiology, cellular and molecular biology, biochemistry, genetics, evolutionary
biology and neuroscience” (xvii). Therefore, I have included accounts focusing biology since biology is considered
by many to be a part of the mind-brain sciences.
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For similar examples in the fields of cytology, genetics, and biochemistry, see pages 46-47 (Darden and Maull,
1977).
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time, a field may contain either no theory, a working theory, multiple competing theories, or one
main successful theory (ibid, 48).20 Sometimes when theories are well confirmed they become
part of the general domain, and one might consequently look for a ‘more encompassing’ theory
to explain said domain (ibid). One final point worth noting is that fields cannot be reduced to
another. Darden and Maull state: “… reduction in the sense of derivation would be impossible
between such elements of a field as techniques and explanatory goals” (ibid). Presumably, this is
because they consider fields to be distinct (insofar as they possess unique sets of vocabulary, a
specific problem and set of tools to address the problem etc.) making it impossible for a classical
reduction to occur.21 Taken together, this is how Darden and Maull understand and use the term
field.22 23
Fields bear relations to other fields via what Darden and Maull dub ‘interfield theories.24 An
interfield theory describes and explains relations that exist between different fields. Darden and
Maull highlight four main types of relations that can hold between fields. The first type is the
part-whole relation whereby one field demonstrates a specific physical location for some
entity/process assumed in a different field. For example, the chromosome theory of Mendelian
heredity posited that Mendelian genes were located either in or on the chromosomes; the
physical location required specification. Cytology had the tools necessary to specify the physical
location of genes (ibid, 49). With this knowledge from cytology (i.e., that genes are in the
chromosomes), the relation between the two fields became complete, hence it being a part-whole
relation (ibid). The second type of relation is the physical nature relation; here, a field may
present the physical nature of some entity/process held by another field. For example, “…
biochemistry provided the physical nature of the repressor, an entity postulated in the operon
theory” (ibid). The third relation is a structural relation and occurs when one field investigates
20

It is important to note here that although Darden and Maull (1977) use the term ‘competing theories’, they
maintain that in general, fields do not compete and nor do theories from different areas of science.
21

This remark clearly demonstrates the authors’ wanting to distance and distinguish themselves from Nagel and
inter-theoretic reduction type models.
22

Cf. also Toulmin’s (1972) term ‘discipline’, Lakatos’s (1970) ‘research programme’, and Kuhn’s (1962) ‘paradigm’
contrasting with their definition of a ‘field’.
23

See Darden and Maull’s (1977) pages 45-46 for a detailed comparison between their concept of a field and
Toulmin’s (1972) ‘discipline’.
24

Interfield theories, Darden and Maull maintain, best describe the kinds of relations between fields in biology
(contra reductive relations) (Darden and Maull 1977, 48).
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the structural property of a given entity/process and another field investigates the functional
properties of the same entity/process (ibid). For example, physical chemistry provided the
structure of molecules and biochemistry provided the function of the molecules – this example
constitutes a structural relation (ibid). Finally, a causal relation occurs when the entities/
processes assumed by one field are the causes of the effects found and studied by a different
field. As an example, Darden and Maull cite the theory of allosteric regulation which provides
“… a causal explanation of the interaction between the physicochemical structure of certain
enzymes and a characteristic biochemical pattern of activity” (ibid). These relations are not
mutually exclusive; a part-whole relation can also be a causal relation, a structural relation may
also be a causal relation, etc. (ibid).
Darden and Maull note three motivating factors for generating an interfield theory. First, there is
motivation to generate an interfield theory when there are relationships between two fields which
are already known to exist. They note: “… prior to the proposal of operon theory, the fields of
genetics and biochemistry were known to be related; to cite one of many instances, the physical
nature of the gene was specified biochemically as DNA. Thus, further relations could be
expected between the fields and might lead to the generation of an interfield theory” (ibid).
Secondly, one might generate an interfield theory when two fields are investigating different
aspects of the same phenomena (ibid).25 Thirdly, one might generate an interfield theory if there
are questions in each field that cannot be answered by their respective resources (i.e., by their
methods, tools, techniques, etc.).26
To better understand the nature of interfield theories, Darden and Maull draw on examples from
the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity (which bridged the fields of cytology and
genetics); the operon theory (which bridged the fields of genetics and biochemistry); and the
theory of allosteric regulation (which bridged the fields of biochemistry and physical chemistry)
(ibid, 48).

25

This motivation will become clearer in the following paragraph wherein the example of the chromosome theory
of Mendelian heredity is described.
26

Similarly, I elaborate on this motivation in the following paragraph.
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For the sake of brevity, I focus on their first example. When cytology emerged as a field in the
early 1800’s, one of its central problems was to answer where within the germ cell ‘hereditary
material’ can be found (ibid, 51). By the 1900’s, it was generally accepted that chromosomes
answered that question. Theories of heredity emerged in the early 1900’s in part due to the
discovery of Mendel’s law (ibid). Mendel noted the hereditary traits of garden peas and crossed
them artificially and proposed a law of inheritance based on his findings (ibid). This one law is
not solely responsible for the emergence of genetics, however. Instead, genetics emerged
approximately between 1900 and 1905 with the “… independent discovery of Mendel’s law by
Hugo de Vries and Carl Correns and with the promulgation of Mendel’s experimental approach
by William Bateson” (ibid).
By 1903, cytology and genetics were investigating the same phenomena (i.e., heredity), but were
asking importantly different questions about it.27 For example, cytology was concerned with the
location of hereditary material within the cell; genetics was concerned with explaining the
patterns of inheritance within genes (ibid, 49). However, there were questions within each field
that could not be answered from within their respective fields’ resources (ibid, 51-52).28 For
example, genetics studied patterns of inheritance and their methods of investigation included
artificial breeding; cytology studied the location of hereditary material within cells via methods
such as various types of microscopy (ibid, 49-50). Thus, part of the motivation to generate an
interfield theory in this instance was because genetics did not have the appropriate set of
tools/methods to answer the question of where genes were physically located. On the other
hand, cytology had the tools and resources required to answer this question and provide the
specific physical location of genes inquired by geneticists (ibid, 52).29

27

Recall that this is the second motivations listed by Darden and Maull as a reason to generate an interfield theory
(Darden and Maull 1977, 49).
28

This is the third motivation listed by Darden and Maull as a reason to generate an interfield theory; thus, there
were numerous motivating factors around during the early 20th c for interfield theories.
29

This nicely demonstrates one of the kinds of relations – i.e., the part-whole relation – that can exist between
fields. As Darden and Maull (1977) explain: “… the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity postulated that the
Mendelian genes were in or on the chromosomes; cytology provided the physical location of the genes. With
more specific knowledge, the theory explained the relation in more detail: the genes are part of (in) the
chromosomes” (49).

18

The chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity is an instance of an interfield theory created to
bridge the fields of cytology and genetics in a way that advanced knowledge of heredity. In
bridging the two fields, the interfield theory unified knowledge in each field which allowed for
deeper explanations such as the similarities between chromosomes and genes (ibid).
According to Darden and Maull (1977), when one shifts the attention away from the traditional
view of science whereby philosophers focus on the relations between theories – specifically,
theories viewed as being the same in kind (i.e., as axiomatic systems) and the relations between
them as derivationally reductive – to focus on the relations between fields, a multitude of virtues
emerge (ibid, 60). For one thing, a host of similarities shared between theories may have gone
unnoticed with the Received View still in place.30 For example, they note that their analysis
revealed important relations between fields (ibid, 61). That is, there are “… important
similarities between the generation and function of relationships which, on the older analysis, are
in the different categories of “reductive” and “nonreductive” and would not have been seen as
similar” (ibid). Thus, interfield theories can bring into awareness new items for a domain that
previously went unmentioned (and would have continued this way without the introduction of an
interfield theory). Secondly, interfield theories can solve some theoretical problems by
introducing a new idea pertaining to the relations between two fields, such as the idea that
chromosomes are the physical location of genes (ibid 52-53, 59). Thirdly, they aid in answering
questions that are unanswerable from within one specific field (as was demonstrated in the
example of the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity) (ibid, 59). Fourthly, interfield
theories can help predict new items for the domains of each respective fields. Fifthly, interfield
theories can generate a new, collaborative line of research fields.31 There are thus numerous
virtues of interfield theories. Importantly, interfield theories involve the fitting together of
different fields of science in a non-reductive way that enables progress and strong explanations.

30

According to Suppe (1974), the Received View, which was almost universally accepted between the 1920’s to
the 1950’s, held that the structure and nature of theories were the most fundamental topic in philosophy of
science, since theories were considered to be a ‘vehicle of scientific knowledge’ and therefore must be involved in
almost every part of science (3). The Received View held that theories were “… axiomatic calculi which are given a
partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules” (ibid). Further, as Darden and Maull (1977)
note, the relationship between theories was understood as derivationally reductive (60).
31

By focusing on the reduction of theories, one potentially misses out on opportunities for collaborative research
projects which can lead to new discoveries and insights.
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On Darden and Maull’s (1977) view, progress in modern biology occurs when interfield theories
bridge together the biological and the physical sciences.32 On their view, it seems that at least
some explanations in the life sciences cannot be complete without interfield theories. Darden
and Maull do not explicitly make this claim, however, it follows that if it is the case that there are
questions and problems that are unanswerable from within one respective field F1, then F1’s
explanations and knowledge can only go so far. Eventually, due to conceptual, technical and
methodological limitations, explanations and the understanding of some phenomena investigated
by F1 will plateau. However, interfield theories have the potential to overcome this plateau by
bridging F1 with F2 (which is equipped with the proper resources to help answer some of the
questions F1 is unable to).33
Indeed, Darden and Maull strongly maintain that interfield theories are crucial for progress: “…
the chromosome theory was the first of a series of interfield theories … that advanced our
understanding of the relationship between the biological and physical sciences and resulted in
progress in modern biology” (ibid, 62, emphasis mine). The aspect of fitting together comes into
play in the different ways that two fields can be bridged together via an interfield theory. It
could be the fitting together of a structure of one field to a function of another field, or an entity
of one field with a physical location of another field, etc. Regardless of those details, the fitting
together of different aspects from different fields via an interfield theory is important for
progress (e.g., new discoveries, new predictions, a new and deepened understanding/explanation
of a given phenomenon, etc.).

32

This is what unification looks like on their view. They call this the “… progressive unification (bridging) of the
biological and physical sciences (Darden and Maull 1977, 61).
33

It seems that, up until this point, Bickle might agree. In fact, this general narrative fits with his description of
and argument for the importance of transdisciplinary projects and higher-level theorizing (i.e., there are some
questions that are simply unanswerable at the cellular/molecular level; one needs to look to different areas of
science using different techniques such as single-cell recording in physiology, biological modelling, and FMRI in
neuroscience to help get a deeper and complete view of some phenomena). According to Bickle’s notion of a
transdisciplinary project both high and low-level neuroscience need to fit together for progress (see my footnote
15 on where to find more details on Bickle et al.’s (2000) transdisciplinary project). At least at this point Darden
and Maull’s and Bickle’s views seem compatible. Where they part ways is the details of fitting together where
Bickle proposes a strongly reductive view and Darden and Maull a non-reductive view. Regardless of those details,
however, a commonality linking the two is that there must be interaction(s) between different fields of science and
aspects of those different fields must be fit together in order to have deeper and more complete explanations of
some phenomenon.
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In sum, the aspect of fitting together thus comes into play in the different ways that two fields
can be bridged together via an interfield theory. Interfield theories enable the fitting together of
different aspects of different fields. For example, an interfield theory might involve the fitting
together of the structure of one field to a function in another field. This fitting together
constitutes progress insofar as it results in new discoveries, predictions, and a more complete and
epistemically strong explanation about a given phenomenon.
Like Darden and Maull (1977), Mitchell (2002, 2003) positions herself in opposition to
reductionist accounts of the relationship between different areas of science and scientific
progress. Mitchell rejects both classical inter-theoretic versions of reductionism (e.g., Nagel
1949, 1970) as well as more current, ‘new wave’ versions of reductionism (e.g., Bickle 1997,
2003; Churchland 1986), and presents an alternative, non-reductive account of the relationship
between different areas of science and scientific progress (Michell 2003, 185-186).34
Alternatives to reduction tend to be pluralistic and Mitchell’s account is no exception (ibid, 186).
However, Mitchell maintains that most pluralist accounts are untenable. Mitchell rejects the
‘anything goes’ pluralism commonly associated with Feyerabend (1975, 1981), stating that
condoning any and all ‘possibly inconsistent’ theories is just as unacceptable as reductionism
(ibid). Non-Feyerabendian versions of pluralism tend to appeal to isolationist theories, such as
Sherman’s (1988) ‘levels of analysis’ account (hereafter LOA).
Sherman’s LOA identified four levels of questions for the biological sciences: the level of
evolutionary origin, of current reproductive function, of ontogeny, and of mechanisms (Mitchell
2002, 57).35 According to LOA, scientists working on a phenomena – e.g., the division of labor
in social insects – would investigate it from within their own respective level (which asks its own
respective questions) (Mitchell 2003, 187). For example, scientists working in the evolutionary
origin level would ask questions concerning why a certain behavior/trait arose at a certain period
in time; those working at the mechanistic level would investigate the “… environmental triggers
34

The biggest reason to reject reductionism stems from the fact that reductionism with its focus on laws and
theories just does not seem to adequately capture the nature and relations of the life sciences (Mitchell 2003). For
general criticisms of classical reduction see Darden and Maull (1977), Fodor (1974, 1975), Feyerabend (1962,
1966), Wimsatt (1972), Van Riel (2011), etc. For criticisms of current ‘new wave’ reductionism, see Schouten and
De Jong (1999).
35

See table 6.1 (page 201) for a visual representation of the LOA analysis (Mitchell 2003).
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and hormonal or cognitive mechanisms that then issue in the behaviors”, etc. (ibid). According to
LOA, levels are autonomous and do not (and need not) interact with other levels. Accordingly,
competition between explanations occurs solely within and not between levels; there can be a
plurality of competing explanations only within a given level (Mitchell 2002, 57; 2003, 187). If
there is no competition between levels, and each level is strictly autonomous, there is no need for
any kind of collaborative interaction between levels; each scientist would work from within their
respective level on their respective questions.
Mitchell draws on Darden and Maull (1977) to argue that this isolationist picture is
fundamentally flawed (Mitchell 2003, 187). That is, it conflicts with the history of science
which is ripe with examples of fruitful collaborative and interdisciplinary projects between
scientists working on questions at different levels (ibid). While Sherman’s (1988) account may
be representative of how some scientists work, it does not represent how all scientists work.
Mitchell argues that the LOA account of how science works is thus mistaken and that its key
mistake lies in its understanding of the epistemological structure of answers (Mitchell 2002, 57).
That is:
… scientific explanations often are causal explanations, identifying the set of conditions that
give rise to the phenomenon of interest. At the same time, complex phenomenon harbor
multiple interacting causal processes and multiple levels of organization which all may be
involved in the generation of the feature to be explained. By disambiguating the question to
be answered by an explanation … one is still left with a plurality of potential causes acting at
a number of levels of organization which may well constitute compatible answers to that
single question (ibid, emphasis mine).36
Thus, due to the complex and dynamic nature of biological organisms, Mitchell argues pluralism
is a better alternative to reductive options. However, that pluralism cannot be a Feyerabendian
‘anything goes’ pluralism, nor can it endorse isolationist views which conflict with the history of
science. Instead, Mitchell (2002, 2003) advances the concept of integrative pluralism to account

36

Bechtel and Richardson (1993) argue similarly against this kind of isolationist picture claiming that the causal
dependence and interaction between different levels implies that narrow work in exclusively one level would be
unable to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of interest.
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for the types of relations existing between levels which constitute strong explanations and
scientific progress.37
To better understand Mitchell’s concept of ‘integrative pluralism’, I begin by reviewing the
earlier (2002, 2003) articulation of integrative pluralism, and then elaborate on Mitchell and
Dietrich’s (2006) later version of integrative pluralism. In articulating this concept, I introduce
her distinction between competitive and compatible explanations, and elaborate on this via her
example of the division of labor of social insect colonies. Afterwards, I explain how the concept
of integrative pluralism relates to the concept of fitting together and scientific progress.
Mitchell’s integrative pluralism hinges on the distinction between competitive and compatible
alternative explanations. Mitchell notes that most philosophers of science have focused
exclusively on the virtues of competitive alternatives (or hypotheses, explanations, etc.) such as
Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of inheritance (Mitchell 2002, 56). The argument in favor of
competitive pluralism is that competition amongst different alternatives concerning the same
phenomena of interest creates an optimal space for testing alternative explanations. According to
this view, science progresses when false alternatives are revealed (and accordingly ruled out and
rejected) through this optimal testing space.38 Therefore, a plurality of competing explanations is
desirable in that they increase the likelihood of ruling out false explanations, thus narrowing the
scope of true explanations (ibid).
Another argument in favor of competitive pluralism is advanced by Beaty (1987) and Kitcher
(1991). They argue that “… maintaining multiple, competing theories and explanations is
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Importantly, other than offering Sherman’s (1988) description of levels in biology, Mitchell gives no description
of what she means by levels. Thus, I operate on the assumption that she accepts Sherman’s definition and uses it
accordingly. While Sherman’s ‘levels’ are described in the biological sciences, and Mitchell seems to accept this
definition, it is unclear whether Mitchell would also accept the traditional picture of levels described by Bickle (see
Bickle 2006, page 413 for illustration).
38

C.f. Bacon’s ([1620] 1902) notion of crucial experiments whereby Bacon took crucial experiments (hereafter CE)
as experiments that could be the neutral arbiter between two competing (rival) theories. This was done by finding
a prediction which two (or more) theories disagreed on, then conducting an experiment to see which makes the
correct prediction. Theory A predicts x and theory B predicts not-x; a CE whose result was x would demonstrate
theory A to be the correct theory. As an example, consider the measurement of the bending of light by the sun.
The general theory of relativity and classical mechanics differ by a factor of two. Eddington’s experiment
demonstrated Einstein’s predictions to be correct, and this can thus be considered as a CE (on Bacon’s account)
which contributed to the early acceptance of relativity.
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deemed the rational strategy to adopt for the scientific community as a whole in order to hedge
its bets against empirical uncertainty” (Mitchell 2002, 56). While these accounts all advocate (a
type of) pluralism, Mitchell argues their conceptualization of pluralism misconstrues how
science is and should be done. Mitchell’s main disagreement with these accounts is that they all
seem to imply the goal of uncovering one true, overarching theory (ibid).39 That is, these
accounts of competitive pluralism all assume “… that pluralism is temporary and strategic, but
ultimately eliminable. While this analysis correctly describes some of the diversity of models
and explanations found in contemporary science, it fails to capture all of it. The remainder is
constituted by compatible, not mutually exclusive, alternatives” (ibid, 56-57, emphases mine).
Mitchell argues many instances in the biological sciences are constituted by compatible
explanations. For example, a social insect colony is compositionally, dynamically, and
evolutionarily complex.40 It is compositionally complex in that it is made up of many, nonrandom parts (ibid, 58). Dynamically, it hosts a multitude of interacting causes, some of those
comprising linear functions, and some comprising non-linear functions (ibid). Evolutionarily,
social insect colonies exhibit a diversity of “… historically contingent, adaptive responses to
environmental challenges” (ibid). Mitchell considers three different self-organization
explanations of the division of labor in social insect colonies: a ‘genetic diversity for threshold
response’ by Page and Mitchell (1991, 1998), a ‘foraging for work algorithm’ by Tofts and
Franks (1992), and a ‘learning algorithm by Deneubourg, Pasteels, Fresneau, and Lachaud
(1987) (Mitchell 2002, 60-61).
Each of these explanations focuses on a single causal factor in the explanation of division of
labor in a social insect colony. Instead of viewing each explanation (all located at the
ontogenetic level) as competing, Mitchell argues they are better understood as compatible
explanations. This is because each explanation represents an idealized abstraction from the
actual, concrete phenomenon (i.e., the division of labor of social insects) (ibid, 63). For
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As we shall see, Mitchell’s account of integrative pluralism recognizes a plurality of ‘true theories’ not one all
encompassing theory. To foreshadow, instead of one true theory of the division of labor in social insects, there
will be one true theory for honeybees, one true theory for leafcutter ants, etc. (Mitchell 2002,67).
40

She appeals to similar examples such as the origin of an infectious disease responsible for amphibian decline
(Mitchell and Dietrich 2006), and Culver (1999) and Koonce and Locci’s (1999) example of Lake Erie as instances of
compatible, not mutually exclusive explanations for complex and dynamical biological phenomena.
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example, Page and Mitchell’s (1991, 1998) genetic model focuses solely on individual genetic
diversity while ignoring any/all other factors (Mitchell 2002, 63).41 Thus, despite residing at the
same level, the three explanations do not actually compete because they each describe only what
would occur in ‘one non-overlapping world’ (ibid, 64).42
What kinds of relations hold between compatible explanations at the same level? Mitchell
(2002, 2003) believes the answer lies in what she calls integrative pluralism. Integrative
pluralism rests on the distinction between theoretical modelling and the application of the model
in the explanation of some concrete phenomenon (Mitchell 2002, 66). At the theoretical level of
the social insect example, pluralism is justified since it presents three different explanations
referring to three different idealized worlds. However, at the application level, integration is
necessary, since no matter how complex and how many causes contribute to some biological
phenomenon, this phenomenon has only one causal history (ibid).
Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) elaborate on the notion of integrative pluralism by defining it as:
“… a view of the diversity of scientific explanations that endorses close study and modeling of
different causes and different levels of organization but calls for integration of multiple accounts
in the explanation of a concrete phenomenon” (S76). Therefore, if the three self-organization
explanations are understood as partial explanations, then a correct theory of the division of labor
of social insects would be one that properly integrated all three partial accounts at the
application level.
However, Mitchell notes, while integration of partial explanations is required for the explanation
of a concrete phenomenon, it is unlikely that integration will occur at the theoretical level
(Mitchell 2002, 67). This is because the “… diversity of ‘solutions’ to adaptive problems and the
historical contingencies influencing those variable paths that preclude global, theoretical
unification” (ibid). For example, ants and bees display similar patterns of division of labor.

41

The other two models similarly focus on one aspect of the division of labor in social insects while ignoring
any/all other factors (Mitchell 2002, 64).
42

C.f. Cartwright (1994, 2000) and Wimsatt (2007) for further discussion of idealized models and the falsity of
models in science. While both views of the falsity of models/theories help make sense of compatible scientific
models, Mitchell believes that her integrative pluralism offers a better solution for making sense of compatible
model examples such as the one described above, and that more can be said on the nature of compatible models
in the biological sciences and how they can be integrated (Mitchell 2002, 65).
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Despite similarities, what may at first seem like a plausible explanation of the same phenomenon
will be dependent on the “… particular features and pathways that occur in each case” (ibid).
This, however, does not sanction a Feyerabendian ‘anything goes’ pluralism, because, as
Mitchell notes, there will be only one ‘true’ integrated explanation for honeybees, and one ‘true’
integrated explanation for leaf-cutting ants, etc. (ibid). Mitchell concludes by noting that while
explanations at the same level can be compatible due to their representing different abstract
idealizations, the true nature of explanation requires integration. Importantly, given the multiple
causal factors and historical contingencies of organisms in the biological sciences, integration at
the application level will be piecemeal. Accordingly, pluralism with respect to compatible
explanations “… can and should coexist with integration in the generation of explanations of
complex and varied biological phenomena” (ibid).
How does integrative pluralism relate to the notion of fitting together and scientific progress?
The answer to this involves the nature of organisms studied in the biological sciences. That is,
scientists in the biological sciences must frequently make use of simplified and abstract models;
these models usually focus on one feature while ignoring others. Accordingly, these models only
account for partial causes. In such cases, Mitchell maintains that a more accurate explanation of
a phenomenon will require the integration of “… diverse theories of all the relevant features that
uniquely characterize a given phenomenon” (Mitchell 2003, 190). Thus, the integration of
partial explanations constitutes the ‘hallmark of better science’ (ibid). To drive the point home,
integration is the hallmark of better science. Good science involves the integration of partial
explanations. To make progress into biological sciences – i.e., to advance accurate and complete
explanations – involves integration, and the concept of integration is where the notion of fitting
together comes into play. That is, in the social insect example, it is the partial causal
explanations of self-organization that must be fit together at the concrete application level to
produce an epistemically strong explanation of the division of labor in the social insect colony.
In sum, Mitchell (2002, 2003) and Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) advocate an alternative to
reduction and non-reductive pluralist accounts of scientific explanations and progress, which
focuses on the relations between compatible explanations. They call this integrative pluralism
whereby different, yet compatible explanations can co-exist within a level, but must be
integrated to provide a complete understanding of a concrete phenomenon.
26

A more recent alternative to reductionism is advanced by Roskies (2010) in her paper ‘Saving
Subtraction: A reply to Van Orden and Paap’, where she argues that scientific progress occurs
when different pieces of evidence in the mind-brain sciences converge on a conclusion via a
method she dubs ‘functional triangulation. I begin by laying out the motivation behind Roskies’
proposal. I then introduce three distinct kinds of functional triangulation and show how Roskies’
account relates to the notion of scientific progress and fitting together.
Roskies’ main motivation is to demonstrate, contra Van Orden and Paap (1997), that contrastive
methods (e.g., classical subtractive methods) commonly used in cognitive neuroscience can and
do enhance our understanding of the mind.43 44 Roskies believes their dismissive attitude
towards neuroimaging is due to their failure to properly contextualize neuroimaging evidence
within the broader scope of the mind-brain sciences (Roskies 2010, 640). Far from conceding
that individual neuroimaging experiments stand on their own by producing conclusive evidence,
Roskies states they must instead be considered “… pieces in a larger puzzle of inference to the
best explanation” (ibid). Roskies argues that neuroimaging advances knowledge of the mindbrain when they are involved in a method called functional triangulation. Functional
triangulation works when “… information from other task comparisons and other studies are
brought to bear on the interpretation of experimental data” (ibid, 640-641). Functional
triangulation (hereafter FT) is a method by which claims about the mind-brain are substantiated
via a mass task/study comparison when the results of which all converge on a given claim.45
A close reading of Roskies’ (2010) paper reveals multiple kinds of FT. Despite this, no clear
taxonomy is advanced; in what follows, I attempt to do this work by distinguishing two main
43

Roskies explains the subtractive method in the following way: “In subtractive studies, task-related changes in
blood flow are identified by subtraction of the image intensity of a blood flow profile due to the performance of
one task from that of another. Thus, suppose task A involves processes X, Y, and Z and task B involves the
processes X and Y. The blood flow profile generated by performing task A will indicate increased activity in the
brain regions which support processes X, Y, and Z, while the profile generated by performing task B will show
increased activation in those areas involved in supporting processes X and Y. … if the results of performing task B
are subtracted from Task A, the resulting subtraction or ‘difference image’ will reflect the blood flow differences
associated with differences in neural activity between the performance of task A and task B. In this case, the
regions subserving process Z will be isolated” (Roskies 2010, 638).
44

Roskies highlights four key criticisms that Van Orden and Paap (1997) wage against the use of neuroimaging to
better understand the mind. I will not be addressing the four criticisms at large (as they do not directly relate to
the main goal of my dissertation), but will refer to them only when necessary.
45

C.f. Campbell and Fiske (1959) and Jick (1979) for earlier articulations of the concept of triangulation.
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types of FT – micro and macro-FT. Under micro-FT is what Roskies calls ‘within-subject’ FT
(hereafter WLFT).46 WLFT employs different comparison tasks within the same lab experiment
where they are (ideally) designed to “… enable comparisons between tasks within different
combinations of psychological components of interest” (ibid, 641). As an example of how this
works in practice, Roskies cites a semantic processing experiment from her own lab (Roskies et
al. (2001)) where experimenters used several different comparison tasks – a hard and easy
categorization task, a synonym task, and a rhyme task – to hone in more specifically on the brain
region(s) involved in semantic processing. Each of these tasks were “… performed on pairs of
words, matched for frequency and length, and both the hard and easy categorization tasks used
the same words” (ibid). The lab researchers began by comparing the difference in activity in
brain regions between the easy and the hard categorization task with the hypothesis that the latter
would require more semantic analysis than the former (ibid). This comparison revealed “… a
frontal region modulated by task …” (ibid). In order to functionally triangulate from within
Roskies’ lab/experiment and accrue greater confidence with respect to the nature of semantic
processing and its associated brain region(s), additional task comparisons were performed via
synonym and rhyme tasks. Data from these tasks were acquired and analyzed to identify
whether the initial brain region was active. The experimenters found that the same frontal region
identified earlier was active in the synonym task, but not for the rhyme task (ibid). Roskies et al.
(2001) concluded that these findings together helped lend support to the initial hypothesis that
the frontal region was involved in semantic processing (Roskies 2010, 641).
In this example, WLFT begins with a certain goal (e.g., to identify (a) brain region(s) involved in
semantic processing) and a certain hypothesis (e.g., that the frontal region is implicated in

46

It is not entirely clear here what Roskies means by the ‘subject’ in her ‘within-subject’ (Roskies 2010, 641). She
could mean functional triangulation occurring within one individual test subject (i.e., within one human, one
animal, one organism). For example, sometimes two or more different experimental conditions will be explored
within the same person, animal, etc. However, Roskies could also mean functional triangulation as it occurs within
one particular lab across subjects (since there are typically multiple ‘subjects’ in a given experiment). In my
dissertation, I take her to be mean the latter, and will thus refer to her ‘within-subject’ FT as ‘within-lab’ FT
(hereafter WLFT). It is important to note that adopting the latter interpretation does not rule out that the former
interpretation is also required.
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semantic processing). That hypothesis gains more support with each additional task comparison
that points to the conclusion that the frontal region is implicated in semantic processing (ibid).47
While the conclusions reached via WLFT may be more accurate than conclusions from a lab
employing only one or even no task comparison, WLFT is not sufficient for the stronger kind of
claims Roskies wants to make (i.e., that functional triangulation and convergence imply that a
claim about the mind-brain stands on firm epistemic footing). As Roskies notes, the results from
one lab experiment in isolation represents nothing more than “… evidence for one way of
parceling out cognitive function over another …” and alone cannot claim the status of
‘conclusive evidence’ (ibid). What would be required for ‘conclusive evidence’? What
demarcates weak from strong evidence? Roskies answers:
Almost invariably, functional triangulation is also achieved with reference to other imaging
experiments, usually those involving other tasks that would seem to involve a like component
…. In such cases, the fact that imaging results are reported with reference to a canonical brain
space helps the scientist to determine whether the same region as the one she has seen in her
experiment is active in other experiments that are hypothesized to involve a similar
psychological component. Convergence across multiple experiments is key to epistemic
warrant when it comes to attributing function to anatomical regions (ibid, emphasis mine).48
The type of FT involved in this quotation is importantly different from WLFT (which focuses on
comparisons within a single lab experiment); as such, I have chosen to classify it under macroFT in that it involves the comparison of multiple tasks from multiple different labs/experiments.49
I identify two types of FT under this category: ALFT-1 and ALFT-2. ALFT-1 involves cases
where there are multiple task comparisons from multiple different labs/experiments from within
the same area of science (e.g., the comparison of the results from 26 lab experiments in
psychology). ALFT-2 involves cases where there are comparisons from different
47

I classify this type of FT under micro-FT insofar as it involves/focuses on multiple task comparisons from within
one individual lab/experiment.
48

One important note concerning this quotation. Due to the aim of her paper, Roskies talks about the importance
for attributing ‘function to anatomical regions’ (i.e., structure-function conclusions). However, it is likely that her
views on convergence here would extend to cover other (non-structure-function) conclusions borne out of the
mind-brain sciences.
49

Due to this type of FT involving multiple labs/experiments, I will call it across-labs FT and abbreviate it as ALFT.
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labs/experiments from multiple different areas of science (e.g., the comparison of results from
different lab experiments focusing on semantic processing in psychology, molecular biology,
physiology, neuroscience, etc.).50 Roskies states: “… results from psychology, neurology, or
neurophysiology are frequently referred to in interpreting imaging data and are also used to
further test hypothesized conclusions from studies already performed” (ibid, 642).51
FT has different forms, but suffice it to say that for Roskies, FT plays a critical role making
headway in understanding the mind-brain (ibid, 642). Roskies’ picture of scientific progress is
(at least, prima facie) compatible with the image of scientific progress endorsed by Darden and
Maull (1977), and Mitchell (2002, 2003). That is, Roskies’ picture of scientific progress is one of
bootstrapping, whereby complete and strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain come
together piecemeal. Roskies explains: “Knowledge derived from other techniques for
investigating brain function is combined with insight from psychological theories and imaging
studies in order to yield interpretations that cohere with our best theories” (Roskies 2010, 660).
Both Darden and Maull (1977) and Mitchell (2002, 2003) – albeit in different ways – emphasize
the fact that there are often questions that are unanswerable with the techniques, resources, and
methods from within one field that another field has the resources to answer.52 For Roskies’, this
is where ALFT-2 comes into play by building an understanding of the mind-brain drawing on the
different techniques/methods from different areas of science all trying to understand some aspect
of the mind-brain.
Thus, the notion of fitting together in Roskies’ account comes into play with the results from
either (a) different task comparisons from within a lab being fit together in a way that yields a
convergent claim, (b) different task comparisons from multiple different labs/experiments are fit
together in a way that yields a convergent claim, or finally (c) that different task comparisons
from within different labs/experiments from different areas of science utilizing different methods
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It could be argued that ALFT-2 is best suited for establishing well-confirmed conclusions in the mind-brain
sciences since it is (or could be) a combination of WLFT and ALFT-1. Roskies herself does not explicitly argue for
this.
51

Here Roskies directs the reader to see Cohen et al. (2008) for an example of this case.

52

Even Bickle’s ruthlessly reductive view concedes this point, which is particularly illuminated with his example of
the importance of transdisciplinary projects.
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and techniques are fit together in a way that yields a convergent claim.53 54 It is in this way that
progress and strong explanations in the mind-brain sciences are achieved.
In sum, on Roskies (2010) account, when the results from different lab experiments from
different areas of science (ALFT-2) converge on the same/similar result we gain new insights
and knowledge about the mind-brain. The fitting together of those results is key to progress
because when convergence is achieved, there are good reasons to believe that the claim in
question stands on firm epistemic footing.
The last alternative to reduction I consider in this chapter is the concept of ‘seamless integration’
advanced by Piccinini and Craver (2011).55 Piccinini and Craver (2011) argue that mechanistic
explanations are superior to all other types on offer in the mind-brain sciences in that they offer
“… deeper, better confirmed and more useful descriptions …” (ibid, 307). Mechanistic
explanations produce reliable claims about the mind-brain by seamlessly integrating results from
psychological and neuroscientific research. To flesh out their account, I begin by describing
functional analysis and mechanistic explanation. Following this, I cite their example of the
neurotransmitter and chemical neurotransmission to introduce their concept of seamless
integration. I close by indicating how seamless integration relates to the notions of fitting
together and progress.
Piccinini and Craver (2011) note there is consensus that the psychological capacities studied by
psychology are explained functionally (ibid, 286). They call this explanation ‘functional
analysis’ which they describe as “… the analysis of a capacity in terms of the functional
properties of a system and their organization” (ibid). There are three main types of functional
analysis, depending on the kind of functional properties being investigated: task analysis
(Cummins 1975; Dennett 1978), functional analysis via internal states (Fodor 1965, 1968; Stich
53

Importantly, no strong examples of (b) or (c) are provided in Roskies’ (2010) work.
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One might also note some compatibility between (b) and (c) and what is required for adequate empirical
support for the assumptions of the primary science in Nagel’s inter-theoretic reduction via his essential condition.
Recall that the essential condition requires that the assumptions of the primary field are well supported empirical
evidence coming from different fields of study (which presumably use different methods and techniques) which fit
together to provide strong empirical support.
55

Again, there are, of course, other alternatives, but to review every and each reductive and non-reductive
account of explanation and progress would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. See footnote 8 of this
chapter for other non-reductive accounts not explored in detail here.
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1983), and boxology (Fodor 1965, 1968) (Piccinini and Craver 2011, 286). Task analysis
involves the decomposition of some capacity into its ‘subcapacities and their organization’;
function analysis via internal states involves analyzing a capacity in terms of its internal states
and their interactions; and boxology involves the decomposition of some capacity into a ‘set of
functionally individuated components’ (often represented in diagrams as black boxes), their
processes and organization (ibid). Importantly, it is typically believed that to explain some
phenomenon properly and fully, functional analysis need only appeal to the functional properties
of a given phenomenon.56
A mechanistic explanation involves describing “… capacities (functions, behaviors, activities) of
a system as a whole in terms of some of its components, their properties and capacities
(including their functions, behaviors and activities), and the way they are organized together”
(ibid, 291, emphasis mine). Components in a mechanism have both functional and structural
properties; an explanation appealing to function with structure, or structure without function
would be incomplete, according to Piccinini and Craver (ibid). The functional properties of a
component may include “… their activities or manifestations of their causal powers, dispositions
or capacities …” and the structural properties of a component may include things like shape,
size, location, and the organization of their sub-components (ibid).57
Mechanistic explanations require identifying the crucial components of a given mechanism
(ibid). These components are sometimes identified in terms of their structural properties; for
example, one might use anatomical techniques to parse out the nervous system based on the
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Piccinini and Craver (2011) do not subscribe to the view that some capacity can be explained solely via analysis
of functional properties and processes. This belief hinges on the argument that functional analyses of psychology
and mechanistic explanations of neuroscience are not autonomous and distinct. For a full explication of this
particular argument, see pages 286-291. For the sake of understanding the concept of integration as integral to
producing good explanations, it will suffice to note that Piccinini and Craver hold that functional analysis and
mechanistic explanation are not distinct and autonomous, and that their description of mechanistic explanation is
“… rich enough to incorporate the kinds of functional properties postulated by functional analysis” (290).
57

Piccinini and Craver (2011) note that the term ‘structure’ as used in mechanistic explanations does not entail
that structural components are static, or possess one sole function, or are neatly organized and localizable, or
stable. Instead, structural components can consist of dynamic and complex feedback relations with other
components in the same or different mechanism. Further, on the potential complexity of structural components,
they note that “… a structural component might be so distributed and diffuse as to defy tidy structural description,
though it no doubt has one if we had the time, knowledge, and patience to formulate it” (291).
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various types of neurons found in each structure and how they are connected (ibid).58 Sometimes
components are identified functionally; here, Piccinini and Craver appeal to how the use of fMRI
has been used on cases of brain damaged patients to help identify areas of the brain that play a
role in certain cognitive functions (ibid).59 These functional components play a critical role for
mechanistic explanation insofar as they help investigators identify the parts of the brain where
different kinds of cognitive functions might be found and help allocate functions to different
parts of the mechanism (ibid). Importantly, mechanistic explanation, on their account, involves a
two-way, interdependent constraint:
… the presence of certain functional properties within a mechanism constrains the possible
structures and configurations that might exhibit those properties. … the presence of certain
structures and configurations within a mechanism constrains the possible functions that might
be exhibited by those structures and configurations (ibid).
Mechanistic explanations can be complete or incomplete. Piccinini and Craver call incomplete
models of mechanisms ‘mechanistic sketches’ (ibid, 292). Mechanistic sketches contain gaps,
questions marks, boxes and arrows, etc., and do not count as a complete mechanistic explanation
insofar as critical details have been left out (ibid). Incomplete mechanistic models still have
heuristic value, however. That is, mechanistic sketches can provide users with just enough
information relevant to the goal/task at hand (e.g., for running an introductory tutorial, for
presenting a defense in a courtroom, etc.) (ibid). While mechanistic sketches can be useful, they
are nonetheless elliptical/incomplete insofar as they fail to provide a full-blown (i.e., consisting
of all the necessary details) mechanistic explanation.
The goal of mechanistic explanation is “… to reveal the causal structure of a system.
Explanatory models are evaluated as good or bad to the extent that they capture, even dimly at
times, aspects of that causal structure” (ibid, emphasis mine). Piccinini and Craver argue that
defenders of functional analysis are committed to the very same norms guiding mechanistic
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Piccinini and Craver (2011) cite Brodmann’s decomposition of the cortex into various structural regions as an
example of identifying components structurally (291).
59

fMRI (or functional magnetic resonance imaging) picks up on changes in blood oxygenation levels (the BOLD
signal) which occur as the result of changes in blood flow and other related factors (Roskies 2010, 637). Typically,
changes in the BOLD signal are taken to correlate with neural activity.
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explanations precisely because the former is an elliptical mechanistic explanation (ibid). Thus,
the two types of explanation, on their account, are inextricably linked.
As an example of a mechanistic explanation, they choose the neurotransmitter and the
mechanism of chemical neurotransmission (ibid, 304). They list six criteria that can be used to
determine whether a molecule is a neurotransmitter (ibid).60 They use this table to demonstrate
how attributing function to the neurotransmitter involves showing how it fits into the mechanism
of chemical neurotransmission. That is, each criterion is meant to demonstrate that the
neurotransmitter is “… organized – spatially, temporally, actively and quantitatively – into the
mechanisms of chemical transmission” (ibid, 305). For example:
Spatially, the transmitter has to be located in the presynaptic neuron and contained within
vesicles. Temporally, if the synapse has to convey signals passed by electrical signals that are
hundreds of milliseconds apart, there needs to be some means for removing the transmitter
from the cleft after each episode of release. The transmitter has to be actively integrated
within the mechanisms of synthesis of the presynaptic cell … and with the receptor
mechanisms of the post-synaptic cell … And quantitatively the molecule’s release must be
correlated with activation of the pre-synaptic cell, and it must be released in sufficient
quantity to affect the post-synaptic cell (ibid, 305-306, emphases mine).
Importantly, many of these criteria (e.g., localization) appeal directly to the structural properties
of the synapse; thus, understanding the neurotransmitter mechanistically involves integrating its
functional properties within the structural components of the mechanism of chemical
transmission. Piccinini and Craver argue that none of the properties alluded to in the example of
the neurotransmitter are ‘independent of the causal details’ of the mechanism of which it is a part
(ibid). Thus, they reason that this example is a prime illustration of how “… functional language
at lower-levels of neuroscience involves implicit commitments to structural facts about the
mechanism in question. The same, we claim, extends all the way up to the highest levels of the
neuroscience hierarchy” (ibid, 306).

60

See their table 1. For a visual representation and listing of the criteria for identifying a neurotransmitter
(Piccinini and Craver 2011, 304).
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It is at this point that they introduce their concept of seamless integration.61 Piccinini and
Craver claim that once the structural properties of some functional analysis are provided, the
functional analysis becomes a full-blown mechanistic explanation. It is this process of fitting the
structural details together with the functional details of some capacity that entails a complete
mechanistic explanation: “… functional analyses can be seamlessly integrated with mechanistic
explanations, and psychology can be seamlessly integrated with neuroscience” and this gives us
a unified picture of cognition (308, emphases mine). Integration entails that “… explanatory
unification will be achieved through the integration of findings from different areas of
neuroscience and psychology into a description of a multilevel mechanism” (ibid, 285).62
While they do not explicitly state it, it follows from their arguments and the
neurotransmitter/chemical neurotransmission example that it is the fitting together of different
areas of the mind-brain sciences (in this example, psychology and neuroscience) that entails
progress. That is, if it is the case that mechanistic explanation and functional analysis are
‘inextricably linked’, and if it is the case that when both explanations from each respective area
of science are fit together they are seamlessly integrated in such a way that entails a complete
explanation, then it would appear that progress requires integration of this sort.63 In fact, Craver
and Piccinini do claim that mechanistic explanations are the best type of explanation on offer in
the mind-brain sciences, and that mechanistic explanations produce “… deeper, better confirmed
and more useful descriptions …” (ibid, 307).
In sum, on their account, it is the functional properties of psychology that are being fit together
with the structural components of a mechanism that yields epistemically strong claims about the
mind-brain.
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Importantly, their concept of ‘seamless integration’ is brought up only peripherally at the end of their paper,
with little description and elaboration on their concept.
62

Thus, Craver and Piccinini (2011) too, like all other surveyed alternative non-reductive accounts position
themselves against reduction both in its classic, inter-theoretic form, and its more current articulations, such as
Nagel (1949, 1961, 1979) and Bickle’s (2003, 2006) accounts of explanation and scientific progress.
63

While they make no mention of Roskies ‘convergence’ (2010), Mitchell’s (2002, 2003) and Mitchell and
Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, nor Darden and Maull’s (1977) ‘interfield theories’, their (general account)
of fitting together seems compatible with both non-reductive accounts of explanation and scientific progress.
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1.2 Evaluating the Different Accounts of Fitting Together
There is consensus between both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts alike that claims
about the mind-brain stand on firm epistemic footing when they are the product of information
from different areas of science fitting together.64 Whether this fitting together involves one
theory being reduced to another, more primary theory (Nagel 1949, 1970), behavior being
reduced to low-level neuroscience (Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006), one theory bridging two respective
fields of science (Darden and Maull, 1977), or different areas of science being integrated
(Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich, 2006; Piccinini and Craver, 2011) or converging
(Roskies 2010), the common thread joining all the surveyed accounts is that epistemically strong
claims about the mind-brain are the product of interactive, collaborative, and integrative work
between different areas of science whereby information from each area is fit together to produce
a claim about the mind-brain. Despite the consensus on this assumption about the role of fitting
together and scientific progress, what each account lacks is a clear explanation of what it means
for information from different areas of science to fit together in such a way that demonstrates, to
use Roskies’ (2010) term, ‘conclusive evidence’ for a given claim (641). I will now elaborate on
this problem and close by stating its implications for the nature of scientific progress (i.e., why is
it important to get a handle on the nature of fitting together).65
On Roskies’ (2010) account, scientific progress consists of a process whereby different areas of
science triangulate (i.e., converge) on a claim; one might ask how convergence is meant to be
understood? Similarly, if we consider Nagel’s (1949) essential condition, which requires that the
claims of the primary science be empirically supported by evidence from different areas of
science, one might ask what it means for different areas of science to provide adequate empirical
support for a given claim? Must they, to use Roskies terminology, converge on the same claim?
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Furthermore, it is worth noting all surveyed accounts implicitly embrace some form of scientific realism. While
none of the authors explicitly state their stance on the matter, it follows that from the general belief that the
fitting together of different areas of science leads to better, deeper, more complete, stronger, and epistemically
warranted explanations that constitute scientific progress, that the authors probably all, to some degree or other,
embrace some form of scientific realism.
65

Although each account was surveyed historically (i.e., chronologically) in the first section, I will now consider
these accounts in terms of which bear important similarities to the other (e.g., Roskies 2010 and Nagel 1949, 1970;
Bickle 2003, 2006 and Darden and Maull 1977; and, Mitchell 2002, 2003, Mitchell and Dietrich 2006, and Piccinini
and Craver 2011).
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Neither Nagel nor Roskies elaborate on what it means for information from different areas of
science to converge/support a claim. Accordingly, I flesh out a couple of possibilities for the
notion of convergence/supporting to show how they are problematic, and state why their
concepts of fitting together require philosophical analysis.
Let us assume that Nagel’s essential condition requires something akin to Roskies’ notion of
convergence.66 How is convergence meant to be understood? 67 I identify two possible ways to
define convergence. The first involves a strong identity claim and the latter involves the notion
of consistency. The strong version requires that evidence from different tasks (for WLFT), or
evidence from different labs from (sometimes) different areas of science (ALFT-1/ ALFT-2)
converge on the exact same claim. A weaker version of convergence can be described via the
notion of consistency, whereby the evidence from different tasks and/or different labs (from
different areas of science) all generally point towards a claim with room for minor
discrepancies.68 However, both characterizations are problematic.
With respect to the strong version, it is impossible for evidence from different lab experiments in
different areas of science to converge on the exact same claim. This is because ALFT-2 involves
experiments from different lab experiments in different areas of science.69 Accordingly, if one
lab is working on memory on the rat brain using lesioning techniques and another lab is working
on memory in the human brain via fMRI, they would not converge on the exact same claim in
virtue of their investigating memory on different species via different experimental
protocols/techniques.
Instead, one might argue that pieces of evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences
need only be consistent with each other – i.e., that they do not contradict each other and there is a
general pointing towards a similar but not identical claim— and thus characterize convergence
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Since Nagel (1949) provides no elaboration on this point, it is at least a possibility that this could be what was
meant.
67

Again, Roskies (2010) herself provides little to no guidance here.
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It is already clear here, however, how terms like ‘general pointing towards’ and ‘minor discrepancies’ are vague
and require elaboration.
69

Nagel (1949) too required that the empirical support for the assumptions of the primary science come from
evidence from different areas of science.
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via the notion of consistency. However, the weak characterization of convergence runs the risk
of reducing mind-brain claims to trivial conclusions. By requiring consistency alone all we seem
to need is a general compatibility between the results from different areas of science. This kind
of compatibility seems all too easy to achieve, and accordingly, it trivializes claims resulting
from ALFT-2.70 Consistency alone is insufficient for ensuring reliable and accurate claims; that
evidence be consistent is one thing, but it is also necessary for evidence to be mutually
reinforcing in a way that coincidence, errors, and alternative explanations can be ruled out.
Thus, the concept of convergence is thus vague and prompts many clarificatory questions.
There is a lot of compatibility between Darden and Maull (1977) and Bickle’s (2003, 2006)
accounts. On Darden and Maull’s view, progress occurs when interfield theories bridge two
fields of science. One of their arguments for the importance of and generation of interfield
theories is that there are often questions which are unanswerable from within one field (F1) that
can be answered via the techniques, methods, and resources of another field (F2). Bickle (2003,
2006) concedes this point. In fact, this is the very basis for his encouragement of
transdisciplinary projects and the importance of higher-level theorizing to help address questions
and problems that cannot be addressed via the resources of low-level neuroscience. Thus, on
both accounts, information from two (or more) fields need to be fit together to solve a
problem/question that one field in isolation cannot answer. This fitting together of information
from different areas of science, on both accounts, leads to strong explanations about the mindbrain71
While they concede these points, both offer different accounts of fitting together. Darden and
Maull (1977) argue the key to complete and epistemically strong claims involves the generation
of interfield theories. However, they fail to provide criteria for determining what defines a
successful interfield theory; what demarcates a successful from an unsuccessful relation? What
would an unsuccessful relation look like? Since there are multiple types of relations that can
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And in any case, who decides what entails a general compatibility? How is one to determine where general
compatibility begins and ends. Is there a general standard/set of criteria for determining this or is it a ‘to each
(researcher) their own’ scenario?
71

Of course, there are critical differences between the two; most notably relating to the characterization of the
relations as non-reductive (Darden and Maull) and reductive (Bickle). The point of emphasis here is to stress
where their accounts are compatible with respect to the notions of fitting together, explanations, and progress.
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hold between fields (Darden and Maull identify three distinct types in their (1977) paper
‘Interfield Theories’)), is there/should there be a hierarchical taxonomy of criteria addressing
each type of relation?
Bickle (2003, 2006) argues that for a successful reduction of behavior-to-molecules, higher-level
theorizing must first isolate a candidate cellular or molecular process. However, on this account,
one might ask what kinds of norms guide this kind of relationship between high-level theorizing
and low-level neuroscience? What criteria must high-level theorizing appeal to in order to
adequately pick out a candidate cellular or molecular process; what criteria must a behaviormolecules reduction appeal to in order to ensure epistemically strong claims/explanations about
the mind-brain? How many studies in low-level neuroscience are required for one to confidently
state a ruthless reduction has occurred? How, when, and at what point can we know that a
reduction of Bickle’s sort has been achieved? Like the concept of convergence, the concept of
interfield theories and ruthless reduction are also vague and subject to many clarificatory
questions.
Finally, Mitchell (2002, 2003), Mitchell and Dietrich (2006), and Piccinini and Craver (2011)
each propose the concept of ‘integration’ to account for the relations between the mind-brain
sciences that constitute strong epistemic claims and scientific progress. Here too, however,
similar questions and problems emerge. Specifically, their characterizations of ‘integrative
pluralism’ and ‘seamless integration’ are vague. On Mitchell (2002, 2003) and Mitchell and
Dietrich’s (2006) account of integrative pluralism, one might ask what it would mean for
different but compatible hypotheses to be integrated together? Mitchell (2002, 2003) appeals to
three explanations of self-organization for the division of labor in social insects and argues that
these different but compatible hypotheses must be integrated at the level of concrete application.
However, Mitchell (2002, 2003) never actually explains if and how this occurred. What criteria
must be satisfied for a proper integration? Must all compatible hypotheses be integrated, or only
some? If the latter, how are the hypotheses to be integrated identified and chosen from the
hypotheses that will be omitted from the integrated explanation; what norms guide this kind of
integration of compatible hypotheses?
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Piccinini and Craver (2011) argue that when neuroscience provides the structural details of some
psychological capacity/process, the two fields are seamlessly integrated resulting in complete
and epistemically strong explanations about the mind-brain. They appeal to the example of
chemical neurotransmission as an instance of information from two fields being seamlessly
integrated, but it remains unclear, from this example, just how exactly information from
psychology and neuroscience was integrated. Seamless integration must require more than
simply fitting (a) function(s) of some mechanism into its structure(s). How can one discern
when a full-blown mechanism has been met? Piccinini and Craver (2011) provide no criteria for
discerning when and how a seamless integration occurs. Admittedly, this is because Piccinini
and Craver say nothing on what it means to be seamlessly integrated (only that it has occurred);
no definition or elaboration is provided. Thus, the various accounts of integration are also vague
and elicit numerous questions and concerns.
None of the surveyed accounts provide a strong definition or an in-depth analysis of what it
would mean for information from different areas of science to be fit together, nor do they
provide a clear set of criteria for determining when, how, and to what extent different areas of
science have been successfully ‘reduced’, ‘integrated’, ‘converged’, etc.

1.3 Concluding Remarks on the Historical Survey of the Accounts of Scientific Progress
and Fitting Together
In sum, all surveyed accounts involve the assumption that information from different areas of
science must be fit together to yield complete and epistemically strong explanations. However,
as I demonstrated in section 1.2, each notion of fitting together is vague and requires
philosophical attention. If it is the case that the fitting together of information from different
areas of the mind-brain sciences is required for claims about the mind-brain to stand on firm
epistemic footing, it is crucial to get clear on the concept of fitting together by asking what fitting
together entails, how it unfolds in scientific practice, and whether it is an achievable goal. Given
that the notion of fitting together is emphasized across both reductive and non-reductionist
accounts of scientific progress as a fundamental requirement for epistemically strong claims, and
given that current accounts of fitting together are unclear, it is critical to isolate and analyze this
concept.
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To address this problem, I introduce the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ in chapter two as a
placeholder for the term ‘fitting together’ to capture what I think philosophers of science have
been gesturing towards, but which has yet to be clearly articulated and analyzed. From this
point, I identity a unit of analysis (i.e., the review paper) that exemplifies the fitting together of
evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences in practice. I conduct a two-part
analysis of a case study of a review paper in chapters three and four, respectively, to get a handle
on how review papers work to corroborate claims about the mind-brain by drawing on evidence
from different areas of the mind-brain sciences.
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Chapter 2
2 Introduction
In chapter 1, I noted the current and popular view of the relationship between the different areas
of the mind-brain sciences is integrationist, interdisciplinary and non-autonomous. A key
assumption behind this view is the thought that evidence from different areas of the mind-brain
sciences must be fit together in a certain way to yield complete and epistemically strong claims
about the mind-brain. I surveyed some reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of scientific
progress emphasizing the notion of fitting together, and closed by highlighting key problems
held by each account. The overall problem I identified is that each concept of fitting together is
vague and under-analyzed; since this concept is emphasized across the board by both
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of scientific progress for strong epistemic claims
about the mind-brain, it is crucial to isolate and analyze this concept.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce various units of analysis that exemplify the fitting together
of findings from different areas of the mind-brain sciences, and to argue that of those units of
analysis, the Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper is a good candidate to start investigating
the nature of fitting together and its relation to strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain. I
begin, in section 2.1, by introducing the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ as a general
placeholder for the notion of fitting together emphasized in the different accounts of scientific
progress I surveyed in chapter one. Critically, ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ is introduced as a
working definition, and accordingly, requires elaboration and analysis. I argue a good starting
point for investigating the nature of ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ is to analyze review papers
as these units of analysis survey literature on a given topic and often demonstrate how different
findings fit together to support a claim about the mind-brain. To get a better understanding of
the epistemic role of review papers in relation to ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ and the mindbrain sciences, I begin by sketching the motivation, history, and development of review papers in
section 2.2. In section 2.3, I advance a taxonomy for the kinds of review papers found in mindbrain science journals. In section 2.4, I note the epistemic advantages review papers boast; this
sets the stage for section 2.5, wherein I argue that the Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper
is a good starting part for analyzing ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’.

42

To better understand the notion of ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ via a Trends in Cognitive
Sciences review paper, I conduct a two-part analysis in chapters three and four, with the aim of
extracting key lessons for the notion of ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ and its relation to
progress in the mind-brain sciences.

2.1 Interdisciplinary Corroboration: A Working Definition
In chapter 1, I identified a common assumption linking both reductive and non-reductive
accounts of explanation and progress – i.e., that different areas of science must be fit together to
generate strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain (or an aspect of the mind-brain, such as
memory). The problem I identified with this assumption is that the notion of fitting together has
been largely under-analyzed; as such, it may turn out that this fundamental assumption is flawed
(or that it requires further philosophical attention). To address this problem, I introduce the term
‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ (hereafter IC) as a general placeholder for what I believe
philosophers of science have been gesturing towards but have yet to articulate and analyze in
detail. It is from this point that I will begin to analyze what IC means and what its implications
are for scientific progress and strong explanations about the mind-brain.
My working definition of IC is that scientific findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain
insofar as they are interdisciplinary, mutually supportive, and all point towards a general claim.
The accounts of scientific progress I surveyed in chapter one all maintained that strong epistemic
claims about the mind-brain required evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences to
fit together. Implicit in their accounts is an argument stipulating claims about the mind-brain are
corroborated by the fitting together of results from different areas of the mind-brain sciences.
For this reason, I introduce IC as a general placeholder for the various concepts of fitting
together presented in chapter one to facilitate my analysis of how interdisciplinary results fit
together to corroborate claims about the mind-brain.
There are two key components comprising IC: an interdisciplinary component, and a
corroboration component. The interdisciplinarity component relates to the different areas
comprising the mind-brain sciences (e.g., computer science and AI, biology, neuroscience,
psychology, genetics, etc.) and their respective findings on a given topic. The corroboration
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component relates to how evidence confirms or lends support to a given claim about the mindbrain.
How do interdisciplinarity and corroboration connect? Bechtel and Richardson (1993) discuss
corroboration in the context of the necessity of independent measures:
If we have available a number of independent but uncertain pieces of evidence, all of which
point to the same conclusion, then that conclusion may in fact be extremely probable, even if
each piece of evidence is uncertain. By contrast, even a highly reliable procedure will have
some likelihood of failure. It is a simple exercise in probability to see that employing
multiple independent modes of evidence is superior to relying on a chain of inferences from
one piece of evidence. Afterall, the likelihood of getting an error in the latter case is the sum
of the likelihood of errors at each step. Think of adding a long series of numbers. At each
step there is a small chance of error, but the overall likelihood of error can be quite high. By
contrast, with independent but unreliable pieces of evidence, each piece of evidence may have
a relatively high likelihood of error, but the overall likelihood will tend to be low (xxvii,
emphasis mine).72
Importantly, they note that for this to be true, it is critical for different pieces of evidence to be
the product of independent measures. This is where the interdisciplinarity component comes into
play. As noted in chapter one of this dissertation and above, the mind-brain sciences comprise
multiple areas of science including but not limited to: psychology, cognitive science, cognitive
neuroscience, biology, cellular and molecular neurobiology, computer science and artificial
intelligence, genetics, etc. Reflected in this diversity of areas investigating the mind-brain are
numerous different methods, tools, techniques, etc. These methods include but are no means
limited to the following: questionnaires and surveys, imaging techniques such as fMRI or
positron emission tomography (PET)), electrophysiological recordings, gene knockouts or
genome editing, computational modelling, etc. Accordingly, it is likely that if there are multiple
sources of evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences, which make use of many
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This is similar to the argument Roskies (2010) makes with her insistence on the necessity of functional
triangulation for convergent (i.e., strong) explanations and scientific progress.

44

different methods, experimental protocols, and tools/techniques of analysis, then one can argue
the pieces of evidence are the product of independent measures.
Bechtel and Richardson (1993) argue if multiple sources point to the same conclusion, and
especially if those multiple sources employ independent measures, it is very likely that a
conclusion has been corroborated (in the sense that it is well-confirmed/supported/highly
likely).73 74 This is what I have in mind for IC: evidence from multiple areas of the mind-brain
sciences (using different tasks, experimental protocols, methods, etc.) corroborating claim x
insofar as that evidence all points towards x and that evidence is mutually supportive.
My working definition of IC leads to the question: how does IC function in the mind-brain
sciences, and to what extent does it result in epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain?
In answering this, it is helpful to look for instances of IC in practice; where are such instances
found? 75
Instances of IC are typically not found in the day-to-day science conducted in individual labs; in
these cases, the goal is to answer very specific research questions from within a specific area of
science. IC involves interdisciplinarity, and, as such, given that most day-to-day lab work is
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Wimsatt (2007) makes a similar argument for his concept of robustness. Building on Campbell’s (1966) concept
of triangulation in the social sciences, Wimsatt argues that things are robust to the extent that, “… they are
accessible (detectable, measurable, derivable, definable, producible, or the like) in a variety of independent ways”
(Wimsatt 2007, 196). Like Bechtel and Richardson (1993), the emphasis on independent measures is critical.
Wimsatt notes that we can be more confident in entities, processes, relations, mechanisms, etc. that are the result
of multiple independent measures because “… the chance that we could be simultaneously wrong in each of these
ways declines with the number of independent checks we have” (Wimsatt 2007, 196).
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Hacking (1983) also makes a similar argument in the context of entity realism. Hacking argues that entity
realism (specifically unobservable entities) is warranted if an entity is detected by multiple different and
independent means of detection; the more independent means of detection; the more warranted said entity
becomes. Hacking refers to the example of detecting the dense bodies of red blood platelets. In this case, “Two
physical processes – electron transmission and fluorescent re-emission – are used to detect the bodies. These
processes have virtually nothing in common between them. They are essentially unrelated chunks of physics. It
would be a preposterous coincidence if, time and again, two completely different physical processes produced
identical visual configurations which were, however, artifacts of the physical processes rather than real structures
in the cell” (Hacking 1983, 201).
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In emphasizing the importance to practice I am aligning myself with the new mechanists, whom, towards the
end of the 20th century, emphasized the importance of looking at the history of science and scientific practice to
inform our theories. See Bechtel and Richardson (1993) for a brief historical summary of the shift from logical
positivism’s focus on scientific justification and the logical structure of explanations, to the focus on history with
Kuhn’s (1970) Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and then to the new mechanist focus on practice, history, and
discovery in the late 1980’s (xxi).
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conducted within one specific area of science, it is not an ideal starting point for examining IC in
practice.
The scientific research papers emerging out of those labs seem like a better option insofar as
these papers often try to situate their findings within the broader context of the literature, and in
doing so, may cite other studies to lend support to the claim(s) they advance. The problem with
these papers is that the primary goal is to present original research, and, accordingly, the scope of
the corroborative work is narrow. Ideally, one would want the scope of corroboration to be
much wider and for the main goal of the paper to demonstrate how interdisciplinary findings on a
given topic fit together to support a given claim about the mind-brain.
Instead, a unit of analysis with great promise for analyzing IC is various types of review papers.
Interestingly, Roskies (2010) claims we can find instances of convergence in metaanalyses/review papers. Arguing against Van Orden and Paap’s (1997) view that neuroimaging
fails to find convergent results, Roskies states:
Convergence across multiple experiments is the key to epistemic warrant when it comes to
attributing function to anatomical regions. Results from any single study are viewed by
scientists as providing evidence for one way of parceling out cognitive function over another,
but not as conclusive evidence. Van Orden and Paap seem to disregard the importance of
functional triangulation in part because they claim that experiments meant to triangulate
function fail to find convergent regions of activity. The majority of the literature belies this
interpretation as recent meta-analyses have shown strong convergence in imaging results
across tasks, across laboratories, and both across and within subjects (Roskies 2010, 641,
emphasis mine).
Roskies cites review papers by Krain et al. (2006), Miller et al. (2002), Steele and Lawrie (2004),
and Van Overwalle (2009), as examples of literature demonstrating convergence (Roskies 2010,
624). However, Roskies does not provide an in-depth analysis of these units of analysis, nor
their implications for convergence and scientific progress.
Briefly, as an introductory description, authors of review papers summarize literature on a given
topic. Some review papers consist primarily of a literature summary and contain no arguments.
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Critically for my dissertation, however, many review papers provide more than a summary; they
also contain arguments – sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit. These arguments support
claims about the mind-brain based on the author’s summarized findings. These arguments often
involve the author demonstrating how findings from different areas of science combine to
corroborate a claim about the mind-brain. Sometimes these arguments are the product of metaanalysis, sometimes they are the result of a qualitative analysis. Thus, authors of review papers
appear to do the work required by IC; that is, they demonstrate how findings from different areas
of the mind-brain sciences (interdisciplinarity) fit together in a way that lends support
to/confirms (corroboration) claims about the mind-brain. Therefore, review papers provide a
strong starting point for beginning to investigate the nature of IC by analyzing how it unfolds in
practice.76
Other philosophers of science have stated that progress in science is made when the findings
from different areas of science fit together to support/confirm a claim about the mind-brain.77 IC
is a working definition I introduce to get a handle on the phenomena of fitting together. Review
papers are a good starting point for this project insofar as they involve both the interdisciplinarity
and corroboration aspects, and, accordingly, appear to produce epistemically strong claims about
the mind-brain. In chapters three and four, I conduct an in-depth analysis of a case study review
paper. Importantly, because I begin with a working definition of IC in this chapter, it is likely
that a more complex and nuanced picture of IC will emerge post-analysis. Before conducting my
analysis of a review paper, however, I begin by explicating what a review paper is, what
elements it is composed of, what standards it must adhere to, and arguments for the epistemic
superiority of claims emerging out of review papers.

2.2 Motivation, History, and Development of Review Papers
If one is interested in IC, and the ideal outcome of IC is knowledge production – specifically the
production of epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain – in the mind-brain sciences, and
if review papers are strong candidates for how IC works in practice, then one would imagine
there are certain standards review papers must adhere to. Part of my goal in this chapter is to
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That is not to say that review papers represent the only way in which areas of science are demonstrated to
corroborate a claim about the mind, only that it is a strong candidate to begin analyzing IC in practice.
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See my chapter one for a review of this literature.
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explicate what a review paper is, when and how it developed in the sciences, and to elucidate
what criteria are used to produce epistemically strong claims.
A few precursory notes before I begin. There are no specific organizations or lists of criteria for
writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences.78 For this reason, when I discuss the history,
development, and criteria for writing review papers, I do so in the context of the social sciences
and the health sciences. Accordingly, I reference different organizations (e.g., the Cochrane
Collaboration) and standardized checklists for writing review papers (e.g., the Preferred
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (hereafter PRISMA)) within those
areas of science. Critically, the standards for Cochrane Collaboration and PRISMA review
papers are not representative of review papers found in mind-brain science journals. This is
because review papers in the mind-brain sciences involve the synthesis of information from the
different areas of science housed under the umbrella of the mind-brain sciences (e.g.,
psychology, biology, computer science and AI, genetics, neuroscience, etc.). These areas of
science make use of different methods, experimental protocols, and tools and techniques of
analysis, and, accordingly, the standards advanced by organizations such as the Cochrane
Collaboration in the health sciences, for example, will not be applicable to review papers in the
mind-brain sciences.79 As such, I introduce and discuss the history, development, and criteria
for writing review papers in the context of the health and social sciences while referring to
organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration for comparative reasons.
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I will return to this point later in this section.
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That is, review papers in the health sciences frequently analyze and synthesize information using similar
methods, tools, and techniques of analysis. For example, a Cochrane review by Mehrholz, Thomas, and Elsner
(2017) looked at treadmill training and body weight support interventions for humans post-stroke. Critically, this
review looked at two main types of interventions – i.e., treadmill training and body weight support – and focused
on human adults post-stroke. Of the 3105 human participants, the majority were approximately 60 years old and
had previously had a stroke; thus, there was little variation in the type of species being considered in the review
paper. Further, the methods used were all similar; all involved a combination of treadmill training with body
weight support, treadmill training without body weight support, and treadmill training with some other
physiotherapy support. Review papers in the mind-brain sciences, however, involve looking at information from
different areas of the mind-brain sciences; consequently, the information being synthesized comes from research
conducted on a wide variety of human and non-human animals, using very different and distinct methods,
experimental protocols, techniques and tools of analysis. Consequently, the standards for review papers in the
health sciences/social sciences are not applicable to the types of reviews found in mind-brain sciences journals.
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Generally speaking, a review paper provides a condensed summary of the current state of
research in a specific field (e.g., in literature, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, etc.) in
relation to a specific topic within that field (e.g., exile in Prussian literature, kinship in
anthropology, episodic memory in cognitive neuroscience, etc.), and this summary will include
multiple citations from relevant secondary sources. Review papers typically include some or all
of the following features (depending on the kind of review paper they are classified as80): a
summary, an explanation, a synthesis, and a direction(s) for future research. The first
component involves summarizing recent work relative to some question within a field of
research, and, as such, it provides an avenue for the reader (both the expert, but particularly the
non-expert) to develop a general understanding of the topic and where things stand. In writing
this summary, authors of review papers cite relevant published papers. Authors of the review
papers might also explain how the various findings from their cited studies shape and impact the
question or topic they are writing on, and they might also provide a synthesis of those findings
such that a given claim is advanced as substantiated by the cited literature. Finally, authors
might suggest, based on their summary and/or their analyses (via explanation and/or synthesis),
directions for future research. This is a rough and ready sketch of what a review paper is. I will
now contextualize review papers within the history and development of research synthesis, and
then contextualize them further within the mind-brain sciences.
Gurevitch et al. (2018) trace the beginning of research synthesis with the birth of meta-analysis,
which they date around the early 20th C. They define research synthesis as: “… synthesizing
results across studies to reach an overall understanding of a problem and to identify sources of
variation outcomes” (Gurevitch et al. 2018, 175). This began when Pearson attempted to
combine knowledge from different studies to determine whether vaccination was an effective
preventative measure against typhoid in soldiers in 1905 (ibid, 176). In 1925, Fisher developed a
method for combining probabilities over multiple studies (ibid). The development of metaanalysis continued into the mid-20th century with the attempt to formalize Fisher’s method via
fixed and random-effects models by Yates and Cochran (1938) and Cochran (1954) (Gurevitch
et al. 2018, 176). However, it was not until 1977 that meta-analysis became acknowledged as a
significant and invaluable tool for scientific research. That is “… it was not until the insight of
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I will elaborate on this classification below in section 2.3.
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psychologists G. Glass and M. Smith in 1977 – that outcome measures from different
experiments could be standardized and put on the same scale – that meta-analysis began to affect
scientific research to a large extent” (ibid).
Approximately nine decades following Pearson’s attempt to combine results across multiple
studies, Chalmers and Altman introduced the term ‘systematic review’ in their 1994 foreword to
their 1995 book, Systematic Reviews. In this book, they argue for the necessity of review papers
in light of the “… ever-increasing tidal waves of new research evidence” (Chalmers and Altman
1994, foreword).81 Specifically, they argue that what they call ‘the systematic review’ is best
suited to help researchers navigate the ‘tidal wave’ of new evidence pouring in from multiple
sources in the health sciences (ibid). They define the systematic review as a review which has
“… been prepared using some kind of systematic approach to minimizing biases and random
errors, and that the components of the approach will be documented in a materials and methods
section” (ibid, emphases mine).82 Systematic Reviews (1995) acts as an introductory handbook
for understanding and writing systematic reviews by advising potential authors on how to pick
relevant studies for a systematic review, how to identify problems within meta-analyses,
provides checklists for scientifically sound systematic review papers, and guidelines on how to
report, update, and correct systematic reviews.
Chalmers and Altman’s seminal work Systematic Reviews (1995) changed the course of research
synthesis (both with respect to how it was defined and conducted). Prior to 1995, research
synthesis took the form of what Gurevitch et al. (2018) call the ‘narrative review’. Gurevitch et
al. (2018) provide no definition of a narrative review, claiming only that the main aim of a
narrative review is to ‘summarize results across studies” (175). The main problem they identify
with narrative review papers for research synthesis is that it has become increasingly difficult to
summarize hundreds of studies on a given problem in an un-biased way (ibid). This, they
speculate, may account for why narrative reviews haven fallen out of favor and why they have
been replaced by systematic reviews, which are allegedly more equipped to deal with large
81

Importantly, this book is written in the context of the health sciences.
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They distinguish the systematic review from meta-analyses in terms of qualitative and quantitative analyses
(Chalmers and Altman 1994, foreword). Systematic reviews do not necessarily need to incorporate a meta-analysis
(i.e., a quantitative synthesis of data); instead, they may present a qualitative synthesis (this is especially popular in
the social sciences).
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volumes of research and problems of bias and random errors (ibid). Gurevitch et al. (2018) note
that despite having fallen out of favor, narrative reviews are still useful for providing a summary
of the development and progress of a given intervention, problem, or field of research; the
problem is that they cannot adequately ‘summarize results across studies’ (ibid). Importantly,
Gurevitch et al. do not explain what they mean by ‘summarize results across studies’ (ibid). On
my reading, when they claim that narrative review papers cannot accurately summarize results
across studies I take it they mean narrative review papers cannot synthesize results across studies.
Accordingly, one of the key differentiating factors between narrative and systematic review
papers is that the primary component of the former is summary, and the latter is synthesis. If this
is the case, then narrative reviews simply list out/or summarize findings from different studies,
but offer no explanations, arguments, or comments on their findings and how they shape the
topic at hand, nor do they provide a synthesis of those findings. Instead, that kind of work is
performed by authors of systematic reviews.
After 1995, systematic reviews were the main form of research synthesis in the medical/health
and social sciences. Gurevitch et al. define systematic reviews as papers which:
… aim to provide a robust overview of the efficacy of an intervention, or of a problem or field
of research. They can be combined with quantitative meta-analyses to assess the magnitude
of the outcome across relevant primary studies and to analyze the causes of variation among
study outcomes (effect sizes)” (ibid, emphases mine).
Systematic reviews boast numerous advantages and are revered in the literature on research
synthesis as being a critical tool for scientific research and scientific progress (ibid).
One particular feature – i.e., the reduction of bias – is held by many in the research synthesis
literature (e.g., Chalmers and Altman 1995, Gurevitch et al. 2018, Mulrow 1995, Shamseer et al.
2015, etc.) as being one of the standout features that differentiates systematic reviews from
traditional, narrative reviews, contributing to epistemically strong claims. None of these authors
advance a full-fledged argument for the reduction of bias via the systematic review. However,
on my reading, their claim hinges on what I identify as two key assumptions made in the
literature on research synthesis. The first involves systematic reviews relying on an explicit set
of methods and standardized guidelines for writing review papers, and the second involves the
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relationship between systematic reviews and open science; I will now review each assumption in
turn.
The first assumption I identify is because systematic reviews rely on ‘explicit methods’ and
‘formal methodological guidelines’ via organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration, the
Campbell Collaboration, and PRISMA, the claims emerging out of systematic reviews stand on
firmer epistemic footing than claims emerging out of papers which do not adhere to any
standardized guidelines (Gurevitch et al. 2018, 175; Mulrow 1995, 1).83 That is, these
organizations produce checklists and guidelines for:
… literature search, study screening (including critical appraisal of eligible studies according
to pre-defined criteria), data extraction, coding and often statistical analysis (that is, metaanalysis), along with detailed, transparent documentation of each step. Software, protocols
and reporting guidelines for systematic reviews and meta-analyses are well established in
many fields; for example, PRISMA … (ibid, emphasis mine).
The key assumption I identity for the reason systematic reviews deliver unbiased claims hinges
on this notion of ‘pre-defined criteria’ (ibid). That is, because, (ideally), all authors are being
held to the same standards with respect to how to write, publish, and update systematic reviews,
authors are less likely to let their own biases infiltrate their analyses. An author writing a
systematic review without consulting well-documented and formalized guidelines would
presumably be choosing their own methods for writing a review paper. Accordingly, the author
in question would be choosing their own selection criteria, method(s) of data documentation and
interpretation, etc., increasing the likelihood of the author’s personal biases infiltrating each step
of the review writing process. This would arguably make the claims emerging from said review
less reliable. 84 85 86 87
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I will elaborate on these organizations and their guidelines shortly.
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C.f. also Oxman and Guyatt (1988) for the elimination/reduction of bias in systematic reviews.
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Again, this is my interpretation of what I think Gurevitch et al. (2018) are trying to get at in their claim that
systematic reviews eliminate bias as they never explicitly back up and elaborate on this claim.
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These claims are, of course, not without their criticisms. See Eysenck (1995); Egger et al. (1997); Ioannidis
(2016); Gurevitch et al. (2018), etc. for some challenges and limitations pertaining to systematic reviews, metaanalysis, and their ability to reduce bias in the health sciences.
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See Sullivan (2016) for a critique of meta-analysis in the mind-brain sciences.
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How did organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration emerge and develop in the history of
research synthesis? The late 20th and early 21st century saw substantial procedural and
methodological growth, with much of that growth being attributed to multi-disciplinary
collaboration organizations geared towards the advancement of research synthesis for the
sciences. Of notable mention for multi-disciplinary collaborations are the Cochrane
Collaboration founded in 1993, the Campbell Collaboration created in 1999, the Society for
Research Synthesis Methodology founded in 2005, and PRISMA (Gurevitch et al. 2018, 175).
These organizations effectively “… oversee systematic reviews in the medical and social
sciences, respectively, bringing practioners and methodologists together and setting standards for
research synthesis publications and evidence-based guidelines for practice and policy” (ibid, 176,
emphasis mine). To re-iterate a point made above, it seems for Gurevitch et al. (2018) and
Mulrow (1995), systematic reviews reduce bias in scientific claims precisely because they follow
the strict and well-documented methods/guidelines advanced by these organizations.
As an example of guidelines for writing sound systematic review papers, meta-analyses, or
systematic reviews with a meta-analysis, consider PRISMA’s 27-item checklist.88 PRISMA
provides potential authors with a minimum set of items required for writing systematic reviews
(with and without meta-analysis) (http://www.prisma-statement.org/). PRISMA “… focuses on
the reporting of reviews evaluating randomized trials but can also be used as a basis for reporting
systematic reviews of other types of research, particularly evaluations of interventions” (ibid).
The PRISMA checklist includes instructions for sections of review papers including the title,
abstract, introduction, methods, results, discussion, and funding (ibid). Each of these sections
contains sub-topics which are elaborated on; this elaboration provides authors with instructions
on what they need to do to ensure a scientifically sound review paper. For example, under the
section ‘methods’ in the sub-topic ‘study selection’, PRISMA states all authors must “… state
the process for selecting studies (i.e., screening, eligibility, included in systematic review, and , if
applicable, in meta-analysis” (http://prismastatement.org/documents/PRISMA%202009%20checklist.pdf, 1). Under sub-section ‘risk of

88

Since PRISMA’s checklist pertains to systematic reviews, meta-analysis, or systematic review with a metaanalysis, I will shorten this to ‘review paper’ in the remainder of this section. Unless specified otherwise, I use the
term in this section of the chapter to encompass any of those types of reviews.
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bias in individual studies’, PRISMA states authors must “Describe methods used for assessing
risk of bias in individual studies (including specification of whether this was done at the study or
outcome level), and how this information is to be used in any data synthesis” (ibid). Under the
sub-section ‘synthesis of results’, PRISMA requires that all authors “Describe the methods of
handling data and combining results of studies, if done, including measures of consistency … for
each meta-analysis (ibid). 89 Similar, but more elaborate guidelines are provided in the Cochrane
handbook for the health/medical sciences and the Campbell Collaboration for the social
sciences.90
PRISMA’s checklist and the standards provided by organizations such as the Campbell
collaboration deliver strict methods and guidelines which, on my interpretation, Mulrow (1995)
and Gurevitch et al. (2018) hold responsible for the reduction of bias in systematic review
papers.91 That is, following these guidelines allows for the un-biased assessment of a question,
problem, or debate, resulting in reliable claims because authors are all held to the same
standards for researching, reporting, writing, and updating review papers. Importantly, I
interpret both Gurevitch et al. (2018) and Mulrow’s (1995) claims as comparative. That is, they
are not claiming that following these guidelines entails the end-product of a systematic review
will be wholly unbiased, but that in comparison to traditional reviews (i.e., narrative reviews),
they are significantly less biased.
The second assumption I identify with respect to the arguments in the literature on research
synthesis for the reduction of bias in systematic reviews involves the relationship between openscience and systematic reviews. Open science is the belief that the dissemination of scientific
research ought to be transparent and openly accessible to the public (including both experts and
non-experts). Gurevitch et al. (2018) discuss the nature and virtues of open-science practices:
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See http://prisma-statement.org/prismastatement/Checklist.aspx for the full PDF version of the checklist.
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Please see file:///C:/Users/Jackie/Downloads/Campbell_Policies_and_Guidelines_v4.pdf for guidelines by the
Campbell Collaboration “Campbell Systematic Reviews: Policies and Guidelines” and http://handbook-51.cochrane.org/ for the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions.
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Their claim thus importantly hinges on most/all journals/authors appealing to and abiding by these guidelines
and standards. That is, if all are held to the same set of standards, then the author’s personal biases are less likely
to infiltrate the systematic review, thus resulting in less biased conclusions.
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Open-science practices have emphasized full and unbiased access to scientific data, which is
of longstanding importance and central to future progress in meta-analysis. Pre-registration
(called ‘registration’ in some fields) of planned studies can reduce selective reporting of
outcomes; publication of ‘registration reports’ in which the methods and proposed analyses
for a study are peer-reviewed and published before the research is conducted and can reduce
publication bias (ibid, 180).
Gurevitch et al. (2018) say little more on how open science contributes to the reduction of bias.
Accordingly, I draw on work by Nosek et al. (2015) to draw out the assumption I believe is
behind Gurevitch et al.’s claims (ibid).
Nosek et al. (2015) elaborate on the nature of open-science practices by advancing eight
standards they deem critical for openness and transparency in the scientific community.92 For
example, Nosek et al. (2015) note that design standards allow for an “… increase in transparency
about the research process and reduce vague or incomplete reporting of the methodology”
(1423). Complete transparency and proper documentation of one’s design protocols allows
others to better evaluate the claims emerging out of review papers. If one’s design and methods
protocols were vague, incomplete, and/or absent, this may lead to an inaccurate assessment of
review paper’s main claim. Accordingly, the epistemic status of that paper’s main claim would
stand on uncertain epistemic footing. That is, to properly assess whether the claims emerging out
of a review paper stand on firm epistemic footing, one needs to know that the methods used to
investigate the topic in question are sound/reliable. It is difficult to make that assessment if the
protocols are not explicitly outlined in the review paper; therefore, increasing transparency and
documentation standards for review papers may help alleviate this problem.
Another standard crucial for openness and transparency involves the preregistration of studies
and the preregistration of plans for the analysis. Gurevitch et al. (2018) also stress the
importance of this standard in relation to open-science practices. Here, they note preregistration
of studies and analysis plans are peer-reviewed and published prior to the writing of the actual
review. This reduces bias insofar as the author must adhere to those published plans, even if the
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I only address a few of their standards here for the sake of brevity. For a full list, see their diagram of standards
and levels on page 1424 (Nosek et al. 2015).
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resulting claim disconfirms their initial hypothesis (180). Nosek et al. (2015) add that the
preregistration of studies makes the process of finding research (published or unpublished) much
easier by making sure the study is recorded in a public registry, and that the preregistration of
analysis plans “… certify the distinction between confirmatory and exploratory research …”
(1423).
In addition to providing eight general standards, Nosek et al. propose levels from 0-3 where
levels 0-3 represent increasingly strict standards where level 0 is offered for comparative reasons
and level 0 does not meet any standard, and level 3 outlines the highest standards for open
science (ibid, 1423-1424). Ideally, all review papers would fall under level 3 – i.e., they would
adhere to strict standards to increase transparency and reduce bias in the review paper.93 The
assumption that systematic reviews reduce bias in virtue of their relationship to open-science
practices is that because guidelines such as the PRISMA checklist are accessible to the public,
and because the emphasis on transparency requires authors to document all steps of the review
process in a public forum (e.g., to publish the plans for the analysis prior to conducting the
review), the claims emerging out of systematic review papers are less likely to be biased
compared to narrative review papers.
The relationship between open-science practices and systematic reviews that Gurevitch et al.
(2018) point towards is one where instead of the traditional reviewer writing within the narrow
confines of their own work space, with little to no interaction with other specialists, choosing
their selection criteria and interpretation of the data as they see fit, systematic reviews (with or
without meta-analysis) are written in a space that breaks the confines of the traditional
workspace in virtue of the author consulting organizations that publish lists of standardized
protocols and guidelines that their work must adhere to. Ideally, all authors of systematic review
papers would adhere to the guidelines set by either the Cochrane Collaboration, Campbell
Collaboration, and/or PRISMA to ensure that the claims emerging out of them stand on firm
epistemic footing. It is thus the openness of science and the adherence to strict and well-
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documented guidelines that reduces the likelihood of bias in review papers, thereby increasing
the integrity of the epistemic status of the claims advanced by the authors of those papers. 94

2.3 Taxonomy of Review Papers in the Mind-Brain Sciences
The history and development of research synthesis as provided by Chalmers and Altman (1995)
and Gurevitch et al. (2018), Higgins and Green (2011), Moher et all (2009, 2015), Stewart et al.
(2015), focus almost exclusively on the medical and health sciences. Handbooks and critical
research on the nature of research synthesis, such as those by Cooper, Hedges and Valentine
(2009) and Rosenthal (1991) focus on the social sciences. Further, some of the largest and most
popular cross-disciplinary organizations, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, contextualize
research synthesis and related methods/guidelines in the health/medical sciences. In their
opening ‘about us’ statement, the Cochrane Collaboration states: “Cochrane is for anyone
interested in using high-quality information to make health decisions. Whether you are a doctor
or nurse, patient or caretaker, researcher or funder, Cochrane evidence provides a powerful tool
to enhance your healthcare knowledge and decision making” (https://www.cochrane.org/aboutus, emphases mine).
Shamseer et al. (2015) similarly highlight the importance of research synthesis for the
health/medical sciences: “Systematic reviews hold a unique place in healthcare. They help form
the basis for developing practice guidelines and they provide information on gaps in knowledge,
thus informing future research efforts. This information is relevant to stakeholders across the
health system” (https://www-bmj-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/content/349/bmj.g7647, emphasis
mine). They continue to note that systematic reviews are particularly trustworthy due to the ‘a
priori planning and documenting’ of their methods and protocols (ibid). While this might help
reduce bias and increase the reliability of claims emerging out of systematic reviews, it is
important to note that most organizations for research synthesis are grounded in the
medical/health sciences and/or the social sciences:
Various international organizations such as the Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations and
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) regularly require and publish
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protocols. However, outside of such organizations, few protocols are published in traditional
journals and most reports of completed reviews (89%) do not mention working from a
protocol… Outside of select systematic review organizations, little to no general guidance
exists for preparing review protocols (ibid, emphasis mine).
This is problematic because many disciplines outside the health/social sciences make use of
research synthesis (in many forms) in the dissemination of knowledge. Of particular importance
for my dissertation is the fact that while the mind-brain sciences make great use of research
synthesis via review papers, there is no organization to date dedicated solely to outlining
criteria/standards for writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences, nor has there been much
analysis done on the nature of research synthesis within the context of the mind-brain sciences.95
96

Now that the background and motivation for research synthesis is in place, I will survey the
different types of review papers found in journals for the mind-brain sciences. Despite having no
handbook or organization dedicated to laying out protocol for review papers in the mind-brain
sciences, journals in the mind-brain sciences are replete with research synthesis in the form of
review papers (both with and without meta-analysis). Given that the standards for review papers
will be different than those in the health sciences, it is important to look at review papers in the
mind-brain sciences to see how, if at all, claims are being corroborated by the synthesis of
interdisciplinary evidence.
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Again, part of the reason for introducing the standards and guidelines advanced by organizations such as the
Cochrane Collaboration was to set the historical background for the development of research synthesis and for
comparative reasons, given that the standards set by organizations for writing review papers in the health and
social sciences will not be applicable to the types of review papers found in mind-brain science journals.
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Of the many journals in the mind-brain sciences, few provide any guidance with respect to review paper writing
standards, with the exception of Frontiers in Neuroscience, which states authors should adhere to the guidelines
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(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience#article-types). However, seeing as the mind-brain sciences
are distinct from the social and health sciences, in that they bring together information from multiple areas of
science, using different methods, experimental protocols, techniques and tools of analysis, one might argue for
and advance a unique set of standards for writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences. I consider this
prospect in chapter four of this dissertation.
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There are numerous journals that researchers in the mind-brain sciences can submit their work
to, including but not limited to: Frontiers in Neuroscience, Trends in Cognitive Science
(Elsevier), Neuron, the Journal of Neuroscience, Nature Neuroscience, etc. I focus only on a
subset of these top journals – specifically Frontiers in Neuroscience and Trends in Cognitive
Science (Elsevier) – that contain review papers for two reasons. First, I must constrain my focus
for the sake of space, and second, of the above-mentioned journals, these two provide the most
detail about the different types of review papers that can be published within their journal and
what each type entails.97 Each journal classifies article types slightly differently, however, as I
will demonstrate shortly, there are three main category types that review papers may fall under.
Frontiers in Neuroscience is a popular mind-brain science journal. In their ‘scope and mission’
section, they describe their journal as:
… publishing rigorously peer-reviewed research across a wide spectrum of specialties and
disciplines. …This multidisciplinary open-access journal is at the forefront of disseminating
and communicating scientific knowledge and impactful discoveries to researchers, academics,
clinicians and the public worldwide. … we seek to integrate and cross-link studies and
citations in related subfields, providing an overview of the state-of-the-art in these fields and
the ways in which they complement each other. After all, we may each of us look at the brain
from particular standpoints - all the way from "genes to behavior" - yet the brain integrates all
these levels seamlessly; this journal should reflect this in the best possible way.
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience#about, emphases mine).
Statistically, Frontiers in Neuroscience is at the forefront of research in the mind-brain sciences.
That is, the journal is the number one most cited journal in the neurosciences
(https://reports.frontiersin.org/reports/frontiers-in-neuroscience-report.html). Frontiers in
Neuroscience boasts an impact factor (i.e., the average number of citations in a given year by
papers that were published from the two preview years) of 3.566, a total of 13 520 508 article
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The other journals either provide little (in comparison to Frontiers in Neuroscience and Trends in Cognitive
Sciences) to no breakdown of article types nor any advice on what makes for a strong review article.
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views and downloads, 691 mentions in newspapers such as Forbes and the Washington Post, and
20,063 citations (ibid).98
Frontiers in Neuroscience provides a list of tier 1 article types published in their journal, and I
elaborate on each kind of review paper below
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience#article-types). Non-review-based tier 1
articles found in the Frontiers in Neuroscience journal include but are not limited to: original
research papers, methods papers, protocol papers, technology report papers, perspective papers,
case report papers, etc.99
Tier 1 review-based articles found in Frontiers in Neuroscience include the following:
1. The systematic review
2. The review
3. The mini review
Authors of systematic review papers advance syntheses of published studies on a specific topic
(e.g., episodic memory, retinotopic maps, semantic processing, spatial cognition, etc.) “… that
uses systematic and clearly defined methods to identify, categorize, analyze and report
aggregated evidence on a specific topic” (ibid, emphasis mine). Authors must address an
important question or problem in their field of research, and their answer must be grounded on
the “… sound empirical basis of studies which were conducted well scientifically” (ibid).100
Authors of systematic review papers do more than provide a summary of the current state of
some field of research or topic; they also compare and explain the findings they cite in their
summary and synthesize those findings into a claim about the mind-brain. The findings involved
in the systematic review may all belong to the same field (e.g., the author(s) may compare a
number of studies in the field of psychology on the nature of mind-reading) and/or they may
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I will comment on these and their relation to review papers shortly.
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No elaboration is provided with respect to what a ‘sound empirical basis’ entails nor how one would
evaluate/discern between studies which are empirically sound and those which are not.
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involve studies from a variety of fields (e.g., the author(s) may compare a number of studies
from psychology, cellular and molecular biology, cognitive neuroscience, etc., on the nature of
mind reading). Systematic reviews may or may not contain meta-analyses (i.e., the quantitative
analysis of data from multiple independent studies on the same phenomenon conducted with the
goal of discovering important trends). The author may use the results of their meta-analysis (or
their qualitative analysis) to advance a synthesized claim about the mind-brain. Authors may
also, in closing, suggest directions for future research. While systematic reviews include all four
components listed in section 2.2 of this chapter – i.e., a summary, explanation, synthesis, and
directions for future research – the primary component to these papers is the synthesis of various
studies (which may include original research papers, books, case reports, perspective papers,
other published review papers, etc.) via either a meta-analysis or qualitative analysis.
The second article type is the review paper (hereafter the Frontiers review paper to distinguish it
from another type of review paper outlined in Trends in Cognitive Science). Frontiers review
papers focus on topics that have undergone a significant change (or which have undergone
substantial progress) and present a comprehensive overview of this topic (ibid). Instead of the
main emphasis being synthesis (as it was for the systematic review), the main emphasis of a
Frontiers review is the summary of the current state of a topic about the mind-brain. Authors of
Frontiers review papers are to discuss critical aspects of their summary such as different sides of
the debate, consensus and controversies, key concepts and problems (including gaps in the
research), and they are also expected to close directions for future research (ibid). Frontiers
review papers, like systematic review papers, are not to include any of their own unpublished
research; instead, they draw on other published research when presenting their summary.
The third article type is the mini review paper. The mini review is similar to the Frontiers
review paper but differs primarily with respect to its scope/length. That is, mini reviews tend to
be more focused in scope, and home in on a particular facet of some topic (e.g., instead of the
general topic of memory, a mini review might summarize findings on the more specific topic of
spatial memory in rats) (ibid). Authors of mini review papers are to present a clear and concise
summary of a topic in the mind-brain sciences. This brief but succinct summary allows readers
to develop an understanding of the current state of the literature, its key concepts, controversies
and problems, as well as future research possibilities (ibid). Much like authors of the Frontiers
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review paper, authors of the mini review paper cannot include any of their own unpublished
research, citing other published research. As mentioned above, the key difference between
review and mini review papers is scope and length of the review, with the former typically
having a maximum word count of 12 000 words (enabling the author(s) to write on a more
general topic like memory) and the latter 3000 (enabling the author(s) to home in on a very
specific aspect of memory) (ibid).
Another popular academic journal for the mind-brain sciences is Trends in Cognitive Sciences
(Elsevier). Trends in Cognitive Sciences (hereafter Trends) is another highly influential peerreviewed journal focusing on review-based articles on topics in the cognitive
sciences/neurosciences. Trends boasts an impact score (i.e., the average number of citations in a
given year by papers that were published from the two preview years) of 15.557 and a total of
25391 citations according to the most recent 2017 Journal Citation Report
(https://www.bioxbio.com/journal/TRENDS-COGN-SCI).
According to their ‘Aims and Scopes’ section, Trends is a highly interdisciplinary journal,
bringing the fields of psychology, computer science, neuroscience, anthropology, evolution,
economics, and political science, etc. together to provide both expert and non-expert readers with
up-to-date knowledge and insight about important topics and debates in the mind-brain sciences
(https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/aims). According to Trends:
Trends journals seek to provide all scientists, from the tenured to the tenderfoot, with concise
and curated updates on the latest research. It is our aim to highlight new scientific
developments and their impact on the world outside the laboratory. Our high-caliber articles
are cutting edge, provocative, yet accessible and are written by the most authoritative voices
in science today. They are intended not only to bring readers up to speed on recent progress in
the field, but also to serve as platforms for debate and to push the boundaries of conventional
thinking. The Trends journals offer more than summaries, they contribute insight
https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/authors).
Each issue of Trends includes what they call review articles (hereafter Trends review papers, to
distinguish them from Frontiers review papers) which function to bring readers up to date on
recent debates and critical developments with respect to a mind-brain related topic.
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Trends review papers are central to the monthly issues in Trends and are written by leading
scholars – those whom they describe as having some of the ‘most authoritative voices in science’
in their respective fields (ibid). Authors of Trends review papers present the reader with a
balanced overview of the current state of some topic in the mind-brain sciences. They do so by
providing relevant background information and highlighting important developments and
discoveries. While Trends review papers focus on the summary component, these papers often
include explanations and directions for future research. That is, while authors of Trends review
papers are not to include their own original research, Trends review papers do “… allow room
for some speculation and debate …” (ibid). Authors can explain and comment on the findings
presented in their summary and/or take a stance with respect to a debate (with the caveat that
authors are clear when they are providing their own opinions) (ibid). It is within this space that
authors can advance arguments regarding the findings contained in their summary. For example,
an author might argue that the summarized findings support a given claim about the mind-brain.
This claim can be read as a synthesized claim insofar as it is the amalgamation of the
summarized findings; it is the product of a qualitative analysis of the cited literature which, taken
together, suggests a given claim. Importantly, however, this synthesized claim is not the product
of a quantitative meta-analysis or statistical modelling (like it is in the case of Frontiers
systematic review), but is instead the result of a qualitative analysis. Authors of Trends review
papers are also strongly encouraged to conclude with directions for future research by clearly
indicating to the reader “… the most productive avenues for future research and by highlighting
current and future limitations” (ibid). Critically, Trends review do not include original
unpublished research, any new hypothesis, mathematic model(s) nor are they to include metaanalyses (ibid).
Before moving onto the advantages of review papers, something should be said about the nature
of the relationship between review papers and the literature upon which they draw.101 The types
of literature review papers draw on include but are not limited to: original research papers, case
reports, perspective papers, books, textbooks, clinical trial papers, conceptual analysis papers,
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When I use the term ‘review papers’ here I am referring to all four types surveyed thus far – i.e., the systematic
review, the Frontiers review, the mini review and the Trends review.
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opinion papers, etc.102 There is a two-way influence when it comes to review papers and nonreview papers. In writing a review paper, authors survey literature on a given topic. The
findings from this survey may influence and shape the authors’ understanding of the topic; this
might manifest itself in the way in which the summary is presented, the nature of the
explanations of the summarized findings, and/or the synthesis. Once a review paper is
published, it has the potential to influence the course of future research. That is, it might
influence a new wave of original research. If, to provide just one example, an author of a review
paper closes with directions for future research indicating a gap within a theory, researchers may
strive to fill in said gap, thus adding new research that may influence a future review paper (or
might be used to update an existing review paper). Thus, there is a two-way influence between
review and non-review papers, and those who herald the importance of research synthesis for
science acknowledge this influential relationship as crucial for progress and better explanations
in the sciences. For example, Gurevitch et al. (2018) state: “Evidence synthesis should become a
regular companion to primary scientific research to maximize the effectiveness of scientific
inquiry” (180).
In sum, three distinct types of review papers emerge from the types I survey: the systematic
review, the Trends review, and what I call the general review paper (hereafter shortened to GRP,
which is essentially an amalgamation of the Frontiers review and the mini review). The
systematic review stands on its own insofar as its main component is synthesis (often the product
of a meta-analysis). The GRP’s are grouped together insofar as their primary component is
summary. Finally, the Trends review stands on its own as it arguably has two main components
– a summary, and an explanation of the summarized findings (which can sometimes take the
form of a synthesized claim, although the synthesized claim will not be the product of a
quantitative meta-analysis as is often the case with the systematic review). This classification is
represented visually below in figure 1.
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Figure 1 - Represents my taxonomy of review paper types in the mind-brain sciences based on their main components.

Now that I have laid out a taxonomy of review paper types in the mind-brain sciences, I turn to
some of the advantages they possess, before closing this chapter with their implications for IC.

2.4 Advantages of Review Papers for Progress in the Mind-Brain Sciences
In general, review papers in the mind-brain sciences provide readers with current, up-to-date
knowledge about the mind-brain (or an aspect of the mind-brain). 103 They help shed light on
important concepts, distinctions, debates, and problems or gaps in the literature. Ideally, this
allows readers to understand what is at stake and potentially influences their thinking and future
research about the mind-brain.
These are the general features of review papers; what about the specific features of each
individual type of review paper? Do the different types of review papers surveyed above possess
distinct features over above the others? Assessing the unique features of each type of review
paper will help set the stage for understanding why review papers are a good place to start
investigating the nature of IC. In this section, I survey the unique advantages of GRP’s, the
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systematic review, and the Trends review, respectively. Once this is complete, I draw out the
implications review papers have for IC.
One major feature of the GRP I consider advantageous for scientific research is their ability to
enhance knowledge and update readers on the current state of a topic in the mind-brain sciences.
This feature is in part due to the primary component of the GRP being the summary. That is, a
large portion of a GRP is dedicated to providing a general overview of a topic including things
like historical background and development, critical debates and controversies, key concepts and
theories, recent progress and problems, etc. All of this helps provide readers with a general
understanding of the current state of a topic in the mind-brain sciences. This feature likely has
different implications depending on the type of reader (e.g., non-expert layman, non-expert
undergraduate, graduate student, expert, etc.). For the non-expert laymen and undergraduate
students, this overview functions somewhat like an introductory handbook (which will include
background information, key concepts and problems, etc.) on the topic, allowing them to achieve
a general understanding of a topic they previously knew little to nothing about. From this point,
the non-expert reader might be influenced to pick up on certain aspects of the summary; for
example, an undergraduate student might find a certain problem interesting, and decide to pursue
graduate studies dedicated towards investigating (potentially solving or deepening) said problem.
Expert/advanced readers may find more benefit in mini review papers, which tend to be less
generalized, and more focused on a specific feature or problem pertaining to the mind-brain.
The mini review therefore might provide the expert reader with new insight, potentially
influencing them to fine-tune their own research (e.g., perhaps by attempting to fill in a gap in
the research), or to conduct a very specific study in relation to a problem noted in the mini
review, thereby contributing more original research on the topic.
Systematic reviews boast numerous advantages; however, I focus on the two most relevant to the
goal of my dissertation (i.e., investigating the nature of IC in the mind-brain sciences and
assessing whether and to what extent review papers corroborate claims about the mind-brain).
The two advantages I identify are the ability to integrate large amounts of information and the
potential to corroborate claims about the mind-brain. Starting with the former, as mentioned
earlier in this chapter, the 21st century is inundated with an avalanche of information coming in
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from multiple areas of science. To provide a general example to set the stage, Mulrow (1995)
notes in the medical sciences “… large quantities of information must be reduced into palatable
pieces for digestion. Over two million articles are published annually in the biomedical literature
in over 20 000 journals – literally a small mountain of information. … In a stack, two million
such articles would rise 500 m” (1).104 With such a large number of articles coming in annually,
a method for sorting through this information in such a way that identifies and picks out the
relevant and scientifically sound papers from the irrelevant and unsound articles is necessary.
Mulrow believes this sorting method is accomplished by authors of systematic review papers
who can critically analyze, evaluate, and sort through the mass amounts of information (ibid, 2).
Mulrow does not argue how nor why these authors are able to do so, but I suspect once again the
assumption behind her claim is the fact that these authors possess the proper sorting tools in
virtue of their abiding by pre-established and standardized guidelines for writing review papers.
That is, authors of review papers can consult the Cochrane handbook or the PRISMA checklist,
for example, scroll to the criteria for study selection, and sort through papers, selecting only
those which are scientifically sound and relevant according to pre-established guidelines.
Having a pre-determined method for selecting studies and data, analyzing and interpreting data,
etc., appears to make authors of systematic review papers mini experts of sorts on how to
efficiently triage and integrate large amounts of information.105
Understanding how systematic review papers can potentially corroborate claims involves
analyzing the notion of synthesis (which is the primary component of the systematic review).
When preparing to write a systematic review, an author will examine papers on a topic in the
mind-brain sciences (e.g., memory) to determine whether there are any trends or patterns
pertaining to a specific question or problem they are investigating. Accordingly, if a metaanalysis is conducted (i.e., either on findings from the same area of science or findings from
different areas of science) and a general trend/pattern x is found, the author might argue that x is
well-supported (i.e., it has a high degree of corroboration because a number of independent
104

These statistics are from the late 20th C, and surely have risen in the 21st C. Importantly, these statistics are
from the biomedical literature, wherein a large majority of the work on research synthesis has taken place for a
while, however, the mind-brain sciences also deal with a large amount of published works on the mind-brain
annually, and their numbers are also likely to be high.
105

Again, this is my interpretation of Mulrow’s (1995) claim that systematic reviewers are best equipped to sort
through and integrate large amounts of information into a claim that stands on firm epistemic footing.

67

studies all suggest/or are consistent with/or point towards the same conclusion).106 This claim is
thus the amalgamation/synthesis of all surveyed papers. For example, if a meta-analysis is
conducted and finds that all the cited papers in the systematic review (and their respective
findings) implicate the hippocampus for memory, the author might argue the claim that the
hippocampus is a critical brain region for memory is corroborated by the literature. That is, this
claim appears to be corroborated by findings from different areas of science all of which appear
to point towards the same general conclusion about the hippocampus and memory.
If systematic reviews can corroborate claims, these papers have the potential to influence
education and future research. For example, an allegedly corroborated claim may be taken as
evidence against an alternative competing claim. That is, if some alternative claim x is supported
by ten studies from one particular area of the mind-brain sciences, meanwhile claim y has been
supported by over eighty studies from multiple areas in the mind-brain sciences, then claim y
(hereafter shortened to ‘y’) might be taken as evidence against claim x (hereafter shortened to
‘x’), since it has a substantially higher degree of corroboration than x. This may lead researchers
to either abandon their work on x, or to try and save x by perhaps modifying it in some way or
other.107
Further, corroborated claims emerging from systematic review papers may be taken as providing
a foundation of sorts. If y has demonstrated a strong degree of corroboration (and this has lasted
for a substantial amount of time), then one may take y as confirmed. This confirmation may
potentially make it such that y becomes a starting point for future research to expand on. For
example, if y represents ‘the hippocampus is a critical brain region for memory’ and y has
received a high degree of corroboration, new research projects might emerge trying to establish
the finer details of y (e.g., what other structures, regions, networks are involved, what other types
of memory are realized in the hippocampus, how can one incorporate claim y within a dynamical
brain systems theory, etc.).
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Of course, one could argue that in time claim x might accrue more support than claim y. Perhaps with newer
and better technologies, and more research, time and funding being poured into claim x, it may turn out that claim
x actually has a higher degree of corroboration than claim y.

68

In an education setting, a chapter on memory may base all of its teaching off the fundamental
assumption that y is true, so that the undergraduate studying memory for the first time may come
to accept this claim as true.108 In sum, the two advantages of the systematic review, ideally, are
its ability to integrate large amounts of information about the mind-brain and its ability to
corroborate said claims via meta-analysis (either qualitative or quantitative, although more
frequently the latter).
Trends reviews also have the potential to integrate information and corroborate claims. With
respect to the former, because Trends reviews are written by leading scholars considered to be
experts in their respective area of science, their expertise and knowledge on a given topic makes
them particularly well-suited for triaging numerous studies in the literature and extracting only
the most scientifically sound and relevant. Their ability to corroborate claims is grounded in one
of the primary components of a Trends review: explanation. That is, authors of Trends reviews
are provided room for ‘speculation and debate’ within their review
(https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/authors). It is within this space that the author
may explain and comment on the summarized findings and advance their own conjecture based
on the current state of the literature (as per the author’s summary). This conjecture can
sometimes take the form of a synthesized claim; that synthesis would likely be the product of
integrating the summarized findings into a cohesive explanation about an aspect of the mindbrain.109 The caveat with Trends reviews advancing their own conjectures and speculations is
simply that the author be clear that this is his/her/their personal opinion
(https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/authors). Interestingly, because Trends claims
to contribute deep insight into the mind-brain by producing reviews written by only the greatest
scholars with the most ‘authoritative voices in science today’, the synthesized claim emerging
from the Trends review appears to stand on strong epistemic footing insofar as it is the integrated
product of a qualitative analysis/synthesis of multiple studies (recall that Trends reviews do not
include quantitative meta-analysis or statistical models) from different areas of the mind-brain
108
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sciences. Further, because the claim is advanced by an authoritative and well-respected voice
within the mind-brain science community, that claim might gain more epistemic warrant (ibid).
The allegedly corroborated claims emerging out of Trends reviews thus have the potential to
influence future research in the same way that the systematic review does: that is, they can
potentially act as evidence against another alternative claim or theory, and/or they can act as a
foundation of sorts, both for research and in education.110
At this point, one might ask what it is about review papers and their specific features that make
them uniquely suited to the project of exploring the nature of IC in the mind-brain sciences. The
goal of the next section will be to make this connection succinct.

2.5 Implications of Review Papers for IC
To understand why review papers are a good place to start investigating the concept of IC – that
is, what features they possess that makes them uniquely suited for the task – it is helpful to reexamine the main components of IC. In section 2.1 of this chapter, I provided a working
definition of IC whereby IC occurs when findings from different areas in the mind-brain sciences
corroborate a claim about the mind-brain in such a way that those findings point towards a claim
and are mutually supportive and interdisciplinary. I noted there are two main components to IC
– interdisciplinarity and corroboration. I will now briefly re-visit both aspects of IC.111
The interdisciplinarity aspect of IC relates to the different areas of science housed under the
mind-brain sciences. Such disciplines include but are certainly not limited to computer science
and AI, biology, psychology, genetics, linguistics, neuroscience, etc. Both systematic reviews
and Trends reviews survey findings from multiple areas of the mind-brain sciences in their
investigation of a given topic; therefore, both satisfy the interdisciplinarity component. Further,
Trends prides itself on being a highly interdisciplinary research journal, and thus one would
assume the articles published therein would be too (or at least contribute to that aspect).
Corroboration occurs when pieces of evidence confirm/support a claim. In section 2.1 of this
chapter, I noted individual research papers provide a good first pass at demonstrating
110
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corroboration in that they (sometimes) try to situate their original findings within the broader
context of the literature by citing other findings that support their main claim/finding, but the
degree of corroboration in these papers was too narrow in scope.
The role of individual research papers, however, is not insignificant to corroboration. As
Gurevitch et al. (2018) note, “An individual primary study may now be seen as a contribution
towards the accumulation of evidence rather than revealing the conclusive answer to a scientific
problem” (178), and, as Mulrow (1995) puts the point, “The hundreds of hours spent conducting
a scientific study ultimately contributes only one piece of an enormous puzzle” (7).
Corroboration thus relies on different findings from original research papers; the more findings
point towards y, the more one can argue y has been corroborated. Thus, for findings to
corroborate y, multiple research sources must confirm/lend support to/point towards y.
Further, a point emphasized by philosophers of science (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson (1993);
Campbell (1966); Hacking (1983); Wimsatt (2007), etc.), those findings must be the result of
‘independent measures’ (Bechtel and Richardson 1993, xxvii). This point connects both the
interdisciplinarity component and the corroboration component in that when the different areas
of the mind-brain sciences (interdisciplinarity) all employ different measures (i.e., they appeal to
specialized tools, methods, technology, software, etc.), and they all point toward y, then y, it
might be argued, has been corroborated. Thus, the more original research from different areas of
the mind-brain sciences points towards y, the more corroboration y accrues.112
112

This process of multiple independent research papers contributing one piece of the puzzle which is completed
when multiple pieces of evidence from different areas of science point towards some claim is strikingly similar to
Roskies’ (2010) notion of convergence via functional triangulation. In this case, the different studies from different
areas of science can be said to triangulate/converge on the same claim, and insofar as this is done, the claim
stands on firm epistemic footing; this, arguably, could be what Nagel’s (1949, 1979) ‘essential condition’ requires.
Further, one might interpret the synthesis component of the systematic review and the Trends review to be akin to
the kinds of ‘integration’ required by Mitchell (2002, 2003), Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) and Piccinini and Craver
(2011). That is, the product of the review paper – the synthesis – is the act of integrating all the results of different
areas of science into one claim; this resulting claim is considered to be well-supported/confirmed and accordingly
stands on firm epistemic footing.
On this point, Bickle (2003, 2006) might claim that it is the analysis of different studies from different labs in
cellular and molecular neuroscience that have been synthesized. In fact, in Bickle’s (2006) example of the cAMPPKA-CREB pathway as the molecular mechanism for social recognition memory in mammals, Bickle points to the
fact that this conclusion has been corroborated by a number of other independent original studies on the topic. In
other words, a large number of studies revealed a general trend – i.e., that this pathway is the molecular
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The concepts of interdisciplinarity and corroboration are echoed in both the systematic review
and the Trends review. Both papers survey research papers from different areas of the mindbrain sciences on a topic (interdisciplinarity).113 Authors of systematic review papers will
analyze these papers and their respective findings to determine any overall patterns/trends; this is
often performed via meta-analysis and statistical modelling. If a trend is identified, authors
advance a claim which can be considered synthesis of the surveyed findings involved in the
meta-analysis.
Authors of Trends reviews summarize the current state of some problem or topic about the mindbrain, citing multiple papers from different areas of the mind-brain sciences. They may also
comment on the nature of their findings and this comment (the authors’ opinion) may take the
form of a synthesized claim.114 This synthesis provides the reader with a more complete
understanding of the mind-brain and is considered more reliable insofar as it is supported by
numerous interdisciplinary findings and is advanced by an author considered to be an influential
and authoritative voice on the matter.
The synthesized claims falling out of both the systematic and the Trends review (as the result of
either a quantitative meta-analysis or a qualitative analysis) relates to the corroboration aspect.
That is, if the interdisciplinary papers (and their respective findings) surveyed by both types of
papers reveal a general trend – which is identified either by meta-analysis in the case of the
systematic review, or qualitative analysis in the case of the Trends review – whereby that trend
suggests a claim about the mind-brain, one might argue that that claim has been corroborated (in
that it is supported by considerable interdisciplinary evidence).

mechanism for social recognition memory in mammals – and this trend is taken to be corroborated by Bickle
(Bickle 2006, 423-424).
Interpreting this through Darden and Maull’s (1977) notion of interfield theories, one might say that an interfield
theory such as the chromosome theory of Mendelian genetics has been corroborated via numerous studies which
confirm the interfield theory.
113

Authors of course are not required to survey studies from multiple areas of science; some authors of review
papers may choose to focus solely on evidence from one particular area of science. However, systematic review
papers and Trends review papers frequently cite evidence from different areas of science, and accordingly, my
claims extend only to papers which do so.
114

Not all authors of Trends reviews will take their own stance on a debate, nor comment on those findings, nor
will those comments (if they provide them) necessarily all take the form of a synthesized claim. My argument
pertains only to those papers that do.
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In section 2.3 of this chapter, I surveyed three main types of review papers (i.e., the systematic
review paper, the Trends review paper, and the GRP). Of those mentioned, the systematic
review and the Trends review paper do what is required for IC: that is, they review findings from
different areas of the mind-brain sciences (i.e., interdisciplinarity), and if a trend/pattern is
identified, authors of the review paper advance a claim taken to be a synthesis of those findings
(i.e., a corroborated claim in that multiple pieces of independent evidence from different areas of
science support this claim). Accordingly, both would provide a good starting point for
investigating the nature of IC and analyzing whether and to what extent claims about the mindbrain are corroborated in practice.
However, due to the length of this project, it is not possible to analyze both a Trends review
paper and a systematic review. Instead, I begin what I hope to be an ongoing project of
investigating the epistemic role of review papers in the mind-brain sciences by analyzing a
Trends review paper; because the Trends review contains less features than a systematic review
(which often additionally includes meta-analyses), my analysis will create a baseline against
which to compare future units of analysis for corroboration. Furthermore, is important to
consider not just the systematic review, since journals in the mind-brain sciences contain and
make use of different types of review papers (not just systematic reviews). Ioannidis (2016)
notes that papers tagged as ‘reviews’ are published at a much larger scale than papers tagged as
‘systematic reviews’ in PubMed (489). Thus, it is important to not rush this investigation by
immediately jumping to a systematic review; again, starting with a Trends review allows a
baseline against which to compare different units of analysis with different/additional features
(such as a meta-analysis) to determine how and whether the additional features increase the
integrity of the claims about the mind-brain emerging from those papers. Since Trends claims to
provide deep insight into the mind-brain via review papers from some of the most authoritative
scholars, the Trends review paper, which contains both the interdisciplinarity and the
corroboration component of IC, provides a strong starting point for investigating the nature of
IC.
In chapters three and four, I analyze a case study of a Trends review paper by Eichenbaum
(2013) entitled ‘Memory on Time’ as a potential instance of IC with the goal of extracting
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critical lessons for the notion of IC and its relation to strong epistemic claims in the mind-brain
sciences.
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Chapter 3
3 Introduction
In chapter one, I surveyed popular accounts of the relationship between different areas of science
emphasizing the notion of fitting together as essential for scientific progress. I noted a problem
with these accounts is their notions of fitting together were vague and subject to multiple
clarificatory questions. In chapter two, I introduced the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’
(hereafter IC) as a placeholder for the notion of fitting together to get a better understanding of
the assumption underlying the surveyed accounts of scientific progress. I noted, however, IC
was a working definition which needed elaboration and analysis. I argued a good place to begin
investigating IC and assessing the extent to which claims are corroborated in the mind-brain
sciences was to look for instances of it in practice via a Trends review paper. As a case study for
this investigation I have selected a paper by Eichenbaum (2013) entitled ‘Memory on Time’.
My investigation of this review paper comprises a two-part analysis structured around what
Eichenbaum does (chapter three) and does not do (chapter four) to show support for the main
claims he defends in this paper. The aim of this chapter is to showcase what Eichenbaum does to
support the main claims he advances in ‘Memory on Time’ and how it is representative of IC.
My analysis focuses on the language and terms used to describe the findings which he cites in
support of his claims. I begin section 3.1 by explicating why I selected Eichenbaum’s review
paper as my case study, what cursory criteria I use to guide my analysis, and what methods I use
to analyze Eichenbaum’s paper. I provide a brief summary of ‘Memory on Time’ and the main
claims advanced by Eichenbaum in section 3.2. In section 3.2.1, I analyze the ways in which
Eichenbaum shows support for the main claims he defends by focusing on the language he used
to describe the cited findings, such as the findings ‘show that’ or ‘suggest that’ x (Eichenbaum
2013, 83, 86)115. I assess the extent to which the case study conforms to IC in sections 3.2.2
(focusing on the interdisciplinary component), and 3.2.3 (focusing on the corroboration
component), and argue that, prima facie, the case study appears to represent a strong instance of
IC where interdisciplinary findings fit together in such a way that lends support to Eichenbaum’s
main claims.

115

Where x represents one of the claims Eichenbaum (2013) advances in ‘Memory on Time’.
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However, in conducting this analysis, certain questions began to emerge such as “what counts as
substantial evidence”, “what does it mean for evidence to be consistent with each other”, and
“how are anomalies factored into the ‘substantial evidence’ that appears to be consistent with
each other”. These questions began to reveal cracks in what appeared to be a clear instance of IC
in Eichenbaum’s review paper. This led me to conduct part-two of my analysis in chapter four,
wherein I deepen my analytic work in chapter three by explicitly addressing these questions and
their implications for IC. As my aim in this chapter is to constrain my focus on the work
Eichenbaum does to support the claims he defends, I bracket these questions and concerns for
chapter four.

3.1 Methods
The case study I selected for this analysis is a paper by Eichenbaum (2013) entitled ‘Memory on
Time’. As noted in chapter one, I am interested in claims made in the mind-brain sciences about
how the brain realizes psychological functions. Memory organization, specifically, spatiotemporal memory (i.e., memory for how events are organized in time and space) is a
psychological function and is the main topic of my case study.
The paper I selected is a Trends review paper with a substantial number of citations.116
However, more than a high citation count, I selected this paper because of the tremendous
influence Eichenbaum has had on memory research. Eichenbaum (1947-2017) is considered by
many to have been one of the leading pioneers in memory research. Hasselmo and Stern (2017)
described Eichenbaum as a ‘vital leader’ in illuminating the role of the hippocampus for memory
and learning (875, emphasis mine). Eichenbaum held an impressive amount of positions in the
scientific community including being a William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, the
director of BU’s Center for Memory and Brain and the Laboratory of Cognitive Neurobiology,
and the founder of “… what is now called the Graduate Program for Neuroscience …” (Brown
2017, https://www.bu.edu/today/2017/howard-eichenbaum-obituary/). Additionally, in 2015, he
116

There were different papers on memory organization by Eichenbaum I could have selected as my case study.
However, I chose ‘Memory on Time’ (2013) which has 179 citations to date as a middle ground between his (2017)
‘On the Integration of Space, Time, and Memory’ paper, which has 54 citations, and his (2014) ‘Time Cells in the
Hippocampus: A New Dimension for Mapping Memories’ paper, which has 247 citations. Eichenbaum’s (2013)
review ‘Memory on Time’ has enough citations that a case can be made that the paper is influential, but not too
many that tracking the citations and cited studies (the 2014 paper has approximately 70 more cited studies than
the 2013 paper) would be too lengthy.
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was elected into the American Academy of Arts and Science and was a Fellow of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, where he acted as chair in the neuroscience
division and the Association for Psychological Science (ibid). He also served on the Council of
the Society for Neuroscience as well as the National Institute of Mental Health (ibid). Finally,
Eichenbaum was the editor-in-chief of the journal Hippocampus until his passing in 2017
(Hasselmo and Stern 2017, 875).
Eichenbaum was an ‘internationally recognized figure’ known for making headway and
advancing knowledge of the hippocampus and the neural mechanisms for memory organization
(Brown 2017, https://www.bu.edu/today/2017/howard-eichenbaum-obituary/). Commenting on
Eichenbaum’s work, Dr. David Somers, professor and chair of psychological and brain sciences,
states:
His extensive empirical findings … his integrative approach, which synthesized results
across species, across methods, and across levels of analysis; and his important theoretical
advances concerning multiple memory systems in the brain, all helped advance our
understanding of how memory works and how it is organized in the brain” (ibid, emphases
mine).
Within memory research, Eichenbaum is considered a ‘pioneer’, a ‘titan’, and an ‘internationally
recognized figure’, making him a top scholar on memory research. Given his authoritative status
within memory research, the impressive and deep impact his research has had and continues to
have on the mind-brain science community, as well as the fact that much of his research, as
Somers points out, includes an integrative approach which synthesizes results across different
areas of science (an aspect emphasized by both reductive and non-reductive accounts of progress
in chapter one of this dissertation), Eichenbaum’s paper is a great candidate for my case study.
My goal for my analysis of Eichenbaum’s (2013) ‘Memory on Time’ is to evaluate how and to
what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated within this review paper. From my
analysis, I hope to draw out important lessons concerning the nature of IC and how claims about
the mind-brain are corroborated in units of analysis such as the Trends review paper. These
lessons might serve as a springboard for future research; I discuss such prospects in section 4.4.
of chapter four.
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Importantly, I begin this analysis with a general understanding of how review papers function
from my descriptive work in chapter two. That is, Trends review papers are packaged in such a
way that they include a summary of a topic in the mind-brain sciences, an explanation of
findings cited in the summary section, and directions for future research. I noted, in chapter
two, that the explanation component can manifest in a number of ways. For example, authors of
review papers can explain the relevance of the scientific findings they cite, they can explain
those findings by contextualizing them within a debate or within the broader picture of a mindbrain topic, they can comment on the nature of those findings, they can argue how those findings
fit together to support a given claim, etc. In providing explanations, authors sometimes argue for
claims that are a synthesis of the findings they survey in their summary. This, however, is a
superficial understanding of how review papers work; the purpose of my analysis is to do the
analytic work required to discern how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are being
corroborated in units of analysis such as the Trends review paper.
Accordingly, I come to the table with some cursory criteria to help address these questions and
guide my analysis. These criteria includes the following questions: “what is the aim of
Eichenbaum’s review paper”, “what claims does Eichenbaum argue for”, “how does
Eichenbaum show support for those claims”, “are Eichenbaum’s arguments implicit or explicit”,
and “does the case study represent a strong case of IC, and if so, how”?
To evaluate how and to what extent claims are corroborated in Eichenbaum’s (2013) ‘Memory
on Time’, I begin by laying down some descriptive work by providing a brief synopsis of
Eichenbaum’s paper, including the paper’s purpose and its main claims. I consider the ways in
which Eichenbaum shows support for those claims. In analyzing this, I notice that a crucial
aspect of Eichenbaum’s arguing for the claims he defends involves citing interdisciplinary
findings on memory organization and using certain descriptive terms/phrases indicative of
corroboration. Accordingly, I focus my analytic work around the language and terms
Eichenbaum uses to describe the findings he cites in support of his claims. When relevant, I
appeal to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of important terms via a software program
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called NVIVO12, as well as other important statistical information such as citation counts and
impact factors.117 118 119

3.2 Summary of ‘Memory on Time’
Trends reviews involve a summary of the current literature on a given topic as well as
explanations/comments that sometimes take the form of a synthesized claim (provided the author
clearly states when the claim in question is their own opinion). The main aim of ‘Memory on
Time’ (hereafter referred to as ‘the case study’) is to establish the role of the hippocampus as
creating a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories. In the case study,
Eichenbaum summarizes findings from recent literature on the spatio and temporal aspects of
memory organization. He explains the significance of the findings from this literature by stating
they all fit together to support claims about memory organization. Specifically, he states that in
addition to summarizing literature on memory organization, he will relate the findings he cites on
temporal representation to literature on spatial organization, and argue that, ‘taken together’,
these findings suggest a role for the hippocampus which functions to create a spatio-temporal
framework for the organization of memories (Eichenbaum 2013, 81).
My analysis yielded what I consider to be five synthesized claims advanced by Eichenbaum in
the case study. Importantly, Eichenbaum only flags what I identify as the fifth claim as a
synthesized claim; this is the main claim that Eichenbaum explicitly argues for in the case study.
However, because Eichenbaum states what I identify as claims 1-4 are supported by findings
from different areas of science which, when combined, results in a specific claim about the
nature of memory organization, I read each claim as a unique synthesis of the findings from
Eichenbaum’s cited research papers. Thus, on my reading, the case study contains four implicit
claims (claims 1-4) and one explicit claim (claim 5). The five synthesized claims I take
Eichenbaum to advance and defend in the case study are:

117

NVIVO 12 is one of the leading qualitative research software programs on the market for determining insights
in unstructured data and is used internationally by academia, government, non-profit, and commercial
organizations (Kolodny, online tutorial 2019-03-18).
118

All citation counts were acquired through Google Scholar, which enables users to “… gauge the visibility and
influence of recent articles in scholarly publications” (https://scholar.google.ca/intl/en/scholar/metrics.html).
119

All impact factors were acquired through the most recent statistics released by the Journal Citation Report
(JCR) on their website and/or the website of the journal in question.

79

Claim 1: the hippocampus is responsible for the memory of the order of events (ibid, 83).
Claim 2: the hippocampus disambiguates overlapping sequences of events (ibid).
Claim 3: hippocampal neurons replay sequences of events by encoding and retrieving the order
of events (ibid).
Claim 4: hippocampal time cells possess the properties of context cells, allowing them to bridge
the order of events120 121 (ibid, 86).
Claim 5: the combination of claims 1-4, in addition to previously unmentioned literature on
memory organization, entail that the role of the hippocampus is to provide a spatio-temporal
framework for the organization of memories (ibid, 86-87).
Of the synthesized claims listed above, I make a distinction between two types of syntheses.122 I
identify claims 1-4 as mini syntheses, and claim 5 as the macro synthesis (i.e., the main claim
advanced by Eichenbaum in the case study). My reasoning for the distinction is that claim 5 not
only synthesizes findings from previously uncited studies, but also syntheses claims 1-4 (and the
papers/findings cited for each of those). In this sense, claim 5 is the culmination of the work
done to support claims 1-4, as well as additional references added to provide further support to
claim 5.
In the case study, Eichenbaum argues that claims 1-5 are well supported by interdisciplinary
research on memory organization. Prima facie, it appears that the synthesized claims are
corroborated by results from research spanning multiple areas of the mind-brain sciences
investigating memory organization. In the following section, I demonstrate what kind of work
Eichenbaum does to provide support for claims 1-5 (i.e., how does he argue for their
corroboration), and explore this analysis within the context of IC in sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3.

120

Eichenbaum defines time cells as: “neurons that fire at a specific moment within a temporally structured
episode” (Eichenbaum 2013, 81).
121

Eichenbaum defines context cells as: “theoretical neurons whose activity bridge events and therefore could link
their representations in order. These may pre-exist or arise independent of specific events, or could arise as an
integration of event information over time” (Eichenbaum 2013, 81).
122

For length purposes, I shorten ‘the synthesized claims 1-5’ to ‘claims 1-5’ in the remainder of this dissertation.
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3.2.1 What Eichenbaum Does to Show Support for his Main Claims
In the case study, Eichenbaum advances what I identify as claims 1-5; what does Eichenbaum do
to show these claims are well supported? Put differently, what kind of work does Eichenbaum
do to demonstrate that claims 1-5 stand on firm epistemic footing? How does Eichenbaum argue
for each claim; what kind of arguments does he advance? In analyzing the case study, I noticed
the majority of this work is done by stating findings from different research papers on memory
organization and using certain terms to describe or introduce those findings and the claims that
they suggest. The terms used to describe the findings Eichenbaum states in support of claims 1-5
are indicative of corroboration. To better understand how Eichenbaum provides support for his
claims by using these key terms, I focus on claim 3 and claim 5 as examples.123
Claim 3 states hippocampal neuronal ensembles replay sequences of events in memory by
encoding and retrieving the order of events (ibid, 83). Eichenbaum cites findings from six
research papers on memory organization to demonstrate the substantiation of claim 3.
Eichenbaum provides no critical analysis of these findings. Instead, he briefly states findings
from each paper and states what he takes to be their implication(s) for memory organization. He
begins by stating there is ‘substantial evidence’ for the claim that hippocampal neuronal
ensembles are responsible for representing the order of past events (ibid, emphasis mine).
Importantly, however, Eichenbaum provides no explanation as to what constitutes ‘substantial
evidence’, how it is quantified, etc. (ibid). He goes on to claim a great deal of evidence backing
this claim comes from studies working on rats in a task where the animals routinely pass through
the same route while investigators record place cell activation in the animals (ibid).124
Within this paradigm, Eichenbaum notes ‘numerous studies’ have reported both forward and
reverse replays of place cell sequences (ibid, emphasis mine). The ‘numerous studies’
Eichenbaum refers to consists of four papers investigating memory for order in rats (ibid). The
first study Eichenbaum cites is by Karlsson and Frank (2009), who reported consistent replays of
123

The analysis of claim 3 has similar results for claims 1, 2, and 4, since they all share the same structure (i.e.,
Eichenbaum reviews a certain amount of studies, which, he argues provide strong support for the mini syntheses).
For length purposes I chose to constrain my focus on claim 3 as an illustration of what Eichenbaum does to show
support for his mini synthesized claims 1-4.
124

Eichenbaum defines a place cell as: “neurons in the hippocampus that fire when an animal (or human) is at a
particular location in a spatially defined environment” (Eichenbaum 2013, 81).
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past experience in animals both during periods of wakefulness and rest (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).
After stating this, Eichenbaum cites a paper by Ji and Wilson (2007), who found hippocampal
replays are synchronized with cortical replays, and a paper by Jadhav et al. (2012), which
demonstrated that interfering with replays lead to impairments on memory for maze learning
tasks (Eichenbaum 2013, 83). Eichenbaum claims the two findings together suggest that replays
are an essential aspect of memory consolidation (ibid). Eichenbaum immediately cites a study
by Johnson and Redish (2007), who found when rats undergo maze learning, hippocampal
neuronal ensembles replayed possible route options (ibid). Eichenbaum states this finding
suggests that replays represent memory for past events (ibid). Eichenbaum again does not
explain how this finding fits together with the previous findings from Karlsson and Frank (2009),
Ji and Wilson (2007), and Jadhav et al. (2012), but seems to take these studies as representing the
‘substantial evidence’ implicating hippocampal neuronal replays as essential for memory for
sequences of events.
Eichenbaum continues to show support for claim 3 by claiming there is not only ‘substantial
evidence’ from rat studies, but also evidence from human studies implicating hippocampal
replays in memory consolidation. Specifically, a study from Gelbard-Sagiv et al. (2008) found
neuronal ensembles within the human hippocampus replayed firing sequences when human
participants were asked to recall scenes in a movie, and a study from Paz et al. (2010) found
hippocampal neuronal ensembles demonstrated reliable firing patterns while human participants
learned sequences from a movie (Eichenbaum 2013, 83). As with the rat studies, Eichenbaum
does not explain the relation between the two human studies nor how they fit together with the
rat studies other than immediately concluding the section by claiming: “These findings provide
compelling evidence that hippocampal neuronal ensembles can encode and retrieve the temporal
structure of sequential events” (ibid, emphasis mine).
This is what Eichenbaum does in the case study to substantiate claim three; I will now unpack
this work by establishing what kind of an argument Eichenbaum provides for claim 3.
Eichenbaum wants to demonstrate that claim 3 is supported by evidence from human and nonhuman animals. This evidence consists of four research papers investigating memory
organization in rats, and two papers on memory organization in humans, for a total of six
research papers. Generally speaking, all six findings implicate hippocampal replays in memory
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consolidation (in some shape or form). Eichenbaum’s argument for claim 3 standing on firm
epistemic footing is implicit; that is, he does not explicitly advance an argument explaining how
and in what ways the cited findings support claim 3, but it seems implied that because all six
findings are consistent with each other, and further, because the cited findings are from
experiments on different species that all implicate hippocampal replays in memory consolidation
(i.e., because they all point towards the same general claim), claim 3 stands on firm epistemic
footing.
This seems especially true considering the terms Eichenbaum used to describe/introduce the
findings he cites. That is, the terms used to describe the overall evidence in favor of claim 3
include: ‘there is substantial evidence for’, ‘provides compelling evidence that’, and ‘suggests
that’ (ibid). These statements convey a great deal of confidence with respect to the epistemic
status of claim 3. That is, if there is substantial and compelling evidence suggesting claim 3, it
would seem that one has good reasons to believe claim 3 stands on firm epistemic footing.
Again, however, the argument Eichenbaum advances to support claim 3 is implicit; the reader
may be able to piece together Eichenbaum’s argument, perhaps by noting as I do that all six
findings seem to point towards the same conclusion and are consistent with each other, however,
Eichenbaum himself never explicitly makes this point in the case study. Instead, Eichenbaum
simply states there is ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ evidence for claim 3, cites findings from six
interdisciplinary studies on memory organization, and states that they all suggest hippocampal
replays are involved in memory consolidation (ibid, 83).
In sum, Eichenbaum shows support for claim 3 by stating there is compelling and substantial
evidence for it by citing six findings from different scientific research papers on human and nonhuman animals, and stating what they, together, suggest for memory organization (which is
claim 3, according to Eichenbaum). I will now analyze the work done by Eichenbaum to support
claim 5.
The main claim Eichenbaum defends in the case study (i.e., claim 5) is that the fundamental role
of the hippocampus is to create a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories
(ibid, 81). Eichenbaum begins by stating there is ‘considerable evidence’ implicating the
hippocampus in spatial representation; here he cites McNaughton et al. (1996) and Shapiro et al.
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(2006) (Eichenbaum 2013, 86). However, he notes claims 1-4 implicate the hippocampus in
temporal representation. Eichenbaum asks how the two streams of research can be reconciled?
Does the hippocampus function to represent spatial or temporal memory information?
Eichenbaum answers this by stating time and place cells are not, in fact, distinct, and that
whether their activity is associated with temporal or spatial representations depends on the
context of learning within which the human/non-human animal is engaged in (this is claim 5)
(ibid). His answer thus synthesizes both streams of research on the role of the hippocampus for
memory organization. How does Eichenbaum provide support for claim 5? How does he argue
claim 5 stands on firm epistemic footing?
Eichenbaum argues claim 5 is supported by two key features of place and time cells. The first
feature is that the two cell types share a host of similarities. He cites findings from MacDonald
et al. (2011) – a study Eichenbaum cites heavily in support of claim 4 – stating changes to the
primary dimension of a task creates a ‘partial re-timing’ of hippocampal time cells in much the
same way that changes to ‘spatial cues’ causes ‘partial re-mapping’ of place cells (Eichenbaum
2013, 86). Drawing again on MacDonald et al. (2011, 2012) and newly on Komorowski et al.
(2009), Eichenbaum states both time and place cells encode specific events from within their
respective frameworks (Eichenbaum 2013, 86). Despite there being multiple sources of temporal
information in the brain (here Eichenbaum cites two new papers from and Buhusi and Meck
(2005) and Mauk and Buonomano (2004)), Eichenbaum draws on Kraus et al. (2012) to show
the main source of spatial and temporal information reaches the hippocampus via the medial
entorhinal cortex (Eichenbaum 2013, 86). Eichenbaum continues to highlight a final similarity
between the two types of cells. Specifically, he cites McNaughton et al. (1996) who found that
place cells seem to be ‘pre-configured’ and applied to representations of spatial dimensions, just
as Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) (previously cited in support of claim 4) found that time cells “…
reflect a sequential configuration of the passage of time, onto which specific events are serially
attached” (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).
The second feature of time and place cells Eichenbaum identifies as key to substantiating claim 5
is demonstrated by MacDonald et al. (2011) (previously cited in support of claim 4) who found
that time cells tend to incorporate spatial information, and place cells tend to incorporate
temporal information (Eichenbaum 2013, 86). Further, a finding by Kraus et al. 2011 (also cited
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to support claim 4) in experiments where rats traverse through a T-maze task demonstrated that
many of the same neuronal ensembles ‘fire selectively’ at periods of time also display ‘spatially
specific activity’ while the rat traverses the maze (Eichenbaum 2013, 86). Thus, while
Eichenbaum does not comment further on these findings, it would seem as though time and place
cells are the same type of cell (or at least that they share many of the same properties).
After listing traits shared between time and place cells and demonstrating hippocampal cells
represent both spatio-temporal aspects of memory organization, Eichenbaum comments critically
on the distinction between the two cells in the literature as being “… a reflection of different
experimental designs that emphasize time or place representation, respectively, rather than a
fundamental distinction between time cells and place cells” (ibid). Finally, Eichenbaum sums up
in his ‘concluding remarks’ section by claiming
… a synthesis of emerging knowledge suggests that the same population of hippocampal
neurons encodes both the spatial and temporal regularities of experience, creating a
framework that organizes the spatio-temporal context of experience and puts each event into
its time and place (ibid, 87, emphases mine).
This is a brief description of what Eichenbaum does in the last two sections of the case study
where he introduces claim 5. Like claim 3, Eichenbaum wants to demonstrate that claim 5 is
supported by evidence from human and non-human animals. He begins by stating there is
‘considerable evidence’ implicating the hippocampus in spatial memory; for this, he cites one
research paper on rats, one review paper including data on human and non-human animals, and
two studies on human animals (ibid, 86). Thus, the ‘considerable evidence’ consists of four
papers on human and non-human animals implicating the hippocampus in spatial memory.
Eichenbaum asks how one stream of research (i.e., the spatial aspects of memory in the
hippocampus) can be reconciled with literature suggesting the hippocampus is responsible for
temporal aspects of memory (i.e., claims 1-4 and all the research papers he cites to support those
claims)? His answer is to synthesize the two streams of research and argue that the role of the
hippocampus is to establish a spatio-temporal framework for memory organization (ibid, 86).
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According to Eichenbaum, there are two main features of time and place cells suggesting claim 5
(ibid). The first feature is that time cells and place cells share similar properties; here
Eichenbaum cites three rat studies, two review papers on human and non-human animals, and
one paper on mice, for a total of five papers. While each cited finding refers to a different
similarity, generally speaking, all six of these studies show that time and place cells share
properties such as ‘re-timing’ and ‘re-mapping’, for example (ibid).
The second feature is that time cells incorporate spatial information and place cells incorporate
temporal information; here, Eichenbaum cites a paper on rats and a review paper on human and
non-human animals, for a total of two papers. Eichenbaum’s argument for claim 5, like claim 3,
is implicit. That is, Eichenbaum does not explicitly state what the two features entail, but it
seems implied that if time and place cells share a host of similarities, and if each type can
incorporate spatial and/or temporal information, then the two cell types are not distinct. Since
they are not distinct (the implicit argument seems to go), whether their activity is associated with
time and/or space is dependent on the context within which the human/non-human animal finds
itself (ibid, 86).
To re-iterate, the implicit argument rests on the two features of time and place cells described by
Eichenbaum. These two features are supported by a total of seven papers (three of which are
review papers) on human and non-human animals. When Eichenbaum reports these features, he
does so by briefly stating what each paper found, generally speaking, without introducing them
with any terms like ‘compelling evidence’, ‘shows that’, ‘suggests that’, or ‘indicates that’, etc.
(ibid 83-86-87). Eichenbaum only uses terms indicative of corroboration at the beginning of his
section entitled ‘time and place cells’, when claiming there is ‘considerable evidence’
implicating the hippocampus in spatial representations in non-human animals and ‘strong
evidence’ for it in human animals, and when he introduces claim 5 as an answer to how the
spatial and temporal aspects of the hippocampus and memory can be reconciled. With respect to
the latter, he argues there are two main features of time and place cells which ‘suggest that’ the
role of the hippocampus is to establish a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of
memories (ibid). In his section entitled ‘concluding remarks’, Eichenbaum states that a
‘synthesis of emerging knowledge’ – presumably that which he reviewed in the case study –
‘suggests that’ the same population of hippocampal neurons encode both spatial and temporal
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aspects of experience, therefore time and place cells are not distinct, and the role of the
hippocampus is to create a spatio-temporal framework for memory organization (ibid, 87). Thus,
the main terms used to introduce and advance claim 5 are ‘suggest that’ in Eichenbaum’s section
entitled ‘time cells and place cells’ and ‘suggests that’ in his section entitled ‘concluding
remarks. What suggests claim 5? Again, Eichenbaum does not make this argument explicit, but
it seems that what suggests claim 5 is ‘compelling’, ‘substantial’, ‘considerable’ evidence from
claims 1-4, along with evidence from a few papers which were not cited in support of claims 1-4
in his section ‘time cells and place cells’ showing time and place cells are not distinct (ibid, 83,
86-87). Importantly, the term ‘suggests’ implies that while claim 5 may not be completely true,
it is very likely, given that it is well supported by interdisciplinary research on multiple species
in the mind-brain sciences investigating memory organization.
This descriptive analysis leads to the question: “does the case study represent a strong case of IC,
and, if so, how”? I address these questions in the following sections.
3.2.2 In What Ways ‘Memory on Time’ is a Prime Example of IC in Practice: The
Interdisciplinarity Component
Thus far I have showcased what Eichenbaum does in the case study to argue for claims 1-5 by
focusing on the language and terms he used to describe the findings he reported to substantiate
claims 1-5. That is, he used terms like ‘compelling’ and ‘substantial evidence’ to describe the
cited findings, and (sometimes) commented on some of the findings by stating what he thinks
they suggest (ibid, 83). I now want to address how and in what ways the case study adheres to
the requirements of IC; does the case study represent a strong case of interdisciplinary
corroboration?
In answering this, I begin with the interdisciplinarity component of IC insofar as it is relatively
straight-forward to define and assess. The interdisciplinarity component held that the papers
surveyed in one’s review paper must come from different areas of science, which often make use
of different methods of experimentation, different protocols, different types of analysis, on
different animals, etc., (instead of reviewing studies only in psychology, only on humans, using
only questionnaires). The 59 articles mentioned in Eichenbaum’s review paper span the fields of
neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, biology, computational biology,
neurobiology, behavioral biology and cognitive science, cognitive neurobiology, psychology,
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etc.125 Eichenbaum thus does not constrain his focus to one sole area of science, but instead
reviews studies from multiple areas of science housed under the mind-brain sciences researching
memory organization.
Critically, the cited papers not only span different areas of science, but different species. For
instance, the reviewed papers involve experimental research on humans (e.g., Ekstrom and
Bookheimer, 2007; Lehn et al., 2009; Shimamura, 1990; Spiers et al., 2001; Vargha-Kadem et
al., 2007, etc.), rats (e.g., Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2006; Fortin et al., 2002; Karlsson and
Frank, 2009; Kesner et al., 2002, etc.), mice (e.g., Devito and Eichenbaum, 2011; Dragoi and
Tonegawa, 2011Suh et al., 2011), and monkeys (e.g., Naya and Suzuki, 2011; Templer and
Hampton, 2012) (see figure 4 for a breakdown of the type of species studied by each of the cited
papers).
Further, while the cited papers involve work on four main species (i.e., humans, rats, mice, and
monkey), each species type is varied. For example, in humans, control groups were compared
against humans with global retrograde amnesia (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al., 2007), patients with
Korsakoff’s syndrome (e.g., Shimamura, 1990), or with selective bilateral hippocampal lesions
(e.g., Mayes et al., 2001). Of the two papers on monkeys (i.e., Naya and Suzuki, 2011; Templer
and Hampton, 2012), the former used macaque monkeys and the later rhesus monkeys.
Different tasks were used to investigate memory organization such as serial order for list tasks
(e.g., Shimamura, 1990; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2007), memory of order for action and stimuli
sequences (e.g., Ekstrom and Bookheimer, 2007), a taxi cab virtual reality game task, (Lehn et
al., 2009), retrieving a series of action sequences from movie clips task, (e.g., Fortin et al., 2002),
overlapping sequences of odors task (e.g., Agster et al., 2002) retrieval for overlapping images
of faces task (e.g., Ross et al., 2009), and various T-maze tasks (e.g., Ainge et al., 2007;
Ferbinteanu and Shapiro, 2003; Frank et al. 2000; Wood et al., 2000, etc.).

125

While Eichenbaum cites 61 studies in his ‘References’ section, I have chosen to exclude the first two –
Aristotle’s (1930) ‘On Memory and Reminiscence’ and Tulving’s (1984) ‘Precis of Elements of Episodic Memory’ –
insofar as their sole citational purpose is to set up the appropriate background/history of temporal memory
research. Accordingly, because I’m interested in the findings cited for the purpose of providing evidence for claims
1-5, they do not fit this description, and I have thus excluded them from any further analysis in this chapter and
chapter four.
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These tasks involved varied methodologies. One common method of analysis in human and
non-human animals is the comparison of a control group versus a group with some kind of brain
damage. The type of and the extent of brain damage varies from paper to paper. For example,
hippocampal lesions/damage in human animals are often naturally occurring (i.e., they are the
product of some disease/pathology such as Korsakoff’s syndrome and not the product of a
researcher directly intervening by creating the lesions themselves). In non-human animals,
however, brain damage is a product of direct intervention and is produced in a number of ways.
For example, many of the research papers on rats (whether the task is the disambiguation of
overlapping odors or the navigation of a T-maze) compare the behavior of a group of control rats
to rats with various types of brain damage. In some cases, this damage involved brain lesions
which were produced in a number of ways; for instance, Agster et al. (2002) produced humanmade lesions by either injecting infusions of the neurotoxin ibotenic acid or via the application of
a radiofrequency current, and Fortin et al. (2002) surgically created lesions in the hippocampus
(Agster et al. 2002, 5760-5761; Fortin et al. 2002, 458).
Finally, the behavior/results of the tasks are analyzed via a variety of techniques/tools including
but not limited to MRI (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997), fMRI (e.g., Schendan et al. 2003;
Staresina and Davachi, 201), positron emission tomography (PET)126 (e.g., Gill et al., 2011),
electroencephalogram and magnetoencephalographic imaging (EEG and MEG)127 (e.g., Jensen
and Lisman, 2005), and electrophysiological recording/ single-cell recording (e.g., Ji and
Wilson, 2007; Johnson and Redish, 2007; Karlsson and Frank, 2009; Komorowski et al. 2009;
Wood et al., 2000; etc.).
In sum, the case study clearly adheres to/includes the interdisciplinary component of IC. That is,
it includes findings from different areas of science, performed on different species, using
different experimental tasks and protocols, the results of which were analyzed via different
techniques/tools. While the case study has a strong interdisciplinary component, summarizing
findings from different areas of science is not sufficient for IC. The cited interdisciplinary
126

PET uses a radioactive substance to detect disease in the body.

127

EEG is a tool used to detect brain waves and MEG is an imaging technique that allows researchers to detect
and record “… the magnetic field associated with electrical activity in the brain” (https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/electroencephalogram, and https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/magnetoencephalography).
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research papers and their respective findings must also corroborate claims 1-5. In the next
section, I analyze the case study in light of the corroboration requirement.
3.2.3 In What Ways ‘Memory on Time’ is a Prime Example of IC in Practice: The Corroboration
Component
In chapter two, I noted a standard definition of corroboration is one where evidence either
confirms or supports x.128 In the context of the case study, we might say claims 1-5 are
corroborated if multiple pieces of evidence confirm or lend support to one or more of them. To
confirm x is akin to saying the evidence indicates the truth of x. To claim evidence lends support
to x, however, is epistemically weaker. One can claim evidence supports x without making the
additional claim that x is true. That is, in saying a, b, and c, lend support to x, we can accept that
x is not necessarily true, but instead approximately true, likely, unlikely to be false, highly
probable, etc.129 Accordingly, analyzing the case study within the context of IC requires asking
what kind of epistemic claims (i.e., either that it confirms or lends support to) claims 1-5 are
making.
To answer this, I further investigated the language/terms Eichenbaum used before advancing
claims 1-5. The terms used before stating a claim that appear to imply corroboration are: the
studies show that x (a remark made with respect to claim 1 and 2), there is compelling evidence
for x (a remark made with respect to claim 3), these findings strongly support x (a remark made
with respect to claim 4), and that a synthesis of knowledge on time and place cells suggests that x
(a claim made with respect claim 5 in two separate sections of the case study) (ibid 83,86-87).
Since claim 5 is mentioned twice, both in the section of the case study entitled ‘time and place
cells’ and again in the section entitled ‘concluding remarks’, there are a total of 6 terms
indicative of corroboration used to advance a given claim. A text frequency search on NVIVO12
revealed the two most common terms of the six are ‘show that’ (shortened in fig 2. below as
128

Here I take x to represent a claim about the temporal organization of memory, where x could thus be any of
claims 1-5.
129

Bechtel and Richardson (1993) define corroboration in probabilistic terms. They claim when different pieces of
evidence (using different and independent measures) point to some claim x, the likelihood of x being an error is
low. Thus, their epistemic understanding is not one of confirmation, but something weaker along the lines of
probability (xxvii). Similarly, Wimsatt’s (2007) concept of robustness also presents a case for corroboration as
something weaker than confirmation. For Wimsatt, something is robust if it is assessible, detectible, etc., by a
variety of different and independent measures; however, to say x is robust is not to say that x is true, instead, the
likelihood of x being robust increases with each piece of evidence supporting it (Wimsatt 2007, 196).
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‘show’) and ‘suggest that ’ (shortened in fig 2. below as ‘suggest’), each of which make up a
respective weighted percentage of 33.3%.130 To show x implies x is true or has been confirmed,
but to suggest x merely entails it being a likely possibility, approximately true, etc. While it
seems that the kind of corroboration occurring in the case study is undetermined, insofar as the
two most frequent terms are tied, the two remaining terms break this tie. That is, there being
‘compelling evidence’ for x (shortened in fig 2. below as ‘compelling’) and there being evidence
that ‘strongly supports’ x (shortened in fig. 2 below as ‘supports’) each make up a weighted
percentage of 16.67%. Neither of these terms entail x has been confirmed; there can be
compelling evidence for x without x being true, just as evidence can strongly support x without x
being true. These terms simply imply there are good reasons to believe x stands on firm
epistemic footing insofar as it is well supported by multiple distinct pieces of evidence; but it
need not and does not entail x is true.
The terms ‘compelling’ and ‘supports’, along with the term ‘suggest’ support a reading of
corroboration understood in terms of evidence lending support to x. This seems especially true
given the term used with respect to the claim 5 (i.e., the main claim Eichenbaum argues for in the
case study) is ‘suggest that’, which implies something weaker than confirmation. While there
are aspects both of a confirmation and a lending support reading throughout the case study,
ultimately, the terms falling under a ‘lending support to’ reading of corroboration (i.e., suggest,
compelling, and supports) make up a weighted percentage of 66.64%, making it predominantly
on the side of ‘lending support to’ reading of corroboration.131 Corroboration in the case study
should therefore be understood along the lines of ‘lending support’, whereby the cited findings
lend support to claims 1-5 in such a way that one has good reasons to believe the claims are
probable, likely, etc.

130

All weighted percentages were automatically generated via the NVIVO12 text frequency analysis.

131

If one considers the terms used to with respect to claim 5 (i.e., the term ‘suggests’ once in Eichenbaum’s
section entitled ‘time cells and place cells’ and once in Eichenbaum’s ‘concluding remarks’), the percentage jumps
to 100% in support of a corroboration defined as pieces of evidence lending support to claim x (Eichenbaum 2013,
86).
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Figure 2 – Tree map produced via text frequency query on NVIVO12 demonstrating the most common terms to the least
common terms suggesting corroboration. I’ve shortened all the phrases down to their key terms (e.g., ‘studies show that’ to
‘show’).

I noted in section 3.2.1 the phrase ‘suggests that’ used by Eichenbaum before advancing claim 5
left open the possibility that claim 5 may not be completely true, even if there was ‘substantial’
or ‘compelling evidence’ in favor of it (ibid, 83). Applying the new definition of corroboration
to the case study, one might argue claims 1-5 have been corroborated insofar as the findings
cited by Eichenbaum all lend support to claims 1-5 and do so in such a way the claims are to be
understood as approximately true, probable, likely etc. That is, the cited findings, when
combined, appear to lend support to claims 1-5.
Do the cited findings possess any other features that may increase the likelihood of the
corroboration of claims 1-5? What characteristics might the cited findings possess such that one
can confidently say a reliable claim about memory has been advanced? I answer this by
considering two key features of the cited findings in the case study: the journals in which the
findings were published, and the number of citations each of the cited papers received. As
Seglen (1997) notes, evaluating the quality of scientific research papers is notoriously
challenging. Impact factors and citation statistics are frequently called upon in the evaluation of
scientific research papers insofar as they are considered to be a “… quantitative and objective
indicator directly related to published science” (Seglen 1997, 498).
One important feature of the papers Eichenbaum cites in support of claims 1-5 is that they are
published in high-calibre and well-respected journals within the mind-brain science community.
To see a breakdown of the cited journals, I’ve created a chart below indicating the name of the
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journal, how many studies Eichenbaum cites from each journal, and the journal’s impact
factor.132 133
Name of Journal
Academic Press
Annual Review of Neuroscience
Science
Neuropsychologia
Cognitive Neuropsychology
Hippocampus
Learning & Memory
Journal of Neuroscience
PLOS Biology
Cerebral Cortex
Nature Neuroscience
Frontiers in Behavioral
Neuroscience
Neuron
Behavioral Brain Research
Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America
Trends in Neurosciences
Psychological Review
Journal of Experimental Biology
Nature
Current Opinion in Neurology
Frontiers Integrative
Neuroscience
Nature Reviews Neuroscience

Number of Cited Studies in
Case Study
1
2
6
1
1
4
3
11
1
1
3
3

Impact Factor

9
2
1

14.318
3.002
9.504

2
1
1
3
1
1

17.755
7.230
3.32
41.577
5.307
3.23

1

28.880

Book
14.675
37.205
2.888
1.84
3.945
2.906
5.971
9.163
6.308
19.912
3.104

Figure 3 – Chart including one column for the name of the journal, a second column for the number of studies in the case study
that are published in said journal, and a final column stating the impact factor of the journal.

132

Again, I’ve only included the 59 studies as they are the ones doing the epistemic work in the case study.

133

An impact factor is the outcome of a quantitative analysis measuring how frequently articles in a journal have
been cited for a given year (https://researchguides.uic.edu/if/impact). An impact factor is represented numerically
and is used to determine the rank or status of a given journal; the higher the number, the higher ranked the
journal is (ibid). Specifically: “… The calculation is based on a two-year period and involves dividing the number of
times articles were cited by the number of articles that are citable” (ibid). Journal Citation Reports (hereafter JCR)
are responsible for providing impact factors for journals in science, technology and the social sciences (ibid).
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The journals highlighted in yellow in figure 3 represent the three journals with the highest
number of cited papers in the case study. Specifically, Eichenbaum cites six studies from
Science, nine studies from Neuron, and eleven studies from the Journal of Neuroscience, for a
total amount of 26 studies out of 59 (making up almost half of the cited studies at 44%).134 All
three of these journals are well-established within the mind-brain science community. Science,
founded in 1880, claims to publish only ‘the very best’ research articles in science and those
articles “… consistently rank among the most cited in the world”
(https://www.sciencemag.org/about/about-scienceaaas?_ga=2.10191605.1947000741.1556017401-385344628.1554129536). Indeed, out of all the
journals listed above, Science has the second highest impact factor rating (see my fig. 3 above).
Neuron is another well-respected, multidisciplinary journal in the mind-brain sciences. Over the
last fifteen years, Neuron, founded in 1988, has established its place in the scientific community
as “… as one of the most influential and relied upon journals in the field of neuroscience. …
Neuron serves as one of the premier intellectual forums of the entire neuroscience community”
(https://www.cell.com/neuron/aims, emphases mine).
Finally, the Journal of Neuroscience claims to advance neuroscientific research by “…
publishing and widely disseminating the highly rigorous research representative of the breadth
of neuroscience …” (http://www.jneurosci.org/content/about-jneurosci, emphasis mine). The
Journal of Neuroscience prides itself on five main qualities: first, delivering articles of excellent
quality and scientific rigor, by ensuring that studies reflect ‘unbiased and repeatable
experiments’ and reporting procedures to ensure progress in neuroscience (ibid). Second, the
journal represents the wide-scope and ever-evolving field of neuroscience (ibid). Third, the
journal ensures diversity amongst its editorial board (ibid). Fourth, the journal prides itself on its
quick and efficient dissemination of peer-reviewed articles by publishing fifty weeks out of the
year and is committed to publishing articles as quickly as possible while maintaining scientific
rigor and excellence (ibid). Finally, the journal prides itself of its constructive and fair peerreview process whereby: “Decisions are made by our journal editors who are active research
scientists in the field” (ibid). In sum, all three of the journals with the highest number of papers

134

Percentages in this section are rounded up for simplicity.
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referenced by Eichenbaum are from internationally recognized, multidisciplinary, cutting-edge,
and highly influential journals producing some of the best and most scientifically rigorous and
sound articles on the mind-brain.
The impact factors highlighted in turquoise in figure 3 represent the three most highly ranked
journals of Eichenbaum’s 59 references. These journals are Science, Nature, and Nature
Reviews Neuroscience. Science, which is also ranked in the top three journals with the highest
number of scientific papers referenced by Eichenbaum, is the second highest ranked journal of
those included in the case study (in terms of its impact factor). As stated above, Science claims
to publish and disseminate only the very best research articles in science, making it a highranking, peer-reviewed, international journal in the mind-brain sciences
(https://www.sciencemag.org/about/about-scienceaaas?_ga=2.10191605.1947000741.1556017401-385344628.1554129536).
Nature, which has the highest impact factor of those included in the case study, is an
international journal that publishes weekly, producing, “… the finest peer-reviewed research”
(https://www.nature.com/nature/about, emphasis mine). In their mission statement, Nature
states that they contribute to advancing scientific knowledge by the “… prompt publication of
significant advances in any branch of science … to ensure that the results of science are rapidly
disseminated to the public throughout the world …” (ibid). Nature is therefore a
multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed, and highly ranked journal in the mind-brain sciences producing
some of the best research concerning the mind-brain.
The third highest ranking journal according to its impact factor is Nature Reviews Neuroscience.
In their ‘aims and scope’ section, Nature Reviews Neuroscience claims similarly to provide some
of the best peer-reviewed research from a variety of branches in neuroscience
(https://www.nature.com/nrn/about).
The journals with the highest number of cited research papers (i.e., Science, the Journal of
Neuroscience, and Neuron) are considered prestigious and high-calibre mind-brain science
journals. The papers cited from those journals make up almost 44% of Eichenbaum’s
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references.135 Of the top-three highest ranking impact factors, 6 papers were cited from Science,
3 papers from Nature, and 1 paper from Nature Reviews Neuroscience. If these papers are added
to those from The Journal of Neuroscience and Neuron (omitting Science, as its numbers are
already factored into the 44%) we get a total of 30/59 papers, making a total percentage of 50%
of the cited papers. Thus, at least half of the studies Eichenbaum cites in support of claims 1-5
are from internationally top-ranked, multidisciplinary journals that purport to disseminate only
the best and most scientifically sound articles.
Further, there are other highly ranked journals just shy of the top three. For example,
Eichenbaum cites two studies from Annual Review Neuroscience (which has an impact factor of
14.75), three studies from Nature Neuroscience (which has an impact factor of 19.912), and two
studies in Trends in Neurosciences (which has an impact factor of 17.755). Adding these papers
to those above results in 37/59 papers, making a total percentage of 63%. Accordingly, more
than half of Eichenbaum’s references are from trustworthy and reputable sources. A final point
worth noting is all journals listed in fig. 3 (even those with lower impact factors) are peerreviewed journals in the mind-brain science.136
I inquired above whether the findings cited by Eichenbaum possess features which might
increase the likelihood of claims 1-5 being corroborated. The analysis of journal impact factors
suggests that if the cited papers and their respective findings are published in reputable and highcalibre journals that allegedly produce the most scientifically sound articles, one might argue this
lends more credibility to Eichenbaum’s findings, which would not be the case if he were citing
findings from random websites or non-peer reviewed journals. This credibility increases the
likelihood of the corroboration of claims 1-5 in the case study.
Another feature to consider is the number of citations each individual cited paper has received.
To visualize the breakdown of citations per study, I have included a chart (see figure 4)
containing the author(s) of each article, the journal in which it was published, the number of
citations it received, and the primary species studied.

135

Percentage was rounded up for simplicity.

136

Peer-reviewed means any submitted article for potential publication must pass a board of reviewers who are
knowledgeable in the topic to ensure top quality research.
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Author(s)

Journal

# of Citations

Primary Species
Studied

1. N/A
2. N/A
3. Eichenbaum
et al. (2007)
4. Vargha-

Annual Review

2004

Neuroscience

Human and nonhuman animals

Science

1849

Humans

Neuropsychologia

649

Humans

Cognitive

146

Humans

Hippocampus

198

Humans

Learning & Memory

134

Humans

Journal of

155

Humans

236

Humans

Khadem
(1997)
5. Shimamura
(1990)
6. Mayes et al.
(2001)
7. Spiers et al.

Neuropsychology

(2001)
8. Ekstrom and
Bookheimer
(2007)
9. Lehn et al.
(2009)
10. Kumaran and

Neuroscience
PLOS Biology

Maguire
(2006)
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11. Tubridy and

Cerebral Cortex

110

Humans

Journal of

280

Humans

Nature Neuroscience

740

Rats

Behavioral

281

Rats

Hippocampus

21

Mice

Journal of

116

Rhesus Monkeys

Learning & Memory

234

Rats

Neuron

522

Humans

Journal of

66

Rats

Davachi
(2011)
12. Staresina and
Davachi

Neuroscience

(2006)
13. Fortin et al.
(2002)
14. Kesner et al.
(2002)
15. Templer and

Neuroscience

Hampton
(2012)
16. Devito and
Eichenbaum

Neuroscience

(2012)
17. Ergorul and
Eichenbaum
(2004)
18. Schendan et
al. (2003)
19. Ergorul and
Eichenbaum

Neuroscience

(2006)
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20. DeCoteau and
Kesner (2000)
21. Fouquet et al.
(2010)
22. Agster et al.
(2002)
23. Kumaran and

Behavioral

126

Rats

36

Rats

251

Rats

Neuron

109

Humans

Hippocampus

67

Humans

Journal of

94

Humans

Nature Neuroscience

436

Rats

Nature Neuroscience

1115

Rats

Science

410

Rats

Journal of

680

Rats

382

Humans

Neuroscience
Behavioral Brain
Research
Journal of
Neuroscience

Maguire
(2006)
24. Ross et al.
(2009)
25. Brown et al.
(2010)
26. Karlsson and

Neuroscience

Frank (2009)
27. Ji and Wilson
(2007)
28. Jadhav et al.
(2012)
29. Johnson and
Redish (2007)

Neuroscience

30. Gelbard-Sagiv Science
et al. (2008)

99

31. Paz et al.
(2010)

Proceedings of the

74

Humans

369

Humans

Neuron

382

Rats

Academic Press

217

Computational

National Academy of
Science of the United
States of America

32. Jensen and
Lisman

Trends in
Neurosciences

(2005)
33. Mehta et al.
(2000)
34. Levy (1989)

Modelling
35. Wallenstein et
al. (1998)

Trends in

518

Computational
Modelling – Human

Neurosciences

and non-human
animals
36. Rolls (2010)

Behavioral Brain

211

Monkeys

Neuron

450

Rats

Psychological

250

Computational

Research
37. Dargoi and
Buzsaki
(2006)
38. Howard et al.
(2005)
39. McNaughton
et al. (1996)

Review
Journal of

Modelling
852

Experimental
Biology

100

Rats

40. Dragoi and

Nature

380

Mice

Neuron

709

Rats

Neuron

573

Rats

Neuron

429

Rats

Journal of

114

Rats

68

Human and non-

Tonegawa
(2011)
41. Wood et al.
(2000)
42. Frank et al.
(2000)
43. Ferbinteanu
and Shapiro
(2003)
44. Ainge et al.
(2007)
45. Shapiro et al.
(2006)
46. Ginther et al.
(2011)

47. Barnes et al.

Neuroscience
Current Opinion in
Neurobiology
Journal of

human animals
45

Rats

Nature

345

Rats

Neuron

288

Rats

Science

733

Rats

Behavioral

118

Rats

Neuroscience

(1997)
48. Mann et al.
(2007)
49. Pastalkova et
al. (2008)
50. Kesner et al.
(2005)

Neuroscience
101

51. Farovik et al.

Learning & Memory

111

Rats

Science

200

Mice

Neuron

593

Rats

Frontiers of

41

Rats/Mice

Hippocampus

71

Rats

Science

160

Monkeys

Nature

1114

Humans

Journal of

761

Humans

240

Rats

793

Human and non-

(2010)
52. Suh et al.
(2011)
53. MacDonald et
al. (2011)
54. Yin and
Troger (2011)

Integrative
Neuroscience

55. Gill et al.
(2011)
56. Naya and
Suzuki (2011)
57. Erkstrom et
al. (2013)
58. Maguire et al.
(1997)
59. Komorowski
et al. (2009)
60. Mauk and
Buonomano

Neuroscience
Journal of
Neuroscience
Annual Review
Neuroscience

human animals

(2004)
61. Buhusi and
Meck (2005)

Nature Review
Neuroscience

Human and non1618
102

human animals

Figure 4 – Chart with one column for the name of the author(s) and year of publication, a second column for the journal in
which it was published, a third column for the number of citations each received, and a final column for what kind of species the
study (primarily) investigated.

I noted above that Eichenbaum selected research papers from high-calibre journals in the mindbrain sciences, but have those papers themselves had much impact in terms of their citations?
An analysis of the 59 studies reveals a total of 24 274 citations for the combined 59 studies,
giving the references a mean of 411 citations.137 The three papers with the most citations
(highlighted in yellow in fig. 4) are Eichenbaum et al.’s (2007) paper with 2004 citations,
Vargha-Khadem’s (1997) paper with 1849 citations, and Buhusi and Meck (2005) paper with
1618 citations. On the lower end of the spectrum, the three least cited papers (highlighted in
turquoise in fig. 4) are Templer and Hampton’s (2012) paper with 21 citations, Fouquet et al.’s
(2010) paper with 36 citations, and Yin and Troger’s (2011) paper with 41 citations. Despite
these low numbers, the majority of the cited papers hit a minimum of one hundred citations, with
many of those almost reaching (and some breaking) one thousand citations. As an example of
the former, Fortin et al.’s (2002) has 740 citations, and as an example of the latter, Ji and
Wilson’s (2007) article surpassed 1000 citations with a total of 1115 citations.
Further, the three papers with the most citations were also published in high-calibre journals with
high impact factors. For example, Vargha-Khadem’s (1997) paper was published in Science,
which has an impact factor of 37.205, Buhusi and Meck’s (2005) paper was published in Nature
Review Neuroscience, which has an impact factor of 28.880, and finally Eichenbaum et al.’s
(2007) paper was published in Annual Review Neuroscience, which has an impact factor of
14.675, all of which are high impact factors.
Thus, one might argue a mean of 411 citations for Eichenbaum’s cited papers, in addition to their
being published in high-calibre and internationally recognized mind-brain journals adds more
credibility to claims1-5 (since they are grounded in the reliability of cited findings).
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Furthermore, the cited papers having high citation counts and being published in journals with
high impact factors, in addition to the fact that the cited findings are highly interdisciplinary adds
another level of credibility to the findings corroborating claims 1-5. That is, a point made by
Bechtel and Richardson (1993), Campbell (1966), Hacking (1983), Roskies (2010) Wimsatt
(2007), is that when multiple pieces of evidence from different areas of science, using different
tools, techniques, and methods of analysis all point towards a general conclusion, then that
conclusion is more probable than one reached by one individual piece of evidence or pieces of
evidence from the same area of science using the same general protocols and methods of
analysis.138 In section 3.1.1, I noted the ways in which the case study adheres to the
interdisciplinary component of IC by including papers on memory organization from different
areas of the mind-brain sciences, on different species, using different tasks, and methods of
analysis. In section 3.1.2, I noted that claims 1-5 appear to be corroborated by the cited findings,
but in a way that claims 1-5 are understood as likely, probable, etc., but not necessarily full-stop
true. Further, because each the cited findings are from papers published in high-calibre mindbrain science journals with high impact factors and citations, the findings can be considered
reliable pieces of information. Therefore, the case study appears to represent a prime example of
IC in practice insofar as the interdisciplinary papers/findings cited in the case study are
considered reliable pieces of information, which, when taken together, corroborate claims 1-5 in
such a way that makes them very likely/probable.
In sum, I began my analysis in this chapter with a general understanding of how Trends review
papers work based off of my research presented in chapter 2 (i.e., they contain a summary,
explanation(s), which can take the form of a synthesis, and directions for future research). My
analysis in this chapter was based off of this information and was guided by cursory criteria such
as the following questions: “what is the aim of Eichenbaum’s review paper”, “what claims does
Eichenbaum argue for”, “how does Eichenbaum show support for those claims”, “are
Eichenbaum’s arguments implicit or explicit”, “and “does the case study represent a strong case
of IC, and if so, how”?
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Each author articulates this point somewhat differently. For those differences, refer to chapter two of this
dissertation.
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I stated that the main aim of the case study was to establish the role of the hippocampus as
creating a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories. I identified a total of
five synthesized claims advanced in the case study; claims 1-4 were implicit, and claim 5 was
explicitly flagged by Eichenbaum. Eichenbaum supported claims 1-5 by citing findings from
papers suggesting the claim in question. For example, claim 3 stated hippocampal neuronal
ensembles replay sequences of events in memory by encoding and retrieving the order of events
(ibid, 83). To support this claim, Eichenbaum cited findings from human and non-human
animals studies which all generally implicated hippocampal replays in memory consolidation.
That is, while there were minor discrepancies in the findings – for example, intervening with
hippocampal replays impairs the rats memory for maze learning (Jadhav et al. 2012) and that
hippocampal replays are observed in humans during the recall of scenes from a movie (GelbardSagiv et al. 2008) – all six findings observed hippocampal replays during memory and learning
tasks (Eichenbaum 2013, 83). Thus, the combined interdisciplinary findings suggest claim 3.
Further, by describing and introducing findings using terms like ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling
evidence’, Eichenbaum gives the reader the impression that there is good reason to take claim 3
(and by proxy, claims 1, 2, 4, and 5) as corroborated by the interdisciplinary findings he cites.
Critically, the arguments for the corroboration of claims 1-5 are implicit. That is, Eichenbaum
never explicitly spells out the arguments for his claims; instead, he cites a number of studies
which he takes as representing ‘substantial’ or ‘compelling’ evidence for a claim, and states that
taken together, they suggest a given claim 1-5 (ibid). Thus, his arguments for the corroboration
of claims 1-5 are implied by the terms he uses to describe the findings he cites in support of his
claims.
My goal in this chapter was to get a deeper understanding of how review papers work to
corroborate claims about the mind-brain and to assess the extent to which the claims in the case
study were corroborated. In section 3.1.2, I argue that prima facie, the case study appears to
represent a strong case of IC, insofar as claims 1-5 are supported by reliable and interdisciplinary
findings.
However, analyzing the case study – especially the implicit arguments for claims 1-5 – prompted
a number of questions and concerns about the case study representing a strong case of IC. That
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is, part of Eichenbaum’s support for claims 1-5 is that there is ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’
evidence or that there are ‘numerous studies’ corroborating a given claim (ibid, 83). This
introduced worries about what Eichenbaum meant by ‘substantial’ or ‘numerous studies’ (ibid).
Eichenbaum states there are ‘numerous studies’ that show forward and reverse hippocampal
replays in animals (ibid). However, he only cites four papers in support of this claim; are the
findings from four paper sufficient for representing ‘numerous studies’ in this instance (ibid)?
In Eichenbaum’s introduction, entitled ‘the temporal organization of memory’, Eichenbaum
states he will relate the cited findings in such a way that shows how they all combine to
corroborate claim 5 (ibid, 81). This ‘relating’ thus involves showing how the findings fit
together in a way that corroborates claim 5 (ibid). The problem is Eichenbaum only shows how
they fit together implicitly; he never explicitly explains how all of the findings fit together to
support a given claim. Implicitly, it seems that Eichenbaum is arguing that because all the
findings point towards a given claim, and because those findings are consistent with each other,
they corroborate claims 1-5. This, however, introduced worries about the term ‘consistency’;
how is ‘consistency’ defined, how is it measured, and further, is this even what Eichenbaum
meant to imply?
Worries about consistency and ‘substantial evidence’ and its relation to IC prompted questions
about anomalous findings (ibid). That is, I began to wonder about Eichenbaum’s selection
criteria; why were there next to no anomalies or contradictory findings presented in the case
study? Of the few anomalous findings that are included in the case study, how do they fit
together with the rest of findings which are seemingly all consistent with each other; it was not
immediately clear to me that they did fit together with the rest of the findings in this way.
In the following chapter, I elaborate on these problems and their implications for IC in the mindbrain sciences; I then use these questions and concerns to advance a methodology for evaluating
review papers with an eye towards assessing their claims for corroboration in the second half of
chapter four.
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Chapter 4
4 Introduction
In chapter three, I conducted part-one of my analysis of a Trends review paper ‘Memory on
Time’ by Eichenbaum (2013). My aim in chapter three was to focus on the work Eichenbaum
did to support what I identified as claims 1-5.139 I noted this work consisted of citing
interdisciplinary findings, which, taken together, corroborated one of the five claims I identified.
This corroboration was implied by the terms Eichenbaum used to introduce findings and to
advance a given claim. For example, with respect to claim 3, when he introduced relevant
findings, he prefaced their description by stating ‘there is substantial evidence’ for hippocampal
replays representing the order of past events, and that ‘numerous studies’ have shown both
forward and reverse hippocampal replays in memory consolidating (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).
After all the findings for a given claim have been cited, Eichenbaum stated ‘these findings
provide compelling evidence’ for claim 3; this language suggests there are good reasons to think
claim 3 has been corroborated (ibid). An analysis of the language used in the case study revealed
that the kind of corroboration at play in the case study is one where a given claim is not full-stop
true, but instead approximately true, probable, likely, etc. Contextualizing this analysis within
the context of IC revealed that prima facie, the case study appeared to represent a strong example
of IC; that is, interdisciplinary findings corroborate claims 1-5 in such a way that those claims
are understood to be approximately true, probable, likely, etc.
However, the process of conducting this part of my analysis elicited a number of questions and
concerns such as “what counts as substantial evidence”, “what does it mean for evidence to be
consistent with each other”, and “how are anomalies factored into the ‘substantial evidence’ that
appears to be consistent with each other” (ibid). These preliminary questions suggested the
support provided for claims 1-5 in the case study is much more questionable than it initially
appeared in chapter 3. Thus, my analysis in chapter 3 using my understanding of how a Trends
review works from chapter two and my cursory criteria prompted a number of questions and
concerns I deem important to have answered in order to better assess corroboration in the case
study.
139

I noted that the claims 1-4 were implicit in the case study, and claim 5 was explicit in that it is the main claim
Eichenbaum argues for and because he explicitly flags it as a synthesis.

107

The aim of this chapter is to continue my analysis by focusing on what is absent in the case study
and to advance a methodology for assessing review papers for corroboration. I begin in section
4.1 by addressing the question of “what counts as substantial evidence”, what it means for
findings to be consistent with each other in section 4.1.2, and how anomalous findings feature in
the case study in 4.1.3. At the end of each, I note how these questions complicate evaluating the
extent to which claims 1-5 have been corroborated in the case study. As I conducted this part of
the analysis, it struck me that another factor missing in the case study was an evaluation of the
methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites. I discuss this problem in section 4.1.4, and show
how this point, together with the other problems I mention, demonstrate the corroboration of
claims 1-5 is uncertain, at best. From this, I call attention to the lessons learned from my twopart analysis of the case study in section 4.2. In section 4.3, I use the problems and lessons from
my analysis to advance a methodology for evaluating review papers with an eye for
corroboration. I close, in section 4.4., with some questions and directions for future research.

4.1 Substantial Evidence, Numerous Studies, Suggesting, and IC
As I noted in chapter 3, the arguments for claims 1-5 are implicit. That is, Eichenbaum never
explicitly advanced an argument to support them; he never says something akin to “here are the
findings that support claim x, this is how they fit together”, and/or “the findings corroborate
claim x because they have features y and z”, etc. Instead, Eichenbaum shows support for claims
1-5 by stating evidence that appears to point towards or suggest a given claim, and notes that
there is ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ evidence to supporting it (ibid). Using such language
indicates to the reader that there are good reasons to believe claims 1-5; that is, if there is
substantial and compelling evidence suggesting claims 1-5, it would seem that the claims stand
on firm epistemic footing.
This logic might hold if it were the case that there is substantial and compelling evidence
supporting x. However, as I conducted my analysis in chapter three focusing on how
Eichenbaum supports claims 1-5, I began to wonder about what counted as substantial evidence.
Throughout the case study, Eichenbaum uses terms like ‘substantial evidence’, ‘compelling
evidence’, ‘considerable evidence’ to introduce findings that allegedly support a given claim
(ibid 83, 86). These terms convey a powerful epistemic message; that is, a given claim is not
simply supported by a couple scientific findings, but it is backed by substantial empirical
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evidence. This conveys to the reader that the evidence behind a given claim is strong, reliable,
and significant.
However, one might ask: “what does substantial evidence mean”? “Is ‘substantial evidence’
defined and meant to be understood qualitatively or quantitatively” (ibid, 83). If the former, then
some definition would be required for the reader to understand what and how Eichenbaum
understands and uses the term in the case study. If the latter, how much evidence is required for
‘substantial evidence’; how many scientific findings are required to be considered ‘substantial’.
One might also wonder how other key terms like ‘compelling evidence’ and ‘numerous studies’
are defined (ibid). One might ask: “to what extent and how exactly is the evidence compelling”?
“Can evidence be compelling without it also being substantial?” “How many studies must a
review paper cite to constitute or merit the term ‘numerous studies”?
Consider claim 3 again. In showing support for claim 3 – i.e., that hippocampal neurons replay
sequences of events by encoding and retrieving the order of events – Eichenbaum states there is
‘substantial evidence’ that hippocampal neuronal ensembles represent the organization of past
experiences (ibid). The ‘substantial evidence’ for claim 3 consists of six findings from research
papers on memory organization. One might wonder whether six studies is sufficient to count as
substantial evidence. Relatedly, after advancing this statement, Eichenbaum goes on to state
there are ‘numerous studies’ within this ‘substantial evidence’ that demonstrate forward and
reverse hippocampal replays in rats (ibid). The ‘numerous studies’ consist of four findings from
Jadhav et al. (2012), Ji and Wilson (2007), Johnson and Redish (2007), and Karlsson and Frank
(2009) on rats. Again, one might wonder whether four papers sufficiently represents the term
‘numerous studies’ (Eichenbaum 2013, 83). If four papers do sufficiently represent the term
‘numerous studies’, some justification seems to be required.
Further, a big part of how Eichenbaum implicitly argues for claims 1-5 is by stating there is
‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ evidence suggesting a given claim (ibid). However, Eichenbaum
never explicitly explains how the evidences suggests what it does. Instead the argument is
implicit, and the reader is required to try and piece together Eichenbaum’s thought process. I
noted in chapter three that Eichenbaum seems to imply that because there is substantial evidence
that is consistent with each other, and because that evidence seems to point towards claim 3, that
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claim 3 stands on firm epistemic footing. Claims 1-5 are suggested by the substantial cited
evidence. However, if it turns out that the evidence is not substantial, perhaps the support for
claim 3 is weaker than it appears when prefaced with the term ‘substantial evidence’; perhaps the
evidence does not suggest what Eichenbaum claims it does (ibid).
It is important to flesh out these key terms as the corroboration of claims 1-5 hinges on them. If
there is no ‘substantial evidence’, if the evidence is not, in, fact, compelling, then the claims may
not be as corroborated as they appear on a first reading/analysis. Thus, because Eichenbaum
provides no definition for terms like ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling evidence’, and because he
does not provide an explanation as to how the evidence suggests what he claims it does, it is
unclear how/whether claim 3 – and claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 by proxy – are corroborated (ibid 8187).
4.1.1 Consistency and IC
Eichenbaum’s arguments for claims 1-5 are implicit. In chapter three, I noted my reading of the
case study implied that another factor (in addition to there being substantial evidence suggesting
a given claim) implying corroboration is the fact that the cited findings are consistent with each
other. In the example I use in chapter three, I note that all six findings cited in support of claim 3
are consistent with each other insofar as they do not contradict each other and generally seem to
suggest that hippocampal replays are an essential part of memory for past events (i.e., they all
seem to suggest a similar role of hippocampal replays and memory organization). Importantly,
with respect to claim 3, Eichenbaum does not explicitly make this point nor does he state that the
findings are consistent with each other; this is my interpretation of how I think his argument for
claim 3 would go.
Eichenbaum does, however, in other parts of the case study use the terms ‘consistent with’ and
‘complemented by’ with respect to claim 1 and claim 4; this is part of what led me to believe that
the consistency of the findings was crucial to establishing the corroboration of all the claims I
identify in the case study (ibid 82-84, 86). I review claim 1 and claim 4 in turn to make this
connection concise.
Claim 1 stated the hippocampus is responsible for the memory of the order of events (ibid, 81,
83). Eichenbaum begins by reviewing findings implicating the hippocampus for the memory of
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the order of events in human animals; he cites eight studies on human animals suggesting claim
1. Eichenbaum then stated these findings from experiments on human animals are
‘complemented by’ studies on non-human animals (e.g., rats, mice, and monkeys) (ibid, 82,
emphasis mine). Eichenbaum does not explain what he means by evidence from human studies
is ‘complemented by’ evidence from animals studies (ibid). One might surmise that Eichenbaum
means that the studies on animals enhance the argument for claim 1 in the following way: not
only is there evidence for the hippocampus being involved for memory of the order of events in
human animals, but there is also evidence from a number of studies on different non-human
animals suggesting the same general claim. The evidence from animals studies thus enhances
the evidence by providing further support for the claim that it allegedly suggests. This is my
reading of what Eichenbaum means by ‘complementary’ and how it factors into his argument for
claim 1; importantly, Eichenbaum does not explain what he means by complementary here nor
how it functions to corroborate claim 1.
Eichenbaum states that findings are ‘consistent with’ each other multiple times while providing
support for claim 4 (ibid, 83-84, 86). Claim 4 states hippocampal time cells possess the
properties of context cells, allowing them to bridge the order of events (ibid, 86). Eichenbaum
provides support for claim 4 in the same way he does for the other claims: by citing findings
from different areas of the mind-brain sciences, on different species, using different tasks and
methods of analysis, and relating them in such a way that he synthesizes them to show that they,
taken together, suggest claim 4. This work consists primarily of stating findings by introducing
them via terms like there is ‘substantial evidence’ showing that x (ibid). However, Eichenbaum
does more than this with claim 4; here, he states multiple times that various pieces of evidence
not only suggest a given claim, but that they are consistent with each other (ibid, 82-84, 86). On
my reading, this implies that claims 1-5 hinge on the cited evidence being consistent with each
other. It is thus important to understand what is meant by consistency. If no explanation of
consistency is provided, it is difficult to assess whether the evidence is, in fact, consistent, and
consequently, it is challenging to evaluate whether a given claim as been corroborated.
For example, with respect to claim 4, Eichenbaum cites a finding by McNaughton et al. (1996)
demonstrating: “…the existence of pre-configured contextual representations to which specific
behavioral events were linked to compose spatial memory” (Eichenbaum 2013, 84). He then
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relates this finding to another finding by Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) stating: “Consistent with
this proposal … hippocampal ensembles tend to ‘pre-play’ sequences that will subsequently
reflect serial place cell firings in a new environment, which suggests that pre-existing ensemble
structure contributes to new sequence coding” (Eichenbaum 2013, 84, emphasis mine). What is
meant by consistency in this example? Unfortunately, nowhere in the case study does
Eichenbaum provide an explanation of what he means by evidence being consistent with each
other, nor does he provide a measure of consistency (i.e., how is consistency measured in the
case study – qualitatively or quantitatively?).
One might speculate that what Eichenbaum has in mind is that evidence is consistent with each
other to the extent that it does not contradict each other, and that all findings consistently
demonstrate a similar pattern/trend with respect to memory organization. Consider a couple of
the findings cited for claim 4. McNaughton et al. (1996) found ‘pre-configured contextual
representations’ during memory tasks, and Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) found a ‘pre-existing
ensemble structure’ which replayed certain sequences during memory tasks (Eichenbaum 2013,
84). Both findings demonstrate a ‘pre-existing’ neuronal ensemble critical for memory
organization. Thus, one could argue the findings are consistent in that their findings both
revealed a similar trend (i.e., a pre-existing neuronal structure that replays during memory tasks),
and the findings do not contradict each other. Perhaps this is what Eichenbaum meant by
consistency and its relation to the corroboration of claims 1-5.
The point I want to emphasize is that because Eichenbaum provides no explanation nor measure
of consistency in the case study, it is difficult to ascertain whether the evidence is consistent, and
accordingly, it is difficult to evaluate the whether a given claim has been corroborated. Since
Eichenbaum’s arguments for claims 1-5 are implicit, and because they appear to hinge on terms
like ‘consistency’ and ‘substantial evidence’, the fact that neither term is explained is
problematic for evaluating the extent to which claims 1-5 are corroborated in the case study.
Furthermore, in chapter one of my dissertation, I flagged a potential problem with the
consistency of evidence entailing the corroboration of a claim. That is, in discussing a potential
way of fleshing out the concept of convergent evidence for Nagel (1949, 1979) and Roskies’
(2010) accounts of fitting together and strong explanations, I advanced a conceptualization of the
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convergence of evidence via the notion of consistency wherein findings do not contradict each
other and point towards a similar but not identical conclusion. I argued, however, that
understanding convergence via consistency runs the risk of trivializing the claims which it
allegedly corroborates. That is, by requiring the consistency of evidence in corroborating a
claim, all that is required is a general compatibility between different findings; this seems all too
easy to achieve. An author could easily scan the literature and choose to cite only those findings
consistent with each other and with the main claim(s) they want to argue for and ignore
contradictory or anomalous findings. Thus, consistency alone is insufficient for ensuring strong
epistemic claims; that evidence be consistent is one thing, but it is also important that the cited
evidence to be mutually supportive and consistent in a way that coincidence, errors, and
alternative explanations can be ruled out. Thus, without an explanation and measure of
consistency provided in the case study, evaluating whether a given claim has been corroborated
is difficult.
This leads to the next problem I want to address, which is the general lack of anomalous findings
and the lack of substantial explanations as to how the few anomalous findings that do feature in
the case study fit together with the rest of the cited findings.
4.1.2 Anomalies and IC
During the analysis I conducted in chapter three, it struck me that the majority of the cited
findings all suggested a (general) role of the hippocampus in memory organization. I began to
wonder why the cited findings were primarily in favor of claims 1-5. That is, of the 59 findings
Eichenbaum cites, only a couple of them are anomalous; why was no contradictory evidence
included in the case study? Why were there so few anomalies cited in the case study? Are
adequate explanations provided for why the cited anomalies can be dismissed? If claims 1-5
depend on the cited evidence being consistent with each other, then anomalous findings have the
potential to complicate a clear case of consistent evidence, which would consequently undermine
the corroboration of claims 1-5.
One clear anomaly is cited in Eichenbaum’s discussion of claim 4. Recall claim 4 states
hippocampal time cells possess the properties of context cells, allowing them to bridge the order
of events. After summarizing allegedly consistent findings from human and non-human animals
which all suggest “…a temporal context signal containing common elements that encode the
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common temporal structure and distinct elements that encode the differences in memory”,
Eichenbaum flags a potential complication via a finding by Naya and Suzuki (2011)
(Eichenbaum 2013, 86). Naya and Suzuki’s (2011) research on monkeys found:
…hippocampal neurons in monkeys performing a visual paired association task, where the
stimuli are separated in time, provide a temporal signal during the interstimulus interval.
Neurons in the higher order visual areas (inferotemporal and perirhinal cortex) encode the
visual cues, and entorhinal neurons encode both the visual cues and time, whereas the
hippocampal neuronal ensemble signals only the temporal organization, without specificity of
items held in memory (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).
This complicates the narrative Eichenbaum delivers in support of claim 4 insofar as it is
inconsistent with the literature he cites on rats (ibid). Specifically, Eichenbaum notes that it is
unclear why studies on rats have consistently demonstrated the existence of memory-specific
time cells, but Naya and Suzuki’s (2011) work on monkeys demonstrated “…the same time cell
sequences for all memories” (Eichenbaum 2013, emphasis mine).
How does Eichenbaum explain this potentially anomalous finding? Eichenbaum briefly explains
the discrepancy between the findings from studies on rats and the findings on monkeys in this
example as the product of different experimental protocols (ibid). That is, in the experiments on
rats, association tasks involved a small amount of repetitive sequence exposures, whereas the
monkeys performed a task which, conversely, involved a large number of sequence exposures
where those sequences were rarely repeated (ibid). Eichenbaum therefore reasons: “… possibly,
after many exposures, stimulus sequences are embodied in the regularities of the temporal
structure, whereas when diverse stimulus sequences seldom repeat, only the reliable temporal
structure of the task is represented by the hippocampus” (ibid, emphasis mine). This explanation
is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, his reasoning that perhaps the discrepancy is the multiple
exposures that the monkeys undergo is only a possibility. His use of the term ‘possibly’ implies
only that this might explain the differences between the studies; it is also possible that if the tasks
were the same as in the rat paradigm, the findings from the monkey studies might still be
incompatible with the findings from rat studies, thus undermining or complicating the
corroboration of claim 4 (ibid). Secondly, offloading the inconsistency between findings in rats
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and on monkeys as the product of differences in experimental protocols is unsatisfying given that
the majority of the case study comprises findings from different areas of science, studying
different animal species, via different tasks, methods, and experimental protocols. The cited
findings for claims 1-5 all involve different tasks and protocols; nonetheless, they are deemed
consistent with each other, and further, the fact that they employ different experimental protocols
is seen as bolstering the corroboration of claims 1-5. Why is it the case that different
experimental protocols are considered a virtue when they are consistent with and point towards
claims 1-5, but seen as problematic when they yield a result inconsistent with the rest of the cited
findings?
The example above represents one anomaly Eichenbaum introduces in the case study; this
appears to be the only anomalous finding in the case study. One might argue, however, that the
research implicating the hippocampus in spatial representations can be read as anomalous
research insofar as it suggests a different role for the hippocampus than that suggested by claims
1-4 (which all suggest a temporal role). How does Eichenbaum handle this anomalous data?
Eichenbaum handles the discrepancy between research suggesting a spatial role for the
hippocampus and memory and research suggesting a temporal role of the hippocampus and
memory by synthesizing the two streams of research by advancing claim 5. His synthesis is
grounded in two features of time and place cells. He cites evidence from findings cited in
support of claim four, as well as previously uncited findings to illustrate that time and place cells
are not distinct cell types. Importantly, there is no critical analysis of the cited findings
supporting claim 5. In demonstrating the time and place cells are similar, Eichenbaum simply
lists findings indicating similarities between time and place cells.
One interesting and potentially anomalous findings is introduced during this process. That is,
two different review papers by Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005)
found that there are numerous origins of temporal signals in the brain (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).
Immediately after introducing this finding, Eichenbaum dismisses this potential complication by
citing evidence from a poster presentation by Kraus et al. (2012) who found time and place cells
are similar in that both receive information from the medial entorhinal cortex (hereafter MEC)
(Eichenbaum 2013, 86). Eichenbaum does not, however, explain how this finding dismisses the
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potential anomaly introduced by the finding from Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and
Meck (2005). In fact, Eichenbaum does not even flag this finding as an anomaly or source of
worry at all. That is, Eichenbaum does not introduce it as an anomalous finding in the way that
he does with the Naya and Suzuki (2011) finding (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).
On my reading, however, the finding from the two review papers does constitute an anomalous
finding; at least, it constitutes an anomalous finding in the way the Eichenbaum presents the
findings from their respective papers. That is, according to Eichenbaum, Mauk and Buonomano
(2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) review papers state: “…there are multiple origins of
temporal signals in the brain…” (Eichenbaum 2013, 86, emphasis mine). Since this comment
pertains solely to temporal signals, this finding would seem to pertain to time cells (but not place
cells) and the various sources from which they receive information. The Kraus et al. (2012)
finding stated immediately after introducing the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and
Meck (2005) reviews found that a key source of information for time and place cells is the MEC
(Eichenbaum 2013, 86).
However, if it is the case that time cells receive information from the MEC in addition to
multiple other sources – as the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005)
finding seems to suggest – but place cells only receive information from the MEC, this would
demonstrate that time and place cells are not distinct (or at least put pressure on the statement
they that are distinct). Another possibility is that while both receive information from the MEC,
time and place cells may also receive information from other different sources in the brain; this
could also undermine the claim that the two place cells are distinct if the other sources of
information for time and place cells were different for each cell type.140 Due to the fact that
Eichenbaum does not explicitly address this complication, the possibility remains open that the
two cells types are not as similar as the case study makes them out to be.
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It is unclear why Eichenbaum introduced the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005)
finding in the way that he does (i.e., with the strict focus on the temporal signal), especially since both papers are
in agreement that time and space are inextricably linked. To quote Buhusi and Meck (2005): COINCIDENCE
DETECTION is also used by bats, owls and frogs to form an accurate, topographic representation of space from
INTERAURAL TIME DIFFERENCES. For these species, telling space is telling time” (755, italicized emphasis mine).
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Interestingly, neither cited paper specifically stated: “…there are multiple origins of temporal
signals in the brain…”; this is Eichenbaum’s interpretation of their review papers (Eichenbaum
2013, 86). Put differently, this is the aspect Eichenbaum focused on in their papers and decided
to include in his review. However, the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck
(2005) review papers both comprise a review of literature in human and non-human animals on
temporal organization that, on my reading, complicates claim 5. Both papers distinguish
between multiple types of memory organization. For example, Buhusi and Meck (2005)
differentiate between circadian timing, interval timing, and millisecond timing (756). Buhusi
and Meck proceed to cite different results from imaging, lesions studies and electrophysiological
studies investigating different aspects of timing. Unlike Eichenbaum’s review paper, which
highlights and focuses almost exclusively on hippocampal activity in human and non-human
animals during various timing tasks, Buhusi and Meck (2005) – as well as Mauk and
Buonomano (2004) – found and highlighted activation of a whole host of brain areas/networks.
For example, electrophysiological studies (e.g., Lewis and Miall, 2003) demonstrated activation
of the thalamo-cortical striatal circuits, which include the basal ganglia, the prefrontal cortex
(hereafter the PFC) and the posterior parietal cortex (hereafter PPC), during interval timing tasks
(Buhusi and Meck 2005, 760). Imaging studies focusing on millisecond and interval timing
(e.g., Macar et al., 2002 and Lewis and Miall, 2003) found activation of the basal ganglia and the
cerebellum, as well as a majority of the supplementary motor area (hereafter SMA), the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (hereafter DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex and the right parietal
cortex (Buhusi and Meck 2005, 761). In their concluding remarks, Buhusi and Meck (2005)
state:
In mammals, the circadian clock that drives metabolic and behavioral rhythms is located in
the SCN. Another timer, which is responsible for automatic motor control in the millisecond
range, relies on the cerebellum. In contrast to these relatively localized timing mechanisms, a
general-purpose, flexible, cognitively controlled timer that operates in the seconds-to-minutes
range involves the activation of a network of brain areas that form part of the thalamocortico-striatal circuits, notably the SMA, the PFC, and the PPC. … As these areas are
involved in several cognitive phenomena, it is likely that this circuit is not limited to temporal
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processing, but is also involved in other processes, such as the estimation of quantity and
numerosity (763, emphases mine).141
It is interesting to me that while Eichenbaum cited both papers in his review, he chose to
selectively focus on one vague finding, i.e., that temporal processing has multiple origins in the
brain, and then immediately dismisses it, without justification, by the fact that Kraus et al. (2012)
found that both time and place cells receive information from the MEC (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).
The fact that both the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) highlight a
multitude of brain areas/networks involved in various types of timing tasks was not included in
the review is problematic. That is, while these findings do not necessarily falsify claim 5, they
complicate the clear picture painted by Eichenbaum in the case study whereby the hippocampus
is the main brain structure responsible for the realization of spatio-temporal aspects of memory.
Eichenbaum introduces few anomalous/contradictory findings throughout the case study. This
prompts a number of questions about his selection criteria. For example, why were certain
findings included while others were omitted? Were many anomalous or contradictory findings
encountered during his review process; if so, how were those handled? It could be the case that
the reason why so few anomalies are included in the case study is simply because there were not
many in the literature to begin with. However, because Eichenbaum’s selection criteria is not
know to the reader, one cannot know this for certain.
Further, many of the cited papers include more than one finding; what criteria did Eichenbaum
use to decide which findings to focus on and which to omit when reading through individual
research papers. For example, why did Eichenbaum choose to exclude findings which involve
the activation of structures/networks other than the hippocampus (such as the many findings
from the Buhusi and Meck (2005) paper implicating a multitude of brain regions/networks))?
Again, because Eichenbaum’s selection criteria and review writing strategy is unknown to the
reader, one cannot know with certainty why certain findings were included and others omitted.
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Mauk and Buonomano (2004) make a similar point. They note that while there is still debate about whether
temporal processing is localizable or distributed, it seems that if any neural circuit can “… intrinsically process
temporal information, then virtually any circuit could be involved, and the location of temporal processing would
depend on the nature and modality for the task at hand” (334).
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I stated above that the lack of definitions for terms like consistency was problematic for
evaluating the corroboration of claims 1-5. I argued that we want evidence to be consistent in a
way that coincidence, errors, and alternative explanations can be ruled out; because few
anomalous findings are introduced in the case study, and because the explanations of those few
anomalies are unsatisfactory, it is a) not clear that the evidence is consistent, and b) it is not clear
that coincidence, errors, and alternative explanations have been ruled out. Adding this to the
complications arising from the lack of definitions for terms like ‘substantial’, ‘compelling
evidence’, and ‘suggests’, it is unclear how the findings in the case study fit together to
corroborate claims 1-5.
4.1.3 Evaluation of Methods, Citation-Based Bibliometric Statistics, and IC
As I conducted this part of the analysis (i.e., what important aspects are missing in the case study
in section 4.1., 4.1.2., and 4.1.3), it struck me that another missing factor was an evaluation of
the methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites. That is, as I analyzed claim 1 and claim 4 in
greater detail in section 4.1.2 of this chapter, I noticed that Eichenbaum treated claims 2, 3 and 5
slightly differently than claims 1 and 4. Eichenbaum spends more time elaborating on the
findings cited in support of claims 1 and 4. Eichenbaum’s showing support for claims 2, 3, and 5
consisted primarily of Eichenbaum citing findings and immediately stating what they, taken
together, suggest. Eichenbaum does the same thing for claim 1 and 4, but also includes brief
descriptions of the tasks used in some of the papers that he cites.
Importantly, while Eichenbaum sometimes describes the tasks involved in the papers he cites, he
does not critically evaluate the methods and protocols used to yield the findings he cites in the
case study. For example, consider his description of findings from Kumaran and Maguire (2006)
and Lehn et al.’s (2009) research on hippocampal activation for memory for the order of events
in humans:
Another study showed striking selective activation of the hippocampus when humans
reconstructed the correct ordering of scenes previously viewed in a movie clip, as compared
to when they inferred the logical order of related scenes from the same movie … Using a
different approach that exploited the well-known observation of enhanced neural response to
novel stimuli, Kumaran and Maguires [10] demonstrated hippocampal activation when
subjects were presented with items out of order late in a familiar series; activation was not
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observed in the hippocampus … when an entirely novel ordering of familiar pictures was
presented. Thus, hippocampal activation signaled a mismatch of expectation in temporal
order per se, and not merely a novel sequences of pictures (Eichenbaum 2013, 81).
In this example, Eichenbaum describes what kind of task is involved in each paper (i.e., a virtual
reality driving game (Lehn et al. (2009) and the presentation of pictures (Kumaran and Maguire
(2006)) and the results from each task (i.e., human hippocampal activation in the virtual reality
task, and human hippocampal activation when participants were shown items out of order later
on in a ‘familiar series’) (Eichenbaum 2013, 81). What is absent in this description is an
evaluation of the methods/protocols used to conduct and analyze said tasks. This leaves open
the possibility that the methods used by the cited studies are unsound. If the methods of the cited
findings in the case study are unsound, this would discredit or at least put pressure on the
corroboration of claims 1-5.
However, one might argue that because the papers cited in support of claims 1-5 are from papers
published in mind-brain sciences journals with high impact factors and citations that the
methods/protocols used in the cited papers must be sound (I make a similar point in section
3.2.3. of this dissertation wherein I argue that because the cited findings are published in mindbrain journals with high impact factors/citations, the cited findings can be considered reliable
pieces of information).
Citation-based bibliometric measures, such as a journal’s impact factor, are frequently consulted
in the evaluation of scientists and their research (Seglen 1994, 1; Seglen 1997, 498).142 One of
the attractions of this measure is that it is considered to be quantitative, simple to calculate, and
objective (Seglen 1997, 498). Assuming this measure is indeed objective, one might have good
reason to believe that the methods and protocols used by papers published in journals with high
impact factors and citations are scientifically sound.
Should one take it on good faith that the methods/protocols used in the cited papers are
scientifically sound due to their being published in journals with high-impact factors and

142

Funding allocation based on impact factors has been reported in countries such as Canada and Hungary
(Seglen 1997, 498). In many Nordic countries, impact factors have been appealed to in the evaluation of individual
scientists as well as scientific institutions (ibid).
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citations? Drawing on Seglen (1994, 1997), I argue we should not, because impact factors are
not always reliable indicators of sound scientific research. I raise three points to support this
argument.143 Firstly, a journal’s impact factor is not ‘statistically representative’ of individual
research papers published within it (Seglen 1997, 498-499). An impact factor is defined as “…
the mean annual citedness of all articles published in a given journal in a given year” (Seglen
1994, 1). For a journal’s impact factor to be fairly representative of its papers, the citation rate
for each individual article must demonstrate a “… narrow distribution, preferably a Gaussian
distribution around the mean value (the journal’s impact factor)” (Seglen 1997, 498-499).
However, Seglen’s case study of three different biomedical journals showed skewed distributions
of citation rates; only a select few papers came close to the mean (ibid, 499). Further analysis of
Seglen’s case study demonstrated: “… the most cited half of the articles are cited, on average, 10
times as often as the least cited half” (ibid). Assigning the ‘same score’ (i.e., the impact factor)
to all papers within a given journal disguises this important difference (ibid). That is, an article
with low to no citations will receive “… full credit for the impact of the few highly cited articles
that predominantly determine the value of the journal impact factor” (ibid). Therefore, impact
factors do not reliably represent the quality of individual papers. This is one reason to not rely
(solely) on a journal’s impact factor/citations when determining or assessing the quality and
scientific rigour of its papers.
Secondly, authors consider many factors other than a journal’s impact factor when submitting a
paper for publication. Authors do not necessarily submit their best work to the most prestigious
journals, nor are their papers necessarily representative of the impact factor of the journal in
which they are published (Gordon, 1984; Seglen 1997, 499). While some authors may decide
which journal to submit their paper to based on a journal’s impact factor, there are many other
factors that can contribute to an author’s decision on where to submit and/or resubmit a paper for
publication. Other factors include but are not limited to: the journal’s area of science and how
well it aligns with the author’s own specialization, how quickly the editing team works, the
fairness and helpfulness of feedback from peer-reviewers, the likelihood of acceptance,
publication turn around times, etc. (Seglen 1997, 499). Gordon (1984) performed a sociological
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For more arguments on why impact factors are not reliable measures of the quality of scientific research, see
also Allison (1980); Folly et al. (1981); Hargens and Felmlee (1984); Moed et al. (1985); and Seglen (1992,1994,
1997).
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experiment in which 98 biomedical authors were asked to fill out a questionnaire including
questions such as which journal they had recently submitted to, which other journals were
considered, any journals that previously rejected their submission, and if rejected, would they
resubmit to that journal and why (29).
Gordon’s analysis demonstrated a great diversity of responses among the 98 authors involved in
the study with respect to reasons for journal selection criteria, submission, and resubmission.
The data acquired from Gordon’s study provided “… no support to the assumption that scientists
necessarily chose the most prestigious journal from amongst those which they feel would accept
their papers” (ibid, 40). Accordingly, a paper of high scientific quality may end up in a journal
with a lower impact factor because that journal’s area of science aligns more specifically with
the author’s area of expertise, or because the journal is known to have quick publication
turnarounds, etc. Therefore, it is not the case that scientifically sound papers are published
exclusively in journals with high impact factors/high citation rates. This is yet another reason
one should not rely solely on bibliometric measures like a journal’s impact factor/citations in
assessing the soundness/quality of a research paper.
Thirdly, self-citations are frequently not corrected for in the calculation of a journal’s impact
factor (Seglen 1997, 500). That is, databases that record and calculate impact factors such as the
Science Citation Index and the Journal Citation Report include citation types of all sorts such as
citations in editorials, meeting abstracts, etc. (ibid). Further, citations for translated journals are
often listed twice (ibid). Accordingly, journals including items like editorials and meeting
abstracts will have an impact factor that is ‘greatly inflated’ compared to journals excluding
these items (ibid). Editors who want to increase the impact factor of their journal will often
make ‘frequent references’ to these items since the databases do not correct for self-citations
(ibid).
This is particularly relevant to my analysis of the case study insofar as of the 59 papers cited to
support claims 1-5, Eichenbaum co-authored 12/59, for a total of 20% of his references.144
Recall in chapter two of this dissertation I noted one of the alleged advantages of research
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Percentage is rounded down for simplicity.
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synthesis is its ability to minimize bias (Chalmers and Altman 1995, Gurevitch et al. 2018,
Mulrow 1995, Shamseer et al. 2015, etc.). While none of these authors advanced a specific
argument for the minimization of bias in research synthesis, I noted their claims about bias
reduction hinge on systematic reviews adhering to some kind of official and standardized
protocol for writing review papers (whatever kind of review paper it may be).
However, because the case study does not include a methods section stating which standardized
guidelines were used, if any, and because Eichenbaum co-authored 20% of his references, the
corroboration of claims 1-5 is jeopardized by potential author bias. Some of the cited findings
are not as objective as they initially appear. The fact that citation databases do not correct for
self-citations opens the threat of objectivity and worries about bias. This is another reason why
impact factors/citations should not be considered purely objective nor a reliable indicator of the
soundness of one’s scientific research. Thus, because one cannot be certain that the methods
cited by the paper’s Eichenbaum cites are reliable, the integrity of the substantial evidence for
claims 1-5 is questionable. This point makes it hard to assess the extent to which claims 1-5
have been corroborated in the case study due to a lack of evaluation of the methods used in the
papers Eichenbaum cites.
In sum, I have highlighted four key components absent in the case study. First is a definition of
terms like ‘substantial evidence’ ‘numerous studies’ ‘compelling evidence’ and ‘suggests’ (83.
86-87). Eichenbaum’s arguments in the case study are implicit; these arguments, on my reading,
hinge on terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘suggests’ (ibid). If claim x is backed by
substantial evidence suggesting x, one might be confident in the corroboration of that claim.
However, to properly evaluate the extent to which claims 1-5 have been corroborated, a
statement describing what Eichenbaum means by each term and how they factor into the
corroboration of the claims is required. If these terms are undefined, it is difficult to assess
whether claims 1-5 has been corroborated.
Secondly, on my reading, Eichenbaum’s (implicit) arguments for claims 1-5 also hinge on the
terms ‘complemented by’ and ‘consistent with’ (ibid, 82-84, 86). That is, part of Eichenbaum’s
implicit argument is that there are numerous and substantial evidence backing claims 1-5.
Additionally, the cited evidence comprising the substantial and compelling evidence, on my
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reading, requires consistency. The term consistency is used throughout the case study to support
claims 1 and 4 and suggests that for these claims to be corroborated by the interdisciplinary cited
findings, those findings must fit together in such a way that they are consistent with each other
and with the resulting claim. Although Eichenbaum does not use the term consistency explicitly
for claims 2, 3 and 5, it seems necessary for those claims as well that the cited findings be
consistent with each other. However, as I note above, terms like consistency are also not
defined. It is therefore unclear what Eichenbaum means by consistency and how it is measured
in the case study; accordingly, it is open to question that the cited findings fit together in a way
indicative of corroboration.
This second point is further complicated by the third feature lacking in the case study. Namely,
there is a general lack of anomalous findings, and the few times anomalous findings are
mentioned, they are given little explanation with respect to how they fit in with the rest of the
cited findings. This is especially important because if it is true that the cited findings need to be
consistent with each other for the corroboration of claims 1-5, ideally there would be more than
just a general compatibility between findings. Ideally, the cited findings would be consistent
with each other in a way that also rules out random error, coincidence, alterative hypotheses etc.
Therefore, the introduction of anomalous findings and how they fit together with the rest of the
findings is critical. If Eichenbaum introduced anomalous findings for each claim, and if he also
then explained how they fit together with the other findings (e.g., how the other findings reliably
rule out the anomaly), the epistemic integrity of claims 1-5 would increase.
However, in the few instances that Eichenbaum does mention anomalous findings, they are
either immediately dismissed (another finding is introduced and the anomalous finding is left
with no explanation), or the explanation is unsatisfactory (such as Eichenbaum claiming the
discrepancy between the rat and monkey studies cited in claim 4 can be explained away by the
use of different experimental protocols) (ibid, 86).
The final feature I flagged as lacking in the case study was an evaluation of the methods used in
the papers he cites. This is important because claims 1-5 depend on the reliability of the findings
cited in support of them. That is, it is not sufficient for the corroboration of claims 1-5 being
supported by substantial evidence; that substantial evidence must consist of reliable and
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scientifically sound findings. If the substantial evidence cited in support of claims 1-5 comprised
of findings from unsound scientific research, the epistemic integrity of claims 1-5 would be
compromised. One way to demonstrate the reliability of the cited findings in the case study
would be to include an evaluation of the methods used by the cited papers. This might involve
including statements like “these are the methods used in this cited paper and this is why they can
be considered reliable and sound methods” to help increase the reliability of the findings
supporting claims 1-5.
One might argue, however, that this is unnecessary in virtue of the fact that the majority of the
cited findings were published in papers from journals with high impact factors and citation rates;
because such journals allegedly produce research of high scientific rigour, one can confidently
assume the respective findings from those papers are the product of reliable methods. However,
as I argue above, drawing on Seglen (1994, 1997), citation-based bibliometric measures such as
impact factors are not reliable indicators of sound scientific research. It is therefore possible that
some of the methods used in the cited papers were unsound, discrediting the reliability of the
cited findings. Furthermore, the fact that Eichenbaum co-authored 20% of his cited references
generates worry about author bias – again, potentially reducing the reliability of the cited
findings.
Together, these four missing components put pressure on the case study representing a clear case
of IC. Towards the end of my analysis in chapter three, I began to notice some questions and
problems complicating the corroboration of claims 1-5. My analysis in this chapter explored
those problems and showed that given the lack of definitions such as ‘substantial evidence’ and
‘consistency’, along with sufficient explanations of anomalies and the methods used in the cited
papers, it is unclear how the cited findings fit together to support claims 1-5; Eichenbaum does
not tell us this. Accordingly, it is unclear that claims 1-5 have been corroborated. I will now
highlight some key lessons from this analysis.

4.2 Lessons from a Review Paper
The first lesson I draw from this analysis is the fundamental assumption underlying the
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress I surveyed in chapter one – i.e., that
pieces of evidence from different areas of science must fit together in some way to yield
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epistemically strong claims – is not as simple or as clear as it is assumed to be in the literature.
That is, in the case study I analyzed, Eichenbaum argued the claim that the role of the
hippocampus is to create a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories is well
supported by pieces of evidence from different areas of science. This unit of analysis – the
Trends review paper – provided an example of an instance of a claim gaining corroboration in
virtue of different pieces of interdisciplinary evidence supporting it.
However, as my analysis in this chapter revealed, it is unclear exactly how pieces of evidence fit
together to corroborate the claims advanced in the case study, and accordingly, it is difficult to
assess whether or not its claims stand on strong epistemic footing. Put differently, because it is
unclear how the pieces of evidence fit together in the case study, it is uncertain how and to what
extent claims 1-5 have been corroborated. My analysis thus reveals that the assumption I
highlight in chapter one of this dissertation is complex and messy. When one analyzes units of
analysis that appear to do the work required of IC, one sees that pieces of evidence do not
necessarily fit together as neatly as one might expect. This assumption therefore requires more
philosophical attention and work.
The second lesson I draw from my analysis is my working definition of IC (which I introduce in
chapter two) requires revision. Initially my working definition of IC read that findings
corroborate claims about the mind-brain insofar as those findings are interdisciplinary, mutually
supportive, and together all points towards a given claim. However, as I note above, consistency
and mutual support alone is not sufficient for corroboration. Pieces of evidence need to be more
than consistent and mutually supportive; they also need to rule out coincidence, error, and
alternative explanations. Thus, my revised definition of IC reads: interdisciplinary corroboration
is a phenomenon whereby findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain when said findings
are interdisciplinary, mutually supportive and consistent in a way that rules out coincidence,
errors, and alternative hypotheses, and where the findings all point towards a similar (but not
identical) claim.
This leads to the third lesson. My analysis revealed not only that the assumption held by
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress is complex and messy, but that certain
fundamental pieces of information are missing to adequately assess the extent to which
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corroboration occurs in the case study. For example, definitions for key terms like ‘substantial
evidence’, ‘suggests’, and ‘consistency’ were absent. This absence makes it difficult to assess
whether claims 1-5 have been corroborated since it is unclear what Eichenbaum meant by
evidence being consistent with each other and if he even considered it to be a requirement for the
corroboration of claims 1-5. Further, because the reader does not know Eichenbaum’s selection
criteria nor his review process, it is unclear why certain findings were included and others were
omitted. Was the general lack of anomalous findings simply because Eichenbaum did not
encounter many in his search process? Or were some encountered but omitted; if this was the
case, what was the justification for this omission? Of the few anomalies that were included in
the case study, Eichenbaum does not provide a satisfactory explanation of how those anomalies
fit together with the other cited findings and how those cited findings rule out the anomaly. If
one cannot rule out the possibility of potential anomalies, then it is difficult to evaluate whether
claims 1-5 have been corroborated. If one knew, on the other hand, that Eichenbaum
encountered no other anomalies than those cited in the case study, and if Eichenbaum explained
why the cited anomalies could be reliably dismissed, one would be better positioned to assess the
corroboration of claims 1-5. However, since that information is not provided, it is unclear
whether claims 1-5 have been corroborated. Finally, the lack of an evaluation of the methods
used by the cited papers in the case study makes it challenging to assess the corroboration of
claims 1-5. If claims 1-5 have been corroborated by the cited findings, those findings need to be
scientifically sound/reliable. However, because Eichenbaum does not provide an evaluation or
justification for the soundness of the methods used in the cited papers, it is unclear whether the
cited findings constitute reliable pieces of information. Since this cannot be ascertained, it is
difficult to evaluate the extent to which corroboration has occurred in the case study.
The point I want to emphasize is not that Eichenbaum’s main claim is false, nor that the case
study represents poor quality scientific research. The goal of the dissertation was to analyze and
assess how pieces of evidence fit together in such a way that is indicative of corroboration. The
lessons emerging from the analysis of the case study is not that claims 1-5 are false. Instead, the
lessons are that the fundamental assumptions shared by reductionist and non-reductionist
accounts of progress and fitting together is more complicated than assumed by the literature (and
that this assumption requires further philosophical attention), that my working definition of IC
required refinement (i.e., the addition of the fact that the findings must be consistent in such a
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way that they rule out coincidence, error, alternative hypotheses, etc.), and that certain critical
pieces of information are lacking to adequately address the extent to which the corroboration of
claims 1-5 has occurred.

4.3 A Methodology for Evaluating Review Papers for Corroboration
If philosophers are interested in knowledge production and want to assess how pieces of
evidence from different areas of science amalgamate to produce better and epistemically stronger
claims, there are certain questions and concerns that should be raised towards the units of
analysis (e.g. different types of review papers) which allegedly do this work. In virtue of this, I
use the questions and concerns prompted by my analysis in this chapter to advance the following
itemized list as a methodology for analyzing review papers with an eye towards corroboration in
the mind-brain sciences. Importantly, I consider this methodology to be a working framework;
as more research is conducted on different units of analysis and IC, I suspect the list (as well as
my current definition of IC) will change.
Factors to consider in evaluating review papers for corroboration:
1.1. What is the main aim of the review paper?
1.2. What are the main claims advanced in the review? Are those claims implicit, explicit, or
both?
1.3. How does the author argue for those claims? Are their arguments implicit or explicit? Do
the arguments depend on any specific terms? What other important factors do their
arguments hinge on?
1.4. What kind of language does the author use to describe the findings they cite in support of
their claims? What are the key terms used in the paper to relate the different cited findings?
Does the author provide a definition of those terms? Are those terms qualitatively or
quantitatively defined?
1.5. Are the cited findings interdisciplinary? I.e., does the author include evidence from multiple
areas of the mind-brain sciences? Are the species, tasks, and methods of analysis varied in
the cited papers?
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1.6. How current are the cited findings? Does the author draw primarily on current research on a
topic, or do they include older papers as well?
1.7. Does the author primarily report findings from research papers, or do they elaborate on those
findings, explaining the tasks and methods used in each and how they fit together with other
cited findings?
1.8. Does the author report the conclusion of a given research paper as the cited finding, or is it
one of many findings from various tasks in the paper? Are there other findings in the cited
paper that might complicate the picture the author of the review paper is painting?
1.9. Does the author evaluate the methods involved in the cited findings and state how they
constitute reliable pieces of information? Are there other aspects of the review that make up
for the lack of an assessment of the methods of the cited papers (if such a lack is present in
the review paper) such that the reliability of the cited findings remains intact?
1.10.

How is coincidence ruled out in the review paper? How are random errors and

alternative hypotheses ruled out?
1.11. Does the author include any contradictory or anomalous pieces of evidence? If yes, how
many findings fall under these categories? How are they dealt with, and does the author
provide sufficient reasons for why those anomalous findings can justifiably be dismissed?
1.12.

Does there review explicitly adhere to a standardized guideline (e.g., the Cochrane

Handbook)?
1.13.

If no such standardized guideline is used, does the author include a methods section

wherein they describe and justify the methods they use in their review.
1.14. Does the author describe their selection criteria and search process wherein they state
which journal databases they consulted, their criteria for inclusion and omission, etc.?
1.15. What measures does the author use to reduce risk of bias in the individual papers they
cite in the review?
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1.16. Does the author co-author any of the cited papers? If so, how many? How does this
potential risk of author bias factor into corroboration?
1.17. What methods does the author use to combine (i.e., synthesize) the findings in the review
paper? Is a meta-analysis involved or is the combining qualitative? If qualitative, how is the
combining justified? How are anomalous and/or contradictory findings factored into this
synthesis?
1.18. What kind of corroboration is represented in the review paper? Is it one of confirmation,
lending support, or something else?
1.19. Does the author include/flag any limitations their review may be subject to? Do they flag
any gaps in their arguments? Do they acknowledge any potentially complicating factors that
decrease the likelihood of their main claims being corroborated?
This list is meant to be read as a working framework. As I note, in section 4.4. of this chapter,
future research on different types of units of analysis will likely yield important implications for
this methodology (i.e., it may be the case that the list is expanded, certain questions are refined,
or that different types of units of analysis require their own methodology, thus resulting in a
plurality or a hierarchy of methodologies for evaluating corroboration in the mind-brain sciences,
etc.).

4.4 Questions and Directions for Future Research
This dissertation only begins to scratch the surface of the epistemic role of review papers for IC
in the mind-brain sciences. In this dissertation, I analyzed one specific case study; however, one
case study is not sufficient for drawing conclusive claims about the nature of IC and its relation
to scientific progress. Future projects might involve comparing multiple Trends reviews to
discern whether my findings were simply coincidental, then comparing a Trends review paper
with a systematic review paper to see whether and to what extent the additional component of a
methods and materials section increases the integrity of corroboration at play in the case study. I
see the next step of this process as looking at systematic reviews with meta-analysis.145 Another
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Review papers are one way to explore whether interdisciplinary evidence fits together in a way that
corroborates claims about the mind-brain. I conducted an analysis of a Trends review paper in my dissertation and
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project might be analyzing these units of analysis in the of context big data projects (e.g.,
BrainMap) and open science.
As qualitative (and quantitative) analysis software programs such as NVIVO12 develop over
time, a more fine-tuned analysis of the case study I analyze in this dissertation may also be
possible; this may result in a more nuanced definition of IC and a modified methodology for
evaluating review papers for corroboration.
As more research is conducted on the nature of IC and different units of analysis that do this
work, I suspect my current definition of IC will undergo refinement, and that my methodology
will similarly undergo revision. Moreover, I did not elaborate on the methodology I advance in
section 4.3 or provide different methodologies for assessing different types of units of analysis
for research synthesis. Perhaps, as more comparative analyses are conducted (e.g., a Trends
review paper with a systematic review, or a systematic review with a systematic review
including a meta-analysis, etc.), it might be revealed that a plurality of methodologies is best
suited for the task of evaluating different kinds of units of analysis that synthesize research
across different areas of science.
Another important question with respect to evaluating IC in the mind-brain sciences via units of
analysis such as review papers is whether the mind-brain sciences require their own distinct
guideline/handbook/checklist such as the Cochrane handbook for the health sciences. I noted in
my second chapter that the standards for organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration in the
health sciences are not applicable to the mind-brain sciences, in virtue of the latter synthesizing
information from a variety of areas of the mind-brain sciences, using different methods,
protocols, and techniques. As such, future research might involve the advocacy of such an
organization or list of criteria and identify what standards must change and why. In doing so,
one might look to the standards of organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration and identify

found that the pieces of interdisciplinary evidence in the case study did not fit together as neatly nor as clearly as
would be required for corroboration. I see the next stage of my research as systematically moving through various
units of analysis that appear to do the work required for IC; this includes units of analysis such as systematic
reviews with meta-analysis/various types of meta-analyses.
For a different view of where to look for the fitting together of interdisciplinary evidence, see Sullivan (2016), who
is skeptical of meta-analyses and thinks the best strategy is to look at actual ground-work practices in labs.
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whether any of their standards should be included in the criteria for writing reviews in the mindbrain sciences and which new ones need to be introduced in virtue of the mind-brain sciences
being distinct from disciplines like the health sciences.
Future research might also address the question of what aspects of scientific papers are being
cited in the review paper. That is, scientific research papers typically include detailed
descriptions of different tasks and the results of those tasks; there are frequently more than just
one very specific finding in a given scientific paper. For example, Buhusi and Meck (2005)
highlighted multiple brain structure/networks involved in numerous timing tasks; despite this,
Eichenbaum selectively focused on one vague aspect – i.e., the fact that there are multiple
sources of temporal information in the brain – while excluding information about the many areas
and networks in the brain that were activated during various timing tasks. One might therefore
investigate what parts of the cited scientific research papers are being included in the review in
question and what parts are omitted. This is an important question because it has the potential to
impact the corroboration of a given claim. If a claim states something along the lines of “the
hippocampus is the key structure involved in spatio-temporal memory”, and the author
selectively focuses on aspects of papers highlighting hippocampal activation while excluding
findings demonstrating activation in other areas, one might question just how epistemically
warranted that claim is. This leads to my final point.
Finally, future research might involve advocating for a methods section in future Trends review
papers. That is, especially if the review does not adhere to standardized guidelines such as those
included in the Cochrane handbook, the inclusion of a methods section wherein the author states
their selection criteria, defines their key terms, identifies their main claims, states how the studies
they cite were screened for bias and error in individual papers, etc., may help the reader better
assess the extent of corroboration in review papers, thereby increasing the integrity of the review
in question.
In sum, I demonstrated that a lack of definitions for critical terms like ‘substantial evidence’,
‘numerous studies’, ‘consistency’, etc., makes it difficult to assess the extent of corroboration at
play in the case study. This, in addition to a lack of adequate explanations for anomalous
findings and an evaluation of the methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites in support of
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claims 1-5 complicate the case study representing a clear case of IC. I showcased three
implications of my analysis. First, the assumption held by the accounts of progress I surveyed in
chapter one is complex and requires further philosophical analysis. Secondly, my working
definition as introduced in chapter two required revision; my new definition added that IC
required that interdisciplinary evidence be consistent in such a way that rules out coincidence,
errors, and alternative explanations. Thirdly, I argued that critical information was missing in
the case study to adequately assess the extent to which claims 1-5 were corroborated. I used the
lessons and the questions/concerns I addressed in this chapter to serve as criteria for my
methodology for evaluating review papers with an eye towards corroboration.
In the following chapter, I conclude my dissertation by re-capitulating my main aim, how I
achieved it, the results of my analysis, as well as how I think my results generalize out into other
areas of philosophy and science.
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Chapter 5
5 Conclusion
My goal in this dissertation was to analyze what it means for information from different areas of
science to fit together in such a way that results in strong epistemic claims by addressing the
question of how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific
practice.
To address how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific
practice, I began by establishing the relevant historical and motivational background for my
dissertation in chapter one. This involved surveying a number of reductionist (Nagel 1949,
1961, 1979; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006) and non-reductionist accounts (Darden and Maull, 1977;
Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; Darden 2006; Roskies 2010; Piccinini and
Craver 2011) of scientific progress emphasizing the notion of fitting for claims about the mindbrain to stand on firm epistemic footing. I noted that while they all concede that interdisciplinary
evidence must fit together to produce strong epistemic claims, each notion of fitting together
(e.g., ruthless reduction for Bickle (2003, 2006), ‘convergence’ for Roskies (2010), etc.)) was
vague in that it was unclear from their accounts and their examples what it meant for pieces to fit
together in such a way that ‘conclusive evidence’ is provided for a claim about the mind-brain
(Roskies 2010, 641).
To better understand how evidence fits together to yield strong epistemic claims, I introduced the
term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ (hereafter IC) as a general placeholder for what I think
philosophers of science have been gesturing towards, but which has yet to be clearly articulated
and analyzed in chapter two. My working definition of IC stated findings corroborate claims
about the mind-brain when they all point towards a general claim and when said findings are
interdisciplinary, consistent, and mutually supportive. The accounts of progress I survey in
chapter one all claim that the fitting together of interdisciplinary evidence results in epistemically
strong claims; implicit in their accounts is an argument that claims about the mind-brain (e.g., the
frontal region is involved in semantic processing (Roskies 2010, 641)) are corroborated by the
fitting together of interdisciplinary evidence. For this reason, I introduced IC as a general
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placeholder for these accounts to facilitate my analysis of how interdisciplinary evidence fits
together to corroborate claims about the mind-brain.
Since my definition of IC was introduced as a working definition, it required further analysis to
better understand the nature of IC in the mind-brain sciences. To better understand how IC
functions to corroborate claims about the mind-brain, I suggested looking for instances of it in
practice. I argued that a good place to start assessing IC in practice was by looking at review
papers, which are units of analysis surveying literature from a variety of disciplines on a given
topic. Some review papers simply contain a literature review; however, many review papers also
contain arguments (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit). These arguments can involve
showing how a given claim about the mind-brain is supported by the evidence cited in the review
paper (i.e., showing how the interdisciplinary evidence fits together to corroborate a claim about
the mind-brain). Review papers are therefore ideal units of analysis to begin investigating the
nature of IC and addressing the extent to which corroboration occurs in these papers.
To address the questions of how and to what extent corroboration of claims about the mind-brain
occur in review papers, I conducted a two-part analysis in chapters three and four of a case study
of a Trends review paper entitled ‘Memory on Time’ by Eichenbaum (2013).
I began my analysis with some cursory criteria. That is, I came to the table with a general
understanding of how Trends reviews function through my descriptive work in chapter two.
Further, my analysis was guided by cursory criteria such as the following questions: “what is the
main aim of the review”, “what claims does Eichenbaum defend”, “how does Eichenbaum show
support for his claims”, “what kind of arguments does Eichenbaum provide”, and “does the case
study represent IC”? My analysis in chapter three, guided by this criteria and knowledge of
Trends review papers, was structured around the work Eichenbaum did in the case study to
support claims 1-5. I stated Eichenbaum’s arguments for claims 1-5 were implicit and that his
implicit arguments hinged on terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘consistency’ (Eichenbaum
2013, 82-84, 86). That is, claims 1-5 are corroborated insofar as they are supported and
suggested by ‘substantial evidence’ consisting of findings from different areas of the mind-brain
sciences, on different species, using different tasks and methods of analysis, all of which are
consistent with each other and its associated claim. An analysis of the language used in the case
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study revealed that the kind of corroboration at play was one where claims 1-5 are best
understood as being highly probable, but not full-stop true. I further argued that because the
cited findings were published in mind-brain science journals with high impact factors and
citation numbers, the cited findings appear to constitute reliable sources of information. This
increases the strength of corroboration in the case study. On a first pass, the case study appeared
to represent a strong case of IC.
However, my analysis structured around what Eichenbaum does to support claims 1-5 gave rise
to questions and concerns such as: “what counts as substantial evidence”, “what is meant by
consistency in the case study”, and “how are anomalies factored into the findings supporting
claims 1-5”. These questions led me to ask how well the case study represented IC after all.
I used these questions to guide the second part of my analysis, which I conducted in chapter four.
While my analysis in chapter three focused on the work Eichenbaum did to support claims 1-5,
my analysis in chapter four focused on what was absent in the case study. That is, definitions for
key terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘consistent with’ were lacking; because Eichenbaum’s
arguments for claims 1-5 implicitly depend on these terms, it is crucial to understand how
Eichenbaum uses these terms. However, because Eichenbaum provides no definitions or
explanations of these terms, it is challenging to evaluate the extent to which claims 1-5 have
been corroborated. Further, because the anomalous findings introduced in the case study are
inadequately addressed/explained by Eichenbaum, it is unclear how all the cited findings fit
together; Eichenbaum does not tell us. In elaborating on these three questions, I noticed another
aspect missing in the case study was an evaluation of the methods used by the cited findings;
because of this, it is hard to discern whether the methods used in the cited papers are reliable. If
the methods used by the cited papers were unsound, the cited findings would comprise unreliable
pieces of information, thus discrediting or putting pressure on the corroboration of claims 1-5.
Taken together, these questions and the concerns they raise complicated the case study
representing a clear case of IC.
I then stepped back from the analysis in the second half of chapter four to showcase three key
lessons emerging from the analysis. The first lesson is that the fundamental assumptions shared
by both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress I surveyed in chapter one – i.e.,
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that epistemically strong claims are the result of evidence from different areas of science fitting
together – is complex and not nearly as straightforward as the literature makes it out to be. The
second lesson is that my working definition of IC needed to be revised. IC should now be
understood as a phenomenon whereby findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain insofar
as they are interdisciplinary, and mutually supportive/consistent in such a way that rules out
coincidence, errors, and alternative hypotheses, and all point towards a similar claim. The third
lesson from my analysis is that certain critical pieces of information were missing to adequately
assess the extent to which claims 1-5 were corroborated. I used the missing information and the
concerns that arose during my analysis of the case study to advance a methodology for
evaluating review papers in the mind-brain sciences for corroboration.
The contributions of my dissertation to philosophy of the mind-brain sciences are twofold. First,
I demonstrated that a fundamental assumption shared by numerous accounts of progress in the
philosophy of the mind-brain sciences – i.e., that epistemically strong claims are the result of
evidence from different areas of science fitting together – was not as clear as the literature
presumed it to be. Accordingly, I showcased that more philosophical attention is required to
better understand how interdisciplinary pieces of evidence fit together to corroborate claims
about the mind-brain. I began this work by advancing the concept of IC and analyzing a case
study of a review paper to start to get a handle on how IC works in practice. My analysis
revealed critical information was missing in the case study to properly determine whether and to
what extent its claims were corroborated. The implications of this for philosophers of the mindbrain sciences interested in knowledge production is that more work needs to be conducted on
different units of analysis that function to corroborate claims about the mind-brain (such as
comparing a Trends review with a Frontiers review, or a Frontiers review with a review with
meta-analyses, etc.). The more research conducted on the different units of analysis that function
to corroborate claims about the mind-brain, the more one can elaborate and fine-tune both my
working definition of IC as well as the methodology I advance to evaluate review papers for
corroboration. The point is not that the assumption held by reductionist and non-reductionist
accounts of progress is false; instead, my contribution is to demonstrate that the assumption
(which to date has been under-analyzed and unquestioned) is complex, and that future research
should continue to examine this assumption and its implications for knowledge production and
scientific progress.
137

My second contribution to the philosophy of the mind-brain sciences is the methodology I
advance in my fourth chapter for evaluating review papers for corroboration. That is, if
philosophers of the mind-brain sciences are interested in how claims about the mind-brain are
corroborated by evidence from different areas of science, there are certain questions and
concerns that should be addressed in assessing the corroboration of claims in units of analysis
such as review papers. My methodology outlines the questions and concerns I deem important to
be addressed in evaluating the corroboration of claims in review papers.
It should be acknowledged my methodology is meant to be a working framework. My hope is
that as more research is conducted, my methodology will become more fine-tuned. One
limitation of my methodology is that since the dissertation is the beginning of what will
hopefully be an ongoing investigation of the role of IC in the mind-brain sciences, my
methodology pertains primarily to Trends review papers. Future research might address how
different kinds of units of analysis corroborate claims about the mind-brain. For example, such
projects might involve examining a systematic review, or comparing a Trends review paper with
a systematic review, or comparing reviews with different types of meta-analyses, etc. As these
units of analysis involve different components (i.e., some include meta-analysis, some do not;
some include a methods section, some do not, etc.), it may turn out that a plurality of
methodologies for approaching IC in the mind-brain sciences is necessary.
More generally, my dissertation has implications for philosophy of science and empirically
engaged philosophy of mind. With respect to the former, other areas of science similarly draw
on interdisciplinary evidence to corroborate claims. For example, multiple pieces of evidence
from cosmology, chemistry, and particle physics come together to corroborate the existence of
dark matter.146 Here, one might ask whether and to what extent these pieces of evidence
corroborate the existence of dark matter. To address this, one might consider various units of
analysis demonstrating the corroboration of dark matter and appeal to some of the questions I
flag in my methodology to evaluate whether the hypothesis about the existence of dark matter
has been corroborated. Conversely, one might appeal to this list to evaluate alternative theories
concerning dark matter such as the Modified Newtonian Dynamics theory and the Tensor-
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I am grateful to Dr. Marie Gueguen for this point.

138

Vector-Scalar gravity theory.147 Appealing to my methodology in other areas of science outside
the mind-brain sciences may therefore help assess units of analysis for the corroboration (or lack
thereof) of dark matter hypotheses in physics.148
My dissertation also has implications for empirically engaged philosophy of mind. That is, in
the philosophy of mind, philosophers sometimes appeal to empirical research on a given topic in
order to argue for (or against) a philosophical position. For example, in their paper ‘Neural
Plasticity and Consciousness’, Hurley and Noë (2003) argue for a dynamic sensorimotor account
of consciousness that allegedly bridges some versions of the explanatory gap problem. In
arguing for their account of consciousness and how it solves some explanatory gap problems,
Hurley and Noë appeal to scientific evidence to support the main claims behind their account. I
will not get into the specifics of their arguments, nor how it deals with explanatory gap problems,
but instead want to highlight the fact that their account of consciousness hinges on empirical
work on neural plasticity demonstrating that the cortex both dominates (here they cite
Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998) and defers (here they cite
Buchel et al. 1998; Cohen et al. 1997; Sadato et al. 1996, 1998) (Hurley and Noë 2003, 133134).
Since their account depends on this cited empirical evidence, if a philosopher of mind wanted to
argue against Hurley and Noë’s account, a crucial step would be demonstrating that the empirical
evidence upon which their account is based is weak. Using some of the questions I outline in my
methodology might help the reader better assess the empirical literature for strong epistemic
claims, therefore making a stronger case against Hurley and Noë (2003) if it turns out that the
papers they cite and their respective findings are not well-established. Conversely, a philosopher
of mind might appeal to my methodology to identify strong empirical claims from review papers
and cite those to support some of their own arguments about the mind.
In sum, via my analysis of Eichenbaum’s (2003) ‘Memory on Time’, I demonstrated that pieces
of evidence may not fit together as neatly as one would require for the corroboration of a claim.
This does not entail that the assumption that strong conclusions require evidence from multiple
147
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fields of science is false, but that the assumption is complex and requires more philosophical
attention to better understand how claims are corroborated in the mind-brain sciences. The
methodology I advance at the end of chapter four is meant as a guide for philosophers of science
to better assess the epistemic strength of claims emerging out of review papers. Future research
will help expand on this methodology as more work on the nature of IC is conducted.
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